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# THE RUSSIAN REVIEW



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Devoted to Russia  
Past and Present*

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General

Japan

# THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

An American Journal Devoted to Russia  
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# American-Russian Cooperation

BY WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

**T**O CONVINCE the majority of Americans of the desirability, of the necessity of cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union, not only in war but in peace, is to beat on an open door. It is obvious that, assuming a total defeat of the Axis, Russia will rank with the United States and the British Empire as one of the three surviving great powers. China will share in the victory, and possesses a vast industrious population, great area, and one of the world's oldest civilizations. But its industrial development is still too slight to permit China to compete with the other three major powers in terms of military force. France will require time to recover from the shock of the 1940 disaster and the subsequent years of hunger and humiliation.

For two decades after the Revolution and the subsequent Civil War, the United States and the Soviet Union, those two vast continental land powers, lived almost on separate planets. There was a limited amount of trade, very small in relation to the total volume of American foreign trade, most intensive during the period of the First Five Year Plan, rather negligible during the later thirties.

American construction firms and individual engineers and technicians helped to build many of the big new Russian factories and electrical power plants. But this form of aid tapered off very markedly after the new generation of Russian engineers and specialists began to master the technique of operating the new factories. The atmosphere of the purge during the later thirties was very unfavorable to foreigners, and the number of American residents in Russia was very small in the years before the outbreak of the Soviet-German War.

Despite the Hollywood exaggerations of "Mission to Moscow" there was very little substantial and significant Russian-American diplomatic contact until the two countries discovered a common interest in defeating Nazi Germany. Formal diplomatic relations between Moscow and Washington were only established in 1933. Widely separated by geography, except in the desolate, almost uninhabited Arctic wastes of Alaska and Eastern Siberia, still more

profoundly separated by differences of historical background, national traditions, and political and economic institutions, the United States and the Soviet Union lived very much to themselves, with little official or unofficial contact, during the interval between the two World Wars.

It is hardly possible that this state of affairs will return after the end of the present conflict. The elimination of Germany and Japan as major powers will leave a kind of vacuum in large areas of East Asia and Central and Eastern Europe which Russia may well begin to fill. American and Russian interests will impinge over a much wider geographical area than has been the case in the past. The overwhelming probability is that America's relations with the Soviet Union will become either much better or much worse after the end of the war, that the eventless passivity which characterized American-Soviet dealings during most of the twenty-years period between the end of the Russian Civil War and the German invasion will not be reproduced.

There are some favorable auguries for a cordial entente between the two countries. Soviet prestige in the United States has never stood so high as at the present time. Tributes that are generous, sometimes to the point of extravagance, have been lavished on the Soviet Union by high public officials and widely read commentators. American aid to the Soviet Union in lend-lease material has passed the figure of two and a half billion dollars and has been supplemented by considerable contributions in money, clothing, food, and medicines through the Red Cross and various humanitarian organizations. Even individuals who maintain a critical attitude toward the philosophy of communism and toward many Soviet administrative practices recognize, practically without exception, the need for military cooperation against Germany and the desirability of post-war political collaboration.

As further favorable factors for such collaboration one must recognize the complete absence, in the past and in the present, of territorial designs of either country against the other and the freedom from serious conflict of national interest that has marked the history of Russian-American relations in the past.

Public opinion in Russia about America is more difficult to gauge than American public opinion about Russia. But it is the general testimony of correspondents and other Americans who have visited Russia since the outbreak of the war that, whatever suspicious restraints may be imposed by officialdom, the average Russian is friendly in his attitude toward Americans and appreciative of the

help which America has given to Russia in its struggle against invasion.

Yet, in spite of all these favorable elements in the situation, it cannot be said that visible political cooperation between the Soviet Union, on one side, and the United States and Great Britain, on the other, has progressed at a rate comparable with the military advance of the Red Army on the Eastern Front and of the Anglo-American forces in the Mediterranean. This is being written before the reported conference of American, British, and Russian representatives. But, if only as a matter of historical record, one must note, along with such a favorable development as the dissolution of the Communist International, a number of disquieting features in the Soviet attitude toward the Western powers. These features may be listed briefly as follows:

Stalin's persistent absence from the councils of the Western powers. The recall of the two most Western-minded of Soviet diplomats, Maxim Litvinov from Washington and Ivan Maisky from London. Repeated sniping, in the strictly controlled Soviet press, at the military policies pursued by the United States and Great Britain. A rather ostentatious lack of confidence reflected in an unwillingness to share military knowledge and technical discoveries with accredited Allied representatives and in refusing to accord adequate opportunities for observation at the front to American and British attachés. The breach of relations with the Polish government-in-exile and the setting up in Moscow, without any diplomatic coordination with the Western powers, of the so-called Union of Polish Patriots, the possible nucleus of a future Polish puppet government, and of a Free Germany Committee.

When one considers the significance of these developments, one can scarcely escape the conclusion that Stalin, up to the present time, has been, for all practical purposes, waging a separate war militarily and, still more, politically and diplomatically. It is, I think, quite absurd to follow the example of certain commentators and attribute all responsibility for the unsatisfactory state of American-Soviet political relations to so-called "reaction" in the American State Department. The full record is, of course, not yet available. But I think there are reliable indications that more friendly overtures have emanated from Washington than from Moscow.

There are certain objective reasons, rooted in differences of governmental psychology and political institutions, why the path to full agreement and understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union is neither simple nor easy. One can distinguish three

sets of problems that exist as between the two countries, and that will undoubtedly require more than one conference for complete and satisfactory adjustment.

1. Post-war boundaries and post-war reconstruction. Stalin has put forward as a minimum territorial claim in Europe the restoration of the Soviet frontier of 1941, including the formerly independent republics, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia; a part of Finland; about half of the former territory of Poland; and the regions of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, which formerly belonged to Rumania.

There would probably be little objection to Russia's acquisition of Bessarabia, which Rumania seized without any fair plebiscite during a period of Russian weakness and internal chaos after the First World War. Stalin's other claims, however, present awkward moral questions, in the light of the Atlantic Charter and the frequent professions by the United Nations' leaders of respect for the rights of small nations.

The Soviet Union, at its own initiative, recognized the frontiers of Poland, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia by concluding pacts of non-aggression and neutrality with these countries in the early thirties. The Soviet-Finnish frontier, as it existed before it was forcibly changed in 1940, was fair ethnographically. It would be rather fantastic to suggest that Finland, with a population about equal to that of Leningrad, would have either the will or the power to threaten the Soviet Union.

This same observation would hold good as regards the three small Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Perhaps a compromise solution could be found insuring Russia's security by permitting the maintenance of Soviet or United Nations air and naval bases in the Baltic States, while leaving the latter free in matters of internal administration.

The case of the former Eastern provinces of Poland is more complicated. Since Poland was the first country that resisted Hitler's aggression, it is easy to understand the bitter reluctance of Polish statesmen to recognize the legal or moral validity of a sweeping Soviet annexation of Polish territory which was carried out in agreement with Hitler in 1939 as a new partition of Poland.

The question of Poland's eastern boundary is also complicated because a large part of the population in the disputed area is ethnically Ukrainian and White Russian. The Ukrainians in Galicia, having lived first under Austrian, then under Polish rule, have developed under quite different conditions from the Ukrainians in Soviet

Ukraina, with their experience first of Russian, then of Soviet rule. Here again, an agreed settlement, which should correspond so far as possible with the will of the local population, would certainly be preferable to an arbitrary annexation.

The publicity which has been given to the Free Germany Committee that was set up in Moscow last July has aroused some apprehension as to a divergence of war aims as between Stalin, on one side, and Roosevelt and Churchill, on the other. This apprehension has perhaps been exaggerated. It would be in the common interest of the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain to see a Germany deprived of the will and power to carry on aggression, but capable of making its important economic and cultural contribution to European civilization. There is nothing in the program of the Free Germany Committee that is inconsistent with this objective.

What settlement Stalin may desire in the Far East and what may be the Soviet leader's ideas on such questions as international limitation of armaments, collective security, organization of a peaceful world order are subjects for speculation. One has no recent official pronouncements on which to base a definite opinion.

2. The existence in Moscow of the Communist International, an international revolutionary organization which enjoyed the full support and participation of the Soviet government, was for many years a serious obstacle to close and confidential cooperation between the Soviet Union and other states. No one familiar with the highly centralized character of the Soviet régime could doubt for a moment that the Soviet government was in fact, if not in form, identified with all important activities of the International. It would not conceivably have tolerated in its capital the presence of an international organization which it did not fully control.

Now doctrinaire communism has receded as an obstacle to normal Soviet-American relations. The Communist International has been dissolved. A much stronger guaranty of the laying of the spectre of Russian-sponsored social revolutions in other countries is the very interesting swing toward social conservatism in the Soviet Union. The present Communist ruling class in that country, profoundly changed both in personnel and in psychology, is scarcely able to place itself at the head of an authentically proletarian revolutionary movement in another country.

However, it still remains to be proved whether the organic connection between Moscow and the Communist parties in other countries has been severed. While a democratic country can have no objection to Communists as advocates of certain theories of social and



economic reconstruction, it has every reason to object to them as the organized fifth column of a foreign state. Stalin could make no greater contribution to international pacification and good will than the complete breaking off of any form of support and subsidization of Communist movements abroad.

3. Certain problems of Russian-American relations are rooted in the differing historical traditions and political institutions of the two countries. The free give-and-take that is possible between unofficial groups of Americans and citizens of other democracies is not feasible with Russians so long as the dictatorship remains.

America cannot attempt to influence Russia's line of political development, just as America would resent any Russian attempt to interfere in its political affairs. But it would be unrealistic not to recognize that the absence in Russia of the right of free criticism of the government and of uninhibited discussion of public affairs imposes certain limitations on the creation of an international public opinion as between Russia and foreign countries.

America will succeed best in establishing a *modus vivendi* with the Soviet Union if it avoids two undesirable extremes. International affairs cannot be conducted on the basis of a country club. It would be unwise and unjustifiable to reject any possibility of useful cooperation with the Soviet Union because certain acts and administrative practices in the Soviet Union are alien to American traditions.

At the same time America should not act as if it were a twelfth Soviet Republic. The maintenance of practical working relations with the Soviet régime emphatically should not require any abdication of freedom of critical judgment, any renunciation of historical objectivity on the part of Americans in discussing Soviet actions and institutions.

A realistic American policy toward the Soviet Union will be cool and level-headed, unconcerned about minor pin-pricks, but firm on major questions of principle. It is on such a basis, not on a basis of spite and prejudice, or of all-out "appeasement," that Soviet respect will be won and a fruitful collaboration established.

There are three principles which may well serve as touchstones for the future character of American-Soviet relations. These are:

No predatory imperialism, no annexation of foreign territory without the clearly and unmistakably expressed desire of the majority of the people concerned.

No interference in the internal affairs of the other country.

Sincere effort to cooperate in the great postwar tasks of restoring devastated areas, creating an atmosphere of peace and security, limit-



ing the burden of armaments.

The best interests of the peoples, both of the United States and of the Soviet Union, will be advanced by the faithful observance of these principles. If both governments endeavor to implement these principles, there will be a wide field for American-Soviet cooperation, despite the marked difference which will almost certainly exist for a long time to come in the political and economic institutions of the two countries. In so far as there are deviations from these principles, whether on the American or on the Soviet side, the prospects of American-Soviet understanding and of future world peace will be darkened.

# Alexander I and His League To End Wars

By O. J. FREDERIKSEN

FROM the time when Russia became a great power, she has faced the same alternatives between a narrow nationalism and a world view of her mission as that which has since the turn of the century bedevilled the United States; and one can find, particularly in the period of the French Revolution and its Napoleonic aftermath, a number of peculiarly apt parallels with the struggle which has now for twenty-five years been going on in America between the national introverts and the extraverts. As in the case of American internationalists now, there has also been perennially raised the question as to whether Russia's foreign interests should be based upon the lone wolf policy, or upon a cooperative plan—a league of nations.

Just as Hitler did not create the problem for the United States but merely aggravated a condition dating as far back as the Monroe Doctrine, so too did the similar quandary of Russia long antedate the advent of Napoleon in Moscow. Its beginnings may be placed with the partition of Poland, which for the first time threw Russia into close contact with the Great Powers of Central Europe, with whom she thenceforth had to deal on a basis either of armed isolation or of some degree of participation, through a balance of power or a Pan-European concert. Catherine the Great and her predecessors had removed Poland as a buffer, but it was her son Paul who took the first definite step toward deep involvement in Europe by sending Suvorov to crush the hydra of revolution—the Hitlerism of the time. It is highly interesting that this action was not spontaneous but was taken after long delay—isolationism—in response to the appeal for a Concert of Europe issued by Count Kaunitz of Austria on July 17, 1791, in which he declared that it was the duty of all the powers to make common cause for preserving “public peace, the tranquillity of States, the inviolability of possessions, and the faith of treaties.”

When Russia felt that her "unselfish" efforts to maintain the status quo were being used by Austria and England to further their private ends, Austria in Switzerland and Great Britain in Malta, Suvorov was recalled; and this experiment in concerted action came to an unhappy end. By this time, too, Napoleon had returned to France from Egypt, had overthrown the Directory, and by appearing to be, at least for foreign consumption, the champion of conservatism and the friend of peace, had convinced Paul that there was no need for further united intervention. One might perhaps compare this return to isolationism with Hitler's success in convincing the world that he was the true enemy of communist revolution while he was in fact instituting a far more radical and dangerous overturn of much the same pattern. In any case, Paul became converted to the idea that Russians need not preserve their strength for European purposes but could freely expand eastward, in what Russians at the time might have spoken of as following their "national" interests as opposed to "generous" sacrifices for the cause of European comity. As is well known, Russian Cossacks were actually on their way to India when Paul was assassinated.

The young and impressionable Alexander I came to the throne in 1801 with liberal ideas of international generosity, largely acquired from the teachings of his tutor, Cesar Frederick La Harpe, a Swiss friend of Rousseau, and from his Polish boyhood companion, Adam Czartoryski. Although it is possible that English intrigue was at least partially responsible for having replaced the pro-French and anti-English Paul with Alexander, there was no immediate pressure to force the new Emperor to do more than call a halt to the invasion of India—orders for which went out the night that Paul was assassinated. Europe still seemed to need no policing; and the fact that the immediate neighbors of France were willing to make peace with her, at Lunéville in 1801, and at Amiens in 1802, appeared to show Russia, as the Munich agreement did America, that there was no immediate place for anything but a lone hand.

Alexander's first aim in foreign affairs was thus to maintain peace while he grappled with the tremendous problems of internal corruption and disorganization in administration, as America welcomed in Munich an opportunity to forget Hitler and finish the fight with domestic depression. Like most Americans a few years ago, he had had little experience in practical politics, and possessed little conception of the sacrifices needed in a turbulent world to carry out so evidently reasonable an idea as international peace and good will. Peace, he said, would be declared wherever there was war, and

justice and good will would replace the greedy policies of Catherine and the mad whims of Paul. "The Emperor's two ideas are peace and economy," wrote Joseph de Maistre in 1803. And as Alexander told Napoleon's envoy and repeated to his own ambassador in France, he did not wish to interfere in the domestic affairs of anyone, and each country had the right to give itself the kind of government that it preferred.

The energetic and ambitious Napoleon, egged onward by the enthusiasm of a middle class to whom the French Revolution had opened up rich prospects of commercial expansion, was delighted, and promptly began to gather into his fold the neighboring German states. By 1803 Alexander was beginning to have some qualms regarding his program of complete isolation, and was intimating to Napoleon's envoy, Duroc, that although he was a great admirer of Napoleon and was willing to concede him all that he had conquered, still he must warn Napoleon to have at least some regard for appearances, since the lesser princes of Europe were beginning to look to Russia as a guarantor of their rights, such a guarantee having been assumed by the Treaty of Teschen in 1779. One might almost compare Roosevelt's Chicago speech of warning against aggressors with Alexander's description of himself as "the born protector of the weak and the oppressed."

Matters came to a head when in 1804 Napoleon gave all Europe a rude shock by the assassination of the Duke of Enghien, heir to the throne of France, and by his assumption of the ambitious title of Emperor. England dropped her attitude of unconcern with a shriek of anguish and sent out to all the courts of Europe a frantic appeal for concerted action. For Russia there was now no question as to the need for action, but in its place there appeared the problem of the basis for action. Should the coming alliance be founded upon the negative principle of stopping Napoleon, or could it look to a more farsighted program of permanent international cooperation for the maintenance of peace? Could the common danger created by Napoleon be used for putting an end to European anarchy and for the initiation of "a new era of justice and right in European politics?"

In attacking this problem Alexander was no doubt largely guided by the teachings of the French *philosophes* regarding the need of international arbitration and European confederation as a means of putting an end to the destructive wars which were then, as now, the obvious and inevitable result of purely national freedom of action. And behind the French *philosophes* lay a long history of similar

thought. Rousseau's "Project for Perpetual Peace" was the immediate model for his planning; but La Harpe could have pointed out to him a dozen like proposals including those of Dante (*De Monarchia*, c. 1313), Emeric Crucé (*Le Nouveau Cynée*, 1623), Hugo Grotius (*On the Law of War and Peace*, 1625), William Penn (*Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe*, 1693), and Gottfried von Leibniz (1715). It was a part of the climate of opinion created by the intellectuals and pamphleteers of Alexander's boyhood that Europe was something finer than a mere congeries of independent and perpetually quarreling states, and that the ancient unity of the Roman Empire had been handed down through the long centuries in a common body of customs and laws, morals, and religion. Leaders of thought, French and German alike—Voltaire, Kant, Rousseau, Fichte, Goethe—were at the close of the eighteenth century ardent internationalists. With such precedents Alexander's eager mind, said Czartoryski, could roam delightedly over the face of the earth without need of immediate decision or action.

The English call to stop Napoleon demanded something more specific, and Alexander hastily approved a set of proposals prepared either by the Abbé Piattoli or by Adam Czartoryski, but known as the Novosiltsev instructions, since it was the young envoy of this name who was ordered to carry the plan to England. The heart of the proposals was the formation at the close of the war of a single confederation of independent states through "a general treaty which might become the basis of the reciprocal relations between the States of Europe." A revised system of international law should provide for the settlement of conflicts by a process of mediation. Backing the enforcement of the law would be the threat of attack upon law-breakers by the forces of the new union. Woodrow Wilson's League of Nations was hardly more than a detailed elaboration of the Novosiltsev instructions.

It is interesting, in view of the repressions of which the post-war Concert of Europe was guilty, to note that the Novosiltsev proposals dealt with the relation of internal reform to world stability. Member states were to abandon their absolute governments and to adopt constitutions, probably because in the experience of France autocracy had led first to the expansionist ambitions of Louis XIV and then to the inflamed passions of the French Revolution, and had thus created Napoleon. France was to be ringed with a group of powerful barrier states—an enlarged Kingdom of Sardinia, an extended Switzerland, and an independent Holland, all made stable through constitutional



government. The Balkans, then as now the powder keg of Europe, should be prevented from becoming a source of discord by a decision beforehand rather than after the war as to the disposal to be made of the Turkish possessions if Turkey—an old ally of France—should be partitioned; and in any case the Christian subjects of the Sultan should be given some protection against oppression.

Although Alexander's advisers cautioned him that there was little hope that England, with her traditional policy of independence of action based upon her fleet and the manipulation of a European balance of power, would accept any long term commitments, he "refused to be discouraged" and went ahead with his proposals. Pitt's reply was in general favorable, and even contained a suggestion that the eventual league be implemented with definite obligations for mutual support against disturbers of the peace. However, war broke out before further details could be decided upon, so that the actual alliance against Napoleon was of the usual military type, with merely a vague provision for a joint Anglo-Russian guarantee of peace after the war.

In this and later alliances the allies, one after another, were defeated, although Alexander continued in vain to oppose Napoleon's attractive program of a Europe in which troublesome boundaries would be abolished and unity provided by a European civil equality with a program of liberal federation of national states. Too late, the Convention of Bartenstein made with Prussia in 1807 announced that the alliance was formed with the purpose of "rendering to humanity the benefits of a general and solid peace established on the basis of a state of possession finally assured to every power and put under a joint guarantee." It was immediately after this announcement that Prussia and Russia were beaten by Napoleon, and Alexander was forced—at least publicly—to abandon his plans for a federated Europe in favor of a "national" program in the East while allowing Napoleon to do as he would with the West. Whatever his real intentions were, he succeeded in concealing them and in convincing Napoleon that there was nothing further to fear from the direction of Russia. "I have just seen the Emperor Alexander," wrote Napoleon to Josephine. "I am very well pleased with him; he is a very handsome, well-intentioned and young Emperor." Even Alexander, according to those about him, seemed to be genuinely satisfied that Russia could gain more from an alliance with Napoleon, with tangible results in the acquisition of territory from Turkey, than through a vain attempt to establish world peace in cooperation with the selfish and undependable enemies of Napoleon.



The new arrangement, as Stalin discovered of Russia's more recent truce with the Napoleon of 1941, was unsuccessful almost from the start. England was still in the war, and with the prospect of fresh activity against France, was eager to have Russia abandon her neutrality for a new alliance. The difficult problem of the fate of Poland had not been clearly settled, or even that of the Balkan provinces; and, finally, Napoleon's program for a self-sufficient European continent dominated by French merchants and manufacturers could not succeed as long as the important Russian market was outside its control, while for the Russians the Continental blockade directed against England spelled ruin. Much has been written of the dissatisfaction of Russian court circles over their inability to receive the wines and other luxuries formerly imported by way of England, but a much more real source of suffering was the desperate depression of the agriculture upon which the upper classes of Russia lived. During the five years beginning in 1801, Russian grain exports had totalled 174,558 tons; but in the five year period between 1806 and 1810, they had practically disappeared, dropping to 29,000 tons. This loss is quite sufficient to explain the violent opposition of Russian court circles, made up of landed proprietors, to Napoleon and all his ways. The only Russian group to benefit was the manufacturers, and in Alexander's time these were few and far between. As to government finances, the national deficit jumped from a little over 26 million rubles in 1807 to about 143 millions in 1809.

As in the case of the quarrel of Hitler with Stalin, it was Russian stubbornness and not Russian aggression that began the war; and Napoleon, like Hitler, hoped to bring Russia firmly into the circle of his empire by a swift blitzkrieg, which, even if it did not win an immediate victory, would at least destroy the Russian army and make possible a conquest at leisure.

It had been quite possible for Napoleon to misjudge the tremendous vitality of national feeling in Europe in spite of the growth of nationalism within France itself during the course of the French Revolution. His first experience had been with Germany; and in Germany, with its three hundred little states, there was very little patriotism, local or national, to be found in the period of Napoleon's first conquests. As late as 1804 and 1805 the popular lecturer Fichte was asserting that "The Christian Europeans are essentially but one people; they recognize this common Europe as their one true Fatherland, and, from one end of it to the other, pursue nearly the same purposes and are ever actuated by similar motives." But a few years later the Spanish defeat of the hitherto unbeaten French

troops was showing that in some countries a vital nationalism did exist, and even in Germany the internationalism of leaders like Fichte began to fade before a powerful national enthusiasm, which Fichte himself expressed in new lectures appropriately named "Addresses to the German Nation." The impressionable Alexander suddenly realized afresh that Napoleon's internationalism based upon civil liberties could be combatted by the idea of a union of free nations patterned after the Novosiltsev instructions, much as Wilson could combine in the Fourteen Points the apparently conflicting longings for self-determination and interdependence.

Time did not permit the formulation of a project for European Confederation, and the war went on with the allies still bound in a purely military alliance. But in the closing stages of the struggle a broader agreement for cooperation was created in the Treaty of Chaumont, dated March 1, 1814, the first of the many treaties against Napoleon to look boldly ahead to a common policy for the postwar period. It contained a provision for a mutual guarantee of "defensive measures for the protection of their respective territories in Europe against all attempts on the part of France to trouble the results of this pacification," was to be binding for at least twenty years, and was to be renewable. In comparison with the implied international order of the Novosiltsev instructions it was a narrow federation indeed, but in its provisions for a mutual guarantee it provided at least a beginning.

The Treaty of Chaumont might easily have been forgotten by history, as it was in fact forgotten by the allies when they shortly afterward signed the Treaty of Paris, which was a return to dealing with the things of the immediate present. But Napoleon saved the long term union by escaping from Elba and frightening the allies into a new spirit of unity. When the crisis of the Hundred Days had been brought to an end by the battle of Waterloo, the powers were ready to sign a new agreement to provide for the policing of Europe for an extended period; this was done in the so-called Treaty of Alliance, November 20, 1815. The original proposal for this treaty was one made by Alexander on the basis of his oft-repeated effort to create a permanent and effective league, but England was unwilling to enter upon unlimited obligations of an international nature. While the preamble stated hopefully that the purpose of the alliance was to establish a constitutional monarchy in France, and to "preserve this fortunate union of the Powers for this result of common interest," in fact the treaty merely contained an arrangement for meetings at fixed intervals with the vague purpose of

studying "great common objects" and examining "such measures as shall be judged most salutary for the peace and prosperity of Europe." The Treaty of Chaumont and the Treaty of Alliance did, however, contain the organizing principles of the Quadruple Alliance, which in turn was the legal foundation of the Concert of Europe.

To Alexander these agreements appeared to be far too narrow in scope to serve as the constitution of a permanent and secure international order. He approved them as being better than nothing, but immediately set to work to extend them along the lines of the old instructions to Novosiltsev. And by now he was working with new enthusiasm, for his political views in favor of a strong internationalism had become fortified by a deep religious conviction of the blasphemy of civil and international war. This conviction had already appeared in the phrasing of the Treaty of Kalisch of 1813, mentioned above, but it received definitive expression in the Holy Alliance.

Castlereagh called the Holy Alliance "a piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense," and Metternich "a loud sounding nothing." Although signed two months before, it was not even mentioned in the Treaty of Alliance. Later generations have classed it with the world's great futilities, side by side with the Kellogg-Briand Pact. But in fact, unimplemented though it was, it was of immense importance as a faithful reflection of the climate of opinion of post-Napoleonic Europe, even that of England, which later became its bitterest enemy—an importance popularly recognized by its confusion with the Quadruple and Quintuple Alliances and the Concert of Europe. Briefly stated there were two articles in the credo enunciated by the Holy Alliance. One was the belief that there lay upon the governments of Europe a God-given responsibility to not only repel aggression, but preserve the peace; the other was that the "people" had failed to make good use of the rights seized during the French Revolution, and that these had accordingly reverted to the divinely appointed rulers who had originally held them. This time, however, through an enlightened cooperation, they must avoid the mistakes of the past. The moral basis of the Holy Alliance was thus much broader than a mere attempt to preserve the war gains through a stable social and political order, although this was one of the desired ends. Like many others throughout Europe, Alexander, in the words of Metternich, had quitted Jacobinism to throw himself into mysticism. "Today," he himself said, "the Rights of Man have given place to the reading of the Bible."

The Holy Alliance was at the time, and later, viewed with scorn because its form presented an anomaly. It was not a treaty, but a declaration of policy, or perhaps a promise of a policy to be declared at some future time. But in this strange form for an international agreement there was also some sense. The Napoleonic alliances had quite generally proved to be ineffective, and the result then, as to-day, was a widespread disgust with written alliances. Alexander hoped that a public confession of faith by the responsible heads of government would prove more binding. It would be, in his words, "the best means of being penetrated more intimately ourselves by these conservative precepts, too long relegated to the narrow sphere of individual relations," an attempt to get away from the chicanery of diplomatic intrigue to the personal morality commonly expected in private life.

It is, of course, true that Alexander later on attempted to hold together the Confederation of Europe by pointing to the promises made by the signers. But this was an afterthought. It is also of interest that the single phrase in the document which implies political action, that in which the contracting monarchs declare that "considering themselves as compatriots, they will lend each other on every occasion and in every place assistance, aid and succor," was edited by Metternich. A draft of the Holy Alliance discovered in Vienna in 1928 bears in its original form no political significance, but has, in the handwriting of the Austrian statesman, a few trifling alterations, just sufficient to make possible the interpretation of the moral declaration as a political instrument.

It might also be added that the conviction at which Alexander had arrived was not the sole impression of a few foreign mystics, as is sometimes said, but was also strong in Russia itself. Much has been made of the influence of Mme. Krüdener; but she, though German by nationality, was Russian by citizenship. And as that of a brilliant literary and social figure her influence was probably vastly overrated in comparison with the more obscure, but more potent, sway of such Russians as Koshelev and Golitsyn. Mme. Krüdener's influence was probably more acceptable as a defense mechanism than as a guide for action. Metternich and the French, says Empaytaz, tried to break up her strange friendship with Alexander by opening salons "furnished with the most seductive ladies the beauty capitals of Paris and Berlin could afford," but Alexander merely clung more closely to his religious friends. "Up until now," he wrote at the time, "I have by the protection of God resisted seductions, but man is so weak that if he is not upheld by faith, he succumbs to the temp-

tations that besiege him from all sides." A few days after the signing of the Holy Alliance he wrote to Koshelev: "I owe you very much, you have powerfully contributed to make me adopt the course I am now following with conviction and which alone has made me succeed in the difficult task which the All Highest has placed upon me."

The heart of the Holy Alliance was contained in the statement that the various rulers were "to consider themselves all as members of one and the same Christian nation." This aim, Alexander flatly declared, "cannot be reached by force of arms. It is only by the ascendancy of example and the peaceful attractiveness of the happiness which the Christian nations will enjoy under the guiding auspices of their religions that one can hope to see its consoling light spread itself over all nations alike." "An alliance founded upon morality and religion," he told Richelieu, "is the only thing that can save the social order." It was a new and mystical approach to the old ideal of the Novosiltsev instructions—the ideal of a united Europe, to be kept united through confederation.

For a number of years such a unity actually existed, although, as has been said, it was less the work of Alexander than a unity fused by the white heat of the Napoleonic wars. But in the maintainance of this unity Alexander felt, and exercised, a position of tremendous responsibility. "The Emperor of Russia," said Gentz to his detractors, "is today the only sovereign in a condition to realize vast enterprises. He is at the head of the only effective army in Europe. Nothing could resist the shock of this army. None of the obstacles which bind the wills of the other monarchs, such as constitutional laws, public opinion, and so on, exist for him. What he is pleased to decide today, he has the power to realize tomorrow." That he used this authority for the support of unity rather than the private ends of Russia was, in the opinion of Gentz, the final proof of his sincerity.

One of the means which Alexander would have liked to see adopted in the cause of good feeling was that placed in the Covenant of the League of Nations, but, like Alexander's proposal, never put into effect—a general disarmament. In 1816 Castlereagh made a speech before the House of Commons in which he defended the motives of Alexander in forming the Holy Alliance. When Alexander wrote to thank him, he included in his letter a plea for "a simultaneous reduction of the armed forces of all kinds which the Powers have brought into being to preserve the safety and independence of their peoples." United efforts, he hoped, "would be able to bring about in common, and by methods best adapted to the present situa-



tion and the relations of the various Powers, the reduction of armed forces of all kinds whose maintenance on a war footing weakens the credit of existing treaties and must lay a heavy burden on every people." Castlereagh replied that discussion of such a delicate problem might raise a host of embarrassing questions, and Alexander dropped his proposal. It is of interest, however, as a further illustration of the complexity of the problems of world peace-through-federation, a century ago as now.

By 1818 Alexander was beginning to realize that the religious declaration of the Holy Alliance was too nebulous a basis for unity, and that it should be bolstered by a political alliance. The Treaty of Alliance signed after Waterloo had implied the right of a European confederation to supervise and regulate the internal affairs of any state in the name of the common good, but had provided merely for regular meetings to examine and discuss measures looking to this end. And now England was claiming that even this statement was only a general guide, had no binding force, and conferred no general authority; no disputes except those arising over specific treaty obligations could even be discussed. Alexander still wished to see created a league with the same general authority to guarantee the rights of nations that individual states have to guarantee the rights of citizens. It was, and is, a staple argument that such an authority would be reactionary and oppressive, but to this Alexander had a ready reply—valid perhaps today as a chief argument for international organization. A general guarantee of order, he affirmed, would actually promote liberalism, since it would make it possible for absolute monarchs (or other governments) to permit constitutional government, as the chief obstacle in the way of liberalism was the universal fear of revolution. Thus peace could be maintained without loss of popular liberties.

The sanctions proposed by Alexander for such a league were very much like those of Wilson's League of Nations—military intervention, exclusion from the Alliance of offending states, and refusal by the Alliance to recognize revolutionary governments or their acts.

Alexander's motives were much misunderstood, and with the same unhappy results that attended American misunderstanding of the League of Nations. He was accused of plotting behind the scenes a vast scheme for controlling the destinies of Europe, of setting up a secret plan for Russian empire to replace the empire of Napoleon, much as France was to be accused by enemies of the League of Nations of using it as a means to enslave Europe. Alexander himself had to protest to Metternich that he had no such secret national



aims. "I have only to explain my principles," he said, "to dispense with the need of replying in detail to false reports which have gained only too much currency. I seek the welfare of the world in peace, and I cannot find peace except in the attitude we have adopted during the past five years, and in the maintenance of this attitude. . . . My army, as well as myself, is at the disposal of Europe." Gentz equally testified to the Emperor's real loyalty to the cause of European unity. "He considers himself the founder of the European Confederation and would like to be regarded as its head. In the course of these last two years [1816-18] he has not written a single memorandum, or a single diplomatic note, in which his system has not been represented as the glory of the century and the salvation of mankind. After that is it possible to admit that, braving the public opinion that he respects and fears, and the religion that he reveres, he is throwing himself into disloyal enterprises in order to ruin the work from which he expects immortality for himself? Of those who think that he is only playing a part I should like to demand their proofs. . . ."

Alexander's projected confederation was at first intended to include only the countries of Europe, but the world had already shrunk to the point where even a European-wide league appeared too limited to meet the international problems arising out of the war. One of the most pressing of such questions was that of the South and Central American colonies of Spain. Rebellion in the Americas was more than a matter affecting Spain alone, for it had become an example of successful rebellion that was having wide repercussions in Europe at large. According to Richelieu the condition of South America was "becoming more and more an object of attention and of hope to the disaffected in France and to the Jacobins throughout the world." Alexander attempted to secure for the Spanish the right to take part in the meeting of the Concert of Europe at Aix-la-Chapelle, but was refused by the British, who preferred to deal with the former Spanish colonies as independent states. He then turned to the plan of a special conference for the purpose of considering the problem of the lost colonies, to which the United States should be invited, for, as Richelieu declared in a memorandum prepared at his request on "The Perils of the New World," unless the United States were drawn into the general system of Europe there was great danger that a spirit of rivalry and hatred might arise between the old and the new worlds. Again the project foundered upon the rock of English objections. A year later it was proposed that the Duke of Wellington be asked to mediate; and again Alex-

ander gave his support, based upon the impossibility of separating colonial problems from those of the general peace of Europe. The fate of Spain, he argued, was too important to be left either to the obscurantism—the “prejudices and inveterate habits”—of the Spanish government, or to the speculative activities of the London merchants settled in the colonies; it should be decided by general action. No such joint action proved feasible, and Alexander blamed the loss of the colonies upon the refusal to adopt his advice.

In Alexander's last years he began to feel—no doubt wrongly—that the greatest threat to his ideal of orderly internationalism based upon the cooperation of governments was a revolutionary internationalism, aimed at the overthrow of existing governments and their replacement by revolutionary despotisms. He believed that the original center of this movement was at Paris, but that in the course of time it had been moved to Spain; for this reason the question of the Spanish colonies appeared of exceptional urgency.

One of the final tests of Alexander's devotion to the cause of European unity came in the temptation to aid the Greeks in their struggle for liberation from Turkey, at the risk of disrupting the Concert of Europe. Time and again, from the Congress of Vienna on, he was urged to use his authority to relieve the condition of his fellow Eastern Orthodox Christians in Greece, but steadfastly refused to act. Peace, as he told his Greek foreign minister Capo d'Istria in 1816, was not yet sufficiently secure to take chances with it. Two years later he repeated that he could aid the Greeks only by peaceful means, and that to throw into the diplomatic arena the problem of the Levant would be to destroy all the results of his labors. To his old friend Mme. Krüdener, who had close Greek friends, and who had many times urged him to come to the aid of the Greeks, he explained his dilemma at length. Even after the tragic failure of the Greek Insurrection of 1821, he continued his policy of non-intervention, until finally in 1825, after several futile conferences, he announced that he would be forced to act, even if alone. Canning reported that he had decided to risk war itself. Before he could act upon this decision, he died.

Devoid of results though Alexander's efforts were to found a lasting League of Nations in Europe after the holocaust of the Napoleonic wars, they loom in history, like Wilson's futile League, as faltering steps toward a lofty goal; and it may well be that Alexander I will go down in history not as the victor over Napoleon but as the far-sighted initiator and champion of the World Federation which was finally achieved after World War II.

# Inside the Red Army

BY DAVID J. DALLIN

## I.

**T**HROUGHOUT the entire warring world, everyone is familiar with the names of Eisenhower, MacArthur, Montgomery, Alexander. Their pictures appear every day in one or another organ of the press, their biographies, even the most minute details of their lives are widely known. Equally famous are von Keitel, von Brauchitsch, von Arnim, Doenitz, Rommel, and many other German generals. But if one attempts to recall the names of Russian military leaders, the matter is entirely different. Voroshilov? But he has long ago receded into obscurity. Timoshenko? He, too, is no longer in the limelight. Who else? Budenny, Shaposhnikov? They also are men of the past.

The Soviet press allocates almost no space in its columns to individual military commanders, the Soviet radio seldom mentions their names. Except for the Commander-in-Chief, the Soviet military leaders get very little publicity.

In the daily communiqués of the official Information Bureau many of the lower ranking leaders who have distinguished themselves in one or another military operation receive recognition; long lists are given of colonels and generals who have been granted awards of merit. But that is all. Many are known, but none are famous.

In Russia, however, the war has also brought to the fore a whole galaxy of brilliant military leaders, talented, skilled, and daring. The Napoleonic campaign of 1812 was merely a military promenade when compared to the present war: there was nothing then that might be likened to the battles of Stalingrad, Orel, Kharkov, or the two winter campaigns of 1942 and 1943. But during the five months of the struggle against Napoleon there emerged in Russia a group of generals whose names were even then on everybody's lips and later entered into history.

The Soviet generals doubtless consider that they have every right to a greater popularity. It is true that to a certain extent some of the most prominent of the victorious generals have lately been given

recognition in the orders of the day of the Commander-in-Chief. These are Vatutin, Rokossovsky, Popov, Konev, Golikov, Govorov, Zhukov, Voronov, and Vasilevsky, the latter having replaced Marshal Shaposhnikov as the closest adviser to Stalin.

The position of high ranking Red Army officers who have given proof of great military worth is quite peculiar. They are all, of course, members of the Party, loyal to the leader, occupied with their military affairs, and taking no part in the political administration of the country. But command over millions of men, the power of life and death, the direction of huge operations, great responsibility and great risks, all serve to develop men of great will power, initiative, and daring. Military success, the gratitude of their country, and a place reserved for them in history give them importance in the eyes of their contemporaries as well as in their own. And thus names which not long ago were unknown in Russia come to the front, overshadowing those of many traditional political leaders, and standing for national and not Party heroes. There is no need to explain what danger lies herein for established political relations and how this danger is evaluated in a country where the history of the French and English revolutionary wars, the history of Napoleon and Cromwell have been so thoroughly studied.

In Eve Curie's description of her visit to Russia the political independence of a very few individuals is strikingly apparent, an independence that only those crowned with the success of victory can permit themselves. Miss Curie tells of her visit to General Govorov at the front. They sat with many Soviet officers in a tiny dining room when Miss Curie mentioned the Moscow-Berlin Pact of 1939 as a Soviet counterpart to the Munich agreement. "There was an explosion of protests," and everybody defended the Soviet policy of 1939. One person only had the courage to remain silent: General Govorov did not utter a single word.

## II.

The policy of the Party apparatus towards the army resolves itself into a multitude of measures of which little is known outside Russia. Meanwhile, the Party, which rules over the army, is developing a great activity. Its aim is to preserve in wartime the same system that was instituted before the war, and to oppose by every measure any independence of the army from Party control.

In reference to the commanding personnel this policy consists in the following: to give an officer all possible material privileges; to

give him every comfort in life that war conditions permit; but to hold firmly in the hands of the Party all political and ideological leadership and to establish a control over the many thousands of commanders as well as over the millions of soldiers.

As regards the first of these problems, namely the living conditions of the officers and the privileges of commanders, the war was instrumental in bringing back in quick order many of the former regulations, norms, and customs of the old Russian army.<sup>1</sup> Military regulations giving officers many powers over the private, a comparatively good rate of pay, orderlies to serve them, officers' clubs, and a "social life" separated from that of the private and from the civilian population; rewards and decorations, the names of which often have no connection with anything Soviet; even the traditional red stripes on the trousers of generals' uniforms, as well as much else, has been restored on a broad scale and with that decisiveness which is so characteristic of the Soviet government. Everything is being done to make the tens of thousands of non-communist officers feel that the war is a national and not a communistic one.

It must be remembered that among the commanders there are many officers who fought in the First World War, and who are in a position to compare the skill and effectiveness of military organizations. Among them, many come from old Russian noble families, where military service in the position of commanders was a tradition of many generations, where military science, one might say, was imbibed at the mother's breast, and where military talk surrounded the child from the first years of his life. Cadet schools and military academies were the next steps in their training. Formerly 80 or 90 percent of the famous Russian military leaders as well as the rank and file of officers came from these privileged classes of old Russia.

Military defeats of Russia in its two first wars of the twentieth century (1904-1905 and 1914-1917) greatly lowered the prestige of the old military caste. In the loud criticism that enveloped them there was much of truth but also very much exaggeration. A result of this exaggeration was the naïve faith of the first years of the revolution that an anti-nobility policy in the army and a purging of this element were capable of strengthening the military power of the country. This point of view led to drastic measures being taken against officers of the old army. But as the new war approached, and especially from the time it started, it became apparent that this source

<sup>1</sup>This restoration began in a timidly, tentative way as far back as 1935.



of military traditions could no longer be despised. The doors of military schools were opened wide to all, regardless of social origin, and at the front there was systematically and consciously developed an atmosphere which recalled the old Russian army.<sup>2</sup> Everything that might serve to irritate the feelings of non-communist patriotic officers, in so far as possible, was removed. Commanders were to be made to feel that they were directly continuing the work of such loyal servants of the monarchy as Suvorov, Kutuzov, and Skobelev.

During this resurrection of the old order it became apparent in practice that by no means everything had been bad and had to be destroyed. "Proletarian origin" ceased to be regarded as a guarantee of military victories; on the contrary, good upbringing, a tradition of culture, and perhaps even the background of an old officer's family was now considered as ensuring better success at the front.

So, the old officers were called back, cordially accepted, provided with orderlies, and given shoulder straps. Old ranks and decorations were reinstated. To these men were added tens of thousands of reserve officers, mostly intellectual workers from various professions, and then tens of thousands of newly-called young, active patriots, in most cases with no political affiliations. There were communists and non-communists among these various groups of officers; and all alike received new rights, ranks, and privileges. One thing only could not be given them—political influence.

Only in this connection was it found impossible to restore the norms and customs of the old Russian army. On the contrary, against all tradition, the new army was enmeshed in a complicated and dense net of the Party's political institutions.

### III.

In 1939, on the eve of the war, the Political Administration of the Red Army numbered 34,000 "political workers" besides a numerous clerical personnel. Its agencies in the army were Party groups, which included in their ranks commanders, privates, and "political workers." A good-sized military press was at its service.

With the beginning of the war many propagandists, party secretaries, editors, were mobilized for "political work" at the front.

<sup>2</sup>The rôle of former Tsarist officers, in a large part descending from the nobility, apparently is great even among those officers who today belong to the Communist Party. The statistics of the social structure of the Party (the latest published report is of 1930) show that workmen, peasants, and employees form 99%, and "others" —1%. But among communist officers "others" form 11%.



There was quickly formed an enormous military press—undoubtedly the largest in the world—carefully directed from the centre. The Central Political Administration established bureaus all along the front. So-called "Politadministration of the X-army," "Politadministration of the X-front" were formed in every army and in every section of the front. Every division had its own political section. Their functions included the organization of meetings, reports, and "cultural entertainment." It was their duty, of course, also to watch over the morale and the political spirit of the army.

Thus the life of the Red Army differed radically from the life of all other armies and at the same time deviated from the old Russian traditions, recalling rather those of the Soviet wars of 1918-1920.

In this respect the history of the present war can be divided into two phases. For about the first fourteen months—August, 1941 to October, 1942—the organization of the political leadership was headed by the well-known and often described system of military commissars. These commissars, civilians with no military education, enjoyed equal rights with the commanding officers, even in purely strategic matters and no military operation could be carried out without their consent. This led to numerous misunderstandings. Antagonism towards the control of commissars united the officers into one solid body, whether or not they belonged to the Party; and it placed them in opposition to the Party political machine. It must be remembered that, however strange it may seem, the ramified organization of the political leadership of the Red Army was not a military institution and not part of the People's Commissariat of Defense, but formed a section of the Central Committee of the Party, subordinated only to the Politbureau.

In the fall of 1942 this system underwent a radical transformation. The military commissars were abolished, and the officers were given sole responsibility in all military questions. Many of the commissars were sent to military schools and the demand that "politworkers" should have military knowledge was raised throughout the press. It would be a big mistake, however, to believe that the abolition of military commissars meant the liquidation of Party political control. An assistant was appointed to every commanding officer and given the special rank of "political assistant to the commander." All the functions of the former commissars were transferred to them. These assistants to the commanders were now, however, men in uniform, no longer members of the Party organs of the Central Committee, but of the Red Army.

Alexander Shcherbakov, a member of the Politbureau and one of

Stalin's closest collaborators, had been appointed not long before as chief of the Central Political Administration. Nearsighted and a typical bookworm, he was elevated to the rank of general of the Red Army in order to remove every civilian element from the top ranks of the military political machine. At the same time, all the former party propagandists and editors who were working at the front in the capacity of "politworkers" were given officer's rank. In September, 1942, Shcherbakov issued an order establishing a new institution of "Agitators of the Red Army," and numerous groups of agitators were formed at the Political Sections of the fronts and military districts. Their functions were varied and covered all the spheres of "politwork." The *Red Star* wrote about the "agitators of the regiment" that "their primary duty was to maintain a fighting spirit," not only among the soldiers but also among the commanding officers. Furthermore, their function was "to raise an active contingent of agitators" within the regiments themselves.<sup>3</sup> In 1943, the activity of the divisional "Polit-Sections" and of their organizations in regiments and companies was broadened.

The officers accepted this heightened activity in propaganda and agitation as something customary and natural but still foreign to them. The military press noted the endeavor on the part of the "political leaders" to draw the officers into propaganda work; that is to say, into delivering political speeches and making political reports to the soldiers. "Political leaders" even referred to the tradition of Russian history and in particular to Suvorov who used to encourage his troops by means of energetic harangues. It had to be admitted, however, with perplexity and disillusionment, that the officers showed an obvious unwillingness to perform these political functions.

In the autumn of 1942 another interesting innovation was introduced; this time it did not concern the officers but the privates. It was decided to introduce a system whereby communist privates would be responsible for their non-party comrades and for the general discipline in the company. If non-party soldiers violated army regulations, or failed in discipline, if their arms were not in order, the responsibility was to fall not on them alone but also on the members of the Party, their communist comrades. Obviously, however, if the communists were to be held responsible for the blunders and faults of non-communists, the former had to have the right of preliminary control, checking and drilling. This established a new sys-

<sup>3</sup>*Red Star*, October 16, 1942.

tem of interrelations among the soldiers. Party members thus acquired great authority and carried heavy obligations. In September and October, 1942, meetings of the active Party members were held throughout the army, at which the topic of "responsibility of communists for the condition in army units" was discussed.<sup>4</sup> There were no further reports in the military press as to the results of this innovation. One can only assume that its realization proved impossible.

Thus, after many reforms and reconstructions, the organization of the Political Administration of the army turned into a huge department, with many branches, with tens of thousands of employees, with its own printing presses, publishing offices, its own generals, officers, and its own discipline. In size it surpassed many of the State Departments. At the same time, in spirit it remained communist and was composed exclusively of Party members.

As in all large institutions of this kind, bureaucracy soon began to develop in this new organization; and very soon complaints began to pour in from every side of the amount of red tape involved, of the organization's formalistic attitude towards its duties, of its lack of life. This spirit of bureaucracy was in drastic contrast to the fresh energy and initiative of the Red Army in its purely military functions and in the work of its military leaders.

#### IV.

The past year brought a whole series of reforms aimed at the removal of all external expression of contradiction between the Party and the military organizations. During the first year of the war, as we have seen, there existed side by side with the army a multitude of civilian institutions which represented the Party political control: the Political Administration as an organ of the Central Committee, several hundred thousand men in the crack troops of the People's Commissariat of the Interior which were not subordinated to the People's Commissariat of Defense, military commissars, agitators, etc. In the army itself, on the contrary, the Party element was relatively weak; it was limited to the Party "cells" in companies and regiments.

Lately measures have been taken to remove this contradiction. Its removal, however, was not to mean a political compromise.

The leader of the Party now stood at the head of the Commissariat of Defense, and non-military and purely Party organizations

<sup>4</sup>*Red Star*, September 10 and 19, 1942.

began to be incorporated into the army. "Everybody into the Red Army"—such was now the foremost slogan. The Commissars were replaced by military "assistants to commanders," who were required to have at least some military knowledge. The whole organization of the Political Administration was transferred to the War Department, was militarized; and, as mentioned above, a general was appointed as its chief. The troops of the Commissariat of the Interior, which were composed one hundred percent of Party members and which had formerly enjoyed a very privileged position (they had a higher standing than the Red Army), were ordered to change to the general Red Army uniform.<sup>5</sup> A number of members of the Politbureau became generals, Stalin himself became a marshal.

In this way Party elements were being poured into the army from various sources.

The second measure consisted in the endeavor to enroll into the Party as many new members as possible from the ranks of the army. Admission was made easier for them; the complicated rules which governed admission to the Party for civilians were no longer made compulsory for men in the army. During the year 1942, 1,340,000 new members were enrolled into the Party, a great majority of whom were from the army. The present year will evidently show results no smaller. The army, of course, loses a considerable number of its Party men in the general number of war losses. "The Party stratum" of the army, however, has lately increased due to all the measures which have been introduced.

Such has been the development within the army up to the present time. Its political significance is self-evident. The continuation of this trend depends, first of all, on the course of military events, on the tempo with which Russian territories are liberated from occupation, and on the speed with which the Red Army turns into a great victorious army.

<sup>5</sup>These troops, however, were very seldom sent to the front.

# Three Poems by Fet\*

Translated from the Russian

By VLADIMIR NABOKOV

## ALTER EGO

As a lily that looks at itself in a stream  
so my very first song was your mirrored dream.  
But whose was the triumph? Who gave and who took?  
Was it brook from blossom or blossom from brook?

Your childish soul could so easily guess  
the thoughts I was inwardly moved to express.  
Though I live without you by a dreary decree,  
we are one—for nothing can part you and me.

The grass on your grave in a distant clime  
is here in my heart growing greener with time.  
When I happen to glance at the stars, then I know  
that together like gods we had looked at their glow.

Love has words of its own, these words cannot die.  
Our singular case special judges will try:  
in the crowd they will notice us right from the start—  
for as one we will come—we whom nothing can part.

\*Afanasy Shenshin-Fet (1820-1892) was one of the greatest lyrical poets of nineteenth-century Russia. [Ed.].



*Die Gleichmässigkeit des Laufes der Zeit  
in allen Köpfen beweist mehr, als irgend  
etwas, dass wir Alle in denselben Traum  
versenkt sind, ja dass es Ein Wesen ist,  
welches ihn träumt.<sup>1</sup>*

Schopenhauer, *Parerga*, II, 29.

When life is torture, when hope is a traitor,  
when in the battle my soul must surrender,  
then daily, nightly I lower my eyelids,  
and all is revealed in a strange flash of splendor.

Like nights in autumn, life's darkness seems denser  
between the distant and thunderless flashes.  
Alone the starlight is endlessly friendly—  
the stars that sparkle through golden bright lashes.

And all this lambent abyss is so limpid,  
so close is the sky to my spirit's desire,  
that, straight out of time into timelessness peering,  
your throne I discern, empyrean fire.

And there the altar of all creation  
stands still and smokes in a glory of roses.  
Eternity dreams of itself, as the smoke-wreaths  
vibrate with the forces and forms it composes.

And all that courses down cosmic channels,  
and every ray of the mind or of matter  
is but your reflection, empyrean fire,  
dreams, only dreams that flit by and scatter.

And in that wind of sidereal fancies  
I float like vapor, now dimmer now brighter—  
and thanks to my vision, and thanks to oblivion,  
with ease I breathe, and life's burden is lighter.

<sup>1</sup>The uniformity of the passage of time in the minds of all men proves more conclusively than anything else that we are all plunged in the same dream; indeed, that it is one Being that dreams it.

THE SWALLOW

When prying idly into Nature  
I am particularly fond  
of watching the arrow of a swallow  
over the sunset of a pond.

See—there it goes, and skims, and glances:  
the alien element, I fear,  
roused from its glassy sleep might capture  
black lightning quivering so near.

There—once again that fearless shadow  
over a frowning ripple ran.  
Have we not here the living image  
of active poetry in man—

of something leading me, banned mortal,  
to venture where I dare not stop—  
striving to scoop from a forbidden  
mysterious element one drop?

# The Fate of the Baltic Nations\*

BY HENRIKAS RABINAVICIUS

**I**N THE recent stormy years and perhaps even more so in recent months, the future of the three Baltic Republics, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, has been causing deep concern to those dealing with and responsible for the establishment of international peace, lasting friendly relations, and collaboration at the end of this war between the great western democracies, on one side, and the great Soviet totalitarian State, on the other.

A serious difference of both a political and ideological nature exists between the English speaking democracies and the Soviet Union on this vexed question, as America and Great Britain have refused to recognize the annexation of the three Baltic republics by Soviet Russia.

The three Baltic peoples, the Lithuanians, the Latvians, and the Estonians had been completely forgotten by the outside world, and were only brought to the attention of the present generation through the upheaval of 1914-1918. They took their place on the new map of Europe as fully recognized independent national entities in 1918-1920.

While the Allied and Associated Powers were slow in deciding, after 1918, whether or not to recognize the three new republics, Soviet Russia acted immediately and put into operation Lenin's doctrine of self-determination of peoples, establishing full reciprocal diplomatic, consular, and commercial relations with them. Full *de jure* recognition by the Allies came later.

Before Soviet Russia was forced into this war by Hitler's unprovoked attack, she had come to an understanding with Germany by which Germany recognized Soviet Russia's annexation of the Baltic States and the eastern part of Poland, while Soviet Russia recognized Germany's incorporation of Memel into the Reich and the annexation of the remaining part of Poland.

\*This and the following article are discussing the fate of the Baltic States and their relations with Russia from two different points of view. We believe that this discussion will permit our readers to reach a better understanding of this controversial problem [Ed.].

Thus we have witnessed a fourth partition of Poland by which Lithuania and the other two Baltic States were caught in the undertow and submerged out of existence.

It looked as if in twenty-three months (August 23, 1939-June 22, 1941) Russia and Germany had crowded into their relationship as much mutual understanding in regard to the division of territories that separated them, as it had taken them twenty-three years to accomplish a century and a half earlier (1772-1795). It will be remembered that in the year 1795, the Germans and the Russians were the principal parties in the third partition of Poland, by which Lithuania, an independent state in union with Poland, had also fallen under the crown of the Tsars.

The territories of Estonia and Latvia (Livonia), which had been under Swedish sovereignty until 1721, were already a part of Russia at that time; and eastern Latvia, or Latgale, had come under Russian rule at the first partition of Poland in 1772.

The old Russian government had been committing the folly of trying to wipe out by force the national spirit of the compact peoples inhabiting the lands separating Russia from Germany, the largest of which was the Polish people. Poland was renamed *Privislinsky Krai* (Vistula District), Lithuania was renamed *Severo-Zapadny Krai* (North-Western District), Estonia and Latvia were called *Pribaltiisky Krai* (Baltic District). The Russian authorities made themselves believe that by obliterating the names of these peoples and by introducing discrimination against the native peoples, by favoring Russian settlers and the Greek Orthodox Church, and by using other sharp methods, they would stamp out the nationalist, separatist tendencies of these peoples. The results were quite the opposite. There is hardly a people in Europe with a more determined nationalistic spirit than the Poles.

The Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians, because of their smaller numbers and their less turbulent history, for centuries lived a secluded, compact, distinct national life—engaging in their agricultural pursuits and passing on from generation to generation national characteristics of their own: a rich folklore in song, dance, and word, in their own distinct tongues, abounding in esthetic and philological wealth.

The movements of great alien armies through their lands in the middle ages, whether Slav, Tartar, or Teuton, hardly disturbed the basic pattern of their distinct ethnic features.

The Lithuanian people belong to the Indo-Germanic race. The Lithuanian language is one of the oldest European tongues which

has preserved its ancient Sanscrit forms, bearing many resemblances to both Latin and Greek. The Latvians are both racially and linguistically related to the Lithuanians. The Estonians belong to the western branch of the Finno-Ugrian family, with a language akin to Finnish and distantly related to Magyar.

From the earliest times, the Estonians inhabited the northern shores of the Baltic sea with the Latvians and the Lithuanians, their neighbors to the south, dwelling among the great forests and plains between the Dvina and Vistula rivers.

Lithuanian history has been different and more eventful in development through the ages than that of its Latvian and Estonian neighbors. The Lithuanians had formed a state in more or less the present meaning of the term by the middle of the thirteenth century.

While a succession of Lithuanian Grand Dukes were fighting continually the aggressive Teutonic Orders between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, they also became involved in warfare with the Russian Principalities; and the Lithuanians expanded into the territories of Smolensk, Kiev, and Podolia.

The Lithuanian State, however, was not strong enough to hold that great territorial expanse. Prolonged warfare with the Germans, on one side, and the Russians, on the other, reduced Lithuania's power. She entered into closer relations with Poland in order to strengthen herself against the more formidable common enemy, the Germans. An alliance was entered into between the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland, which was consummated in the good old-fashioned way of a marriage between the Polish Queen Hedwiga and the Lithuanian Grand Duke Jagello in 1386. The relationship between the two nations gradually developed into a still closer tie, which led to the pact known as the Union of Lublin concluded in 1569, by which Poland and Lithuania were linked into a dual monarchy in the same manner as Austria and Hungary were united up to the war of 1914-1918, with the Poles predominating over the Lithuanians, as the Austrians did over the Hungarians. It was through this Union that the Lithuanian people embraced the Roman Catholic faith, which remains the leading religion of Lithuania to this day.

Polish ambitions to dominate Lithuania completely led to trouble between the two united parties, and many unsuccessful attempts were made by Lithuania before and after the Pact of Lublin to break her ties with Poland.

While Poland was spreading her influence over Lithuania, the Latvians and Estonians were subjected to influence from across the



Baltic Sea from the then all powerful Swedish Kingdom. In the sixteenth century, the age of Swedish rebirth under Gustavus Vasa, the Swedish fight for Reformation against Roman Catholicism became particularly pronounced. Sweden's territorial expansion was coupled with her opposition to Poland's spread of Catholicism; and after the year 1561 Sweden put down roots deep in the soil of Latvia and Estonia, as well as Finland. Riga, the largest city in the land of the Latvians, became the second important city of Sweden and a center of Protestantism. The leading religion of both the Estonians and Latvians remains Protestant to this day. Sweden ruled in Estonia for about one hundred and fifty years and in Latvia (Livonia) for about one hundred years.

With the ascendancy of Peter the Great in Russia and after the historic battle of Poltava in 1709, when the Swedes were hopelessly defeated by the Russian army, Sweden lost her foothold in the Baltic provinces of Estonia and Livonia, which finally fell to Russia in 1721.

The nationalist spirit of these races, subjugated by the Tsars, had hardly been heard of in the western world. Only when Russia went through troublesome days, did the outcry of the subjugated peoples reach the ears of the world. The Poles, especially, let themselves be heard through a number of important exiles: Kosciuszko at the end of the eighteenth century, Chopin in the middle of the nineteenth, and in later years—Paderewski.

In 1812, the Poles and Lithuanians tried in vain to exploit Napoleon's invasion of Russia to regain their freedom. After the Crimean War of 1854-1856, trouble started again to ferment in the western borderland, culminating in the open revolt of Poles and Lithuanians in the year 1863 which was ruthlessly suppressed by the Tsarist régime. Again, after the unsuccessful Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, when the Russian people made an attempt to rid themselves of Tsarism—the Poles, the Finns, the Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians were all in open revolt for national freedom, which, however, was only won after the collapse of the Russian imperial régime in 1917.

The years 1918-1919 formed a stormy period in the life of the three new Baltic Republics.

The Lithuanian National Council declared the independence of Lithuania at Vilna on February 16, 1918, while still under German occupation. The occupational authorities confiscated the issue of a Lithuanian newspaper in Vilna which printed the Proclamation of Independence the following day. The first Lithuanian government

was actually formed on Armistice Day, November 11, 1918.

Estonian independence was declared eight days after the original Lithuanian attempt, on February 24, 1918, with the formation of a provisional government which was immediately dispersed by the German occupational authorities.

The Latvian National Council, benefiting by the experience of her neighbors north and south with the German occupational authorities, declared the independence of Latvia in secret session on July 8, 1918, and the first Latvian government was formed on November 18, 1918.

A handful of Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian communists, resident in Russia and partisans of the Bolshevik Revolution, were eager to enlist the help of the newly formed Red Army in putting up communist Soviet governments in the capitals—Vilna, Riga, and Tallinn. They did not find much difficulty in obtaining the desired aid from the Soviet government.

In November, 1918, the Red Army began the invasion of the three Baltic countries; and on December 8, 1918, Lenin appointed a government of Soviet Estonia, and on December 23, gave recognition to the communist Soviet governments of Lithuania and Latvia. These steps were taken with the purpose of frustrating the newly formed national governmental bodies in these countries.

The German troops, according to the armistice conditions laid down by the Allied Powers, were ordered to remain in the Baltic territories to help the newly forming national armies of the Baltic States to stem the Bolshevik invasion. The relationship between the German troops and the newly formed Baltic armies was hostile. Their officers hardly exchanged salutes. Trouble was brewing between them. In March, 1919, the Germans attacked and shot a Lithuanian military guard at the hotel in Kaunas in which an American military mission was lodged. In April, 1919, the Germans under the command of General von der Goltz arrested members of the Latvian national government and army and attempted to put into power the "Baltische Landeswehr," composed of Baltic Germans with pastor Needra as figurehead. Order, however, was restored shortly thereafter through the intervention of the Allied Military Mission stationed in Libau, Latvia.

In spite of the defeat of the German armies by the Allies in 1918, the German military authorities in Berlin, a year later, still made attempts to keep a foothold in the Baltic territories. Von der Goltz's failure with the Landeswehr in April-June, 1919, did not fully discourage them. In the late autumn of 1919 a new venture was staged.

German troops with a few Russians among them, dressed in Russian uniforms, under the leadership of a White Russian officer, Bermond-Avaloff, receiving his instructions from the German military authorities in Berlin, took possession of the Lithuanian railroad running from Tilsit, Prussia, across Lithuania to the Latvian frontier and beyond to Riga. This scheme was performed under the guise of fighting Bolshevism, which had already practically been cleared from both countries. The Lithuanian and Latvian armies, with the Estonian army pressing the German remnants from the north, were strong enough by that time to liquidate this campaign with the backing of a British warship anchored outside Riga.

The year 1920 brought a new era of stability to the Baltic States. The Lenin government, proclaiming since inception the principle of self-determination of peoples and its opposition to imperialism, having satisfied itself that the few Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian communists in Russia had no following in their home countries and that the Red Army had failed to establish itself in those countries, decided upon a new course of friendly relations with them. Negotiations were opened with the three governments. The first treaty was signed with Estonia on February 2, 1920; and Maxim Litvinov was sent as first Soviet Minister to Tallinn. A treaty with Lithuania followed on July 12, 1920; and on August 11, 1920, a treaty with Latvia was concluded. By these treaties Soviet Russia renounced forever all sovereign rights over these countries. Permanent and definite frontiers were fixed between them and Russia.

All three countries began to seethe with creative activities in the administrative, educational, and economic fields.

The most important venture initiated by the first Lithuanian Parliament was a bold agrarian reform by which feudal landlordship was abolished. The land poor and landless peasants were allotted adequate parcels of land with an agrarian bank providing long-term credits for agricultural development. Latvia and Estonia did likewise. A great outcry rose against this sweeping reform from the big landowners, who in Lithuania were mostly Poles and in Latvia and Estonia—German Barons. The three new national governments remained firm in the execution of the program, which in years to come proved to be a farsighted and beneficial step in the remarkable growth of the agricultural importance of the three Baltic States. The economic independence and stability of the well distributed and privately owned small farm holdings became the staunchest bulwark against any internal development of communism. Without force from the outside, with the succeeding years it became less and less

possible for communism to make any headway whatsoever in the three Baltic Republics.

While Latvia and Estonia were undisturbed in their work of reconstruction, Lithuania was burdened with two territorial disputes: one over Vilna—with Poland; the other over Memel—with the Allied Powers, who by the Treaty of Versailles acquired the sovereign rights over Memel for the purpose of transferring these rights to Lithuania. The Allies, however, were procrastinating in this transfer; and only after a *coup de force* by Lithuanian insurgents in Memel against the French garrison there, did the Allied Powers cede Memel to Lithuania on February 16, 1923. A convention was entered into between the Allied Powers and Lithuania, by which autonomy was granted to the Memel Territory under Lithuanian sovereignty.

Lithuania's dispute with Poland over Vilna proved to be a problem much more difficult to settle.

An armed clash took place between Poland and Lithuania on October 9, 1920, when Polish troops under General Zeligowski marched on Vilna, the capital of Lithuania, and forced the government to retire to Kaunas. On November 23, 1920, both Poland and Lithuania acceded to the demand of the League of Nations to stop hostilities. The League undertook to arbitrate the dispute but failed in its task. No diplomatic relations existed between the two countries until they were forced upon Lithuania eighteen years later by an ultimatum from Poland in 1938.

Outside of these two disturbances, the three Baltic Republics have enjoyed for over two decades prosperity and continuous, peaceful, and cultural development of independent statehood, participating in all phases of international collaboration among nations.

Through an early introduction of compulsory education in these new republics, illiteracy became unknown among the rising generation. The printing of books on all subjects of human endeavor was remarkable in extent. Universities, technical schools, academies of art and music had capacity attendance in all three countries.

The interrelations between the three small republics were marked throughout their period of independence by constant cordiality and were consistently growing closer and closer. Lithuania's disturbed relationship with Poland, however, on one hand, and Latvia's and Estonia's excellent relations with Poland, on the other, were the only impediments to a complete union between them.

Generally speaking, the entire twenty years of independence of the three Baltic Republics were marked by distinct good relations

with Soviet Russia. During the first six years after their liberation from the Red Army invasion, there was a natural aftermath of suspicion that communism from the outside might again stifle the national development. These suspicions were alleviated by the trend of Moscow's friendliness and non-interference in the internal affairs of the three states.

On September 28, 1926, a Soviet-Lithuanian Pact of Non-Aggression was signed. Later similar pacts were concluded with Latvia and Estonia.

In 1933, the Baltic States adhered to the Soviet Convention for the Definition of Aggression.

The official visit to Moscow of the Lithuanian Foreign Minister Lozoraitis in 1934, his conversations with Premier Molotov and other leading Soviet statesmen strengthened the ties of friendship and understanding between the two countries. The tendency of Lithuania to side with Russia, rather than with her western neighbor, Germany, in case of a military conflict was apparent during the years prior to the present war.

The first note of suspicion that Soviet Russia had other than strategic intentions in the Baltic States was aroused in the summer of 1939, during the Anglo-Soviet negotiations in Moscow. The Soviet government demanded of the British government consent to certain measures to be taken by Russia in the Baltic States, which appeared to the British as interference in internal affairs of independent peoples; and Great Britain refused to be a party to it.

On December 5, 1939, the British Foreign Secretary made the following statement in the House of Lords:

We have tried to improve our relations with Russia, but in doing so we have always maintained the position that rights of third parties must remain intact and be unaffected by our negotiations. Events have shown that the judgment and the instincts of His Majesty's Government in refusing agreement with the Soviet Government on the terms of formulae covering the cases of indirect aggression on the Baltic States were right. For it is now plain that these formulae might have been the cloak of ulterior designs.

As it is known, Herr von Ribbentrop, the Nazi Foreign Secretary, was less hesitant and scrupulous than Lord Halifax; and as a result of the Soviet-German Treaty of August 23, 1939, Soviet Russia was given by Germany a free hand to do as she pleased with the Baltic States.

Upon Soviet occupation of the Vilna territory in September, 1939, after the complete collapse of Poland, the Lithuanian Foreign Minister Urbsys was invited on October 3, 1939, by Premier Molotov



to come to Moscow to settle the transfer of Vilna to Lithuania and to conclude a new treaty of mutual assistance. The lease of air bases and the right of placing limited Soviet garrisons on Lithuanian territory were to be granted to Soviet Russia. Both Stalin and Molotov assured Urbsys that the Soviet government desired to give Lithuania every guarantee that the purpose of the military stipulations of the treaty was exclusively for the strengthening of the defence of both Russia and Lithuania. As proof that Soviet Russia had no ulterior motives, Stalin offered to reiterate in the treaty the U.S.S.R. pledge to respect Lithuania's sovereignty and not to interfere in her internal affairs. A Treaty of Mutual Assistance was signed on October 10, 1939, Article VII of which reads as follows: "The fulfillment of this treaty shall in no way whatsoever affect the sovereign rights of the contracting parties, in particular their forms of government, economic and social systems, military measures, and generally speaking the principle of non-interference in internal affairs."

By this treaty Lithuania granted all strategic facilities to Soviet Russia. The Vilna territory was, according to the same treaty, restored to Lithuania.

There was great jubilation in Lithuania in thanksgiving for the return of Vilna. The personal assurances by Stalin brought back from Moscow by Urbsys and sealed with the above quoted text gave the Lithuanian people a feeling of security and confidence.

Similar treaties were made with Latvia and Estonia. According to these treaties, in addition to garrisons and air bases, the Baltic ports in Latvia and Estonia were placed at the complete disposal of Soviet Russia.

Eight peaceful months had passed with the Soviet garrisons comfortably established in Lithuania and the other Baltic States. The Soviet troops behaved well; and the authorities, as well as the population as a whole, were little aware of their presence. As late as May 25, 1940, the Soviet Minister in Lithuania, Pozdniakov, together with the commander of the Soviet garrisons in Lithuania, affirmed to Foreign Minister Urbsys that there were no complaints to make, that everything was working out most satisfactorily with the execution of the treaty of October 10, 1939.

One week later, in the beginning of June, 1940, after Germany's staggering success with her offensive in Western Europe, on the eve of the collapse of France, the Lithuanian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister were summoned to Moscow, and at midnight of June 14, after a few days of deliberation, were handed an ultimatum expiring nine hours later on the morning of June 15, demanding the

resignation of the Lithuanian government, the formation of a government acceptable to the Soviets, and the stationing of an unlimited number of Soviet troops in Lithuania. The same procedure was followed with Latvia and Estonia.

In a few days the occupation of the three Baltic States by half a million of Soviet mechanized troops was completed. Thousands of persons were arrested all over the country. All newspapers were closed down and replaced by centrally controlled uniform communist papers.

A general election was announced to take place on July 14, 1940. One and only one list of candidates containing a large majority of communists, hitherto unknown to the people, was offered on the ballot.

The population was called upon by special proclamation to appear on July 14 at the electoral districts with their proper identity papers. It was announced in the proclamation that any adult citizen who failed to get his identity paper stamped to the effect that he voted for the list presented, would be proclaimed and treated as an enemy of the people.

After the election, it was announced that over 99 percent of the population voted for the new legislative body.

On July 22, the newly elected Assembly proclaimed Lithuania's decision to ask the U.S.S.R. for inclusion into the Union. The Soviet Union granted this request. The same method was applied to Latvia and Estonia.

On July 23, 1940, Acting Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, on behalf of the United States Government, issued the following statement which was published in the State Department Bulletin of July 27, 1940:

During these past few days the devious processes whereunder the political independence and territorial integrity of the three small Baltic Republics—Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—were to be deliberately annihilated by one of their more powerful neighbors, have been rapidly drawing to their conclusion.

From the day when the peoples of these Republics first gained their independence and democratic form of government the people of the United States have watched their admirable progress in self-government with deep and sympathetic interest.

The policy of this Government is universally known. The people of the United States are opposed to predatory activities no matter whether they are carried on by the use of force or by the threat of force. They are likewise opposed to any form of intervention on the part of one State, however powerful, in the domestic concerns of any other sovereign State, however weak.

These principles constitute the very foundations upon which the existing relationship between the 21 sovereign Republics of the New World rests.

The United States will continue to stand by these principles, because of the con-

viction of the American people that unless the doctrine in which these principles are inherent once again governs the relations between nations, the rule of reason, of justice, and of law—in other words, the basis of modern civilization itself—cannot be preserved.

When the present world-wide bloody conflict comes to its end and the United Nations will be confronted with the task of establishing a more lasting peace than we have known in the first half of this century, no doubt proper account will also be taken of the rights of the small peoples in northeastern Europe.

Judging by the sweeping changes taking place now in the Soviet Union, a striking example of which is the return of freedom to the Greek Orthodox Church, a step which would have been considered an utter impossibility only a few years ago, it is reasonable to expect that Stalin, dictated by wisdom, will cooperate with Roosevelt and Churchill in putting into force the Atlantic Charter and will permit the small Baltic peoples bordering on Russia to enjoy in complete independence their natural right of national self-expression for which they have been struggling for centuries and which for more than twenty years they have shown their ability and justified their right to claim.

# Russia and The Baltic States

BY NICHOLAI P. VAKAR

THE term "Baltic States," as used in polemics today, is somewhat misleading. There is no such political, economic, ethnic, or cultural entity. The only thing which the three countries in question—Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia—have in common is the fact that they were Baltic provinces of the Russian Empire until 1918 and became again a part of Russia in 1940. That is why the term "Baltic States" has a moral rather than a political sense today. Americans always are eager to give support to a dwarf wrestling with a giant: Japan enjoyed it in 1904-1905, and Finland in 1939-1940. Sentimentalism is as misleading in politics as intuition in strategy. However, it is being made again the basis of practical policy in some planning quarters today, and its implications may become grave. The question of the "Baltic States" needs more information, better understanding of the situation in Eastern Europe, and a sense of responsibility in dealing with the implacable forces of reality.

One should weigh facts carefully before taking sides.

## I.

The native tribes of Finno-Ugrian (Ests, Livs, Cours) and Indo-European stocks (Letts, Pruss, Aukstote, Zhmud, etc.) which settled along the eastern shores of the Baltic sea "four thousand years ago," as a Latvian writer believes, were first conquered by the Danes, then by the Germans who baptized the Letts in about 1227, later by the Swedes, and finally by the Russians. The Latvians and the Estonians were subject peoples from 1158 to 1918. Since the tenth century, Russian princes, trying to reach an outlet on the western shore, pressed hard on the natives and, in 1030, founded in Estland the military outpost Yuriev (the present Tartu); from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century, the German bishops ruling the city were under the obligation of paying the Russians a tribute.

The Mongol invasion (1240-1480) interrupted Russian expansion for about three hundred years. But, pushed by an irresistible drive towards the sea, the Russians were again under the walls of

Reval (Tallinn) in 1557, took Yuriev (Dorpat) in 1559, and held Narva from 1558 to 1581. Finally, in 1710, the whole Estonian and the northern part of the Latvian shores were conquered and ceded by Sweden to Russia in 1721 (Treaty of Nystadt). Lithuania and the southern part of Latvia were acquired during the partition of Poland (1772-1795). Russian expansion northwest thus reached its natural limits. A military writer, General A. Kuropatkin, figured out that Russia lost 720,000 in dead and wounded in the battles for the possession of the Baltic shores in the eighteenth century only—far more than America paid for the possession of both the Pacific and Mexican shores.

There was no question of Latvians or Estonians at that time. The Baltic provinces were considered as German ethnographically, and the Tsars paid for the loyalty of the ruling class by conserving its privileges. Since 1765, however, the Russian government endeavored to improve the situation of the serf. Finally, the Latvian and Estonian peasantry was granted personal freedom before the Russians (Estland, 1816; Courland, 1817; Livonia, 1819; all Russia, 1861). Still, for over 150 years the German nobility remained an intermediary between the native and the Russian Empire. Only by the end of the nineteenth century did the government start the Russification of both the noble and the peasant. The Lutheran faith of the native, however, was never persecuted. The Russian language became compulsory in schools in 1890, in the Dorpat (Yuriev) University in 1895, and in the Riga Polytechnical Institute in 1898. As compared with the date of the conquest (1721), this was an astonishing record of tolerance.

However, the Latvians, Estonians, and Lithuanians did not want to become Russians any more than they wanted to become Germans. Already the Latvian Association in Riga since 1868, the Lithuanian Literary Association since 1879, the Estonian Scientific Society since 1839, and the Estonian Literary Association since 1872 were the centers of national renaissance. Their national, scientific, educational, and social activities were directed against the German rather than Russian domination; and, as a matter of fact, the Russian intelligentsia endeavored to help their efforts. The Baltic provinces became that part of Russia where there was the greatest number of schools, in proportion to the population. In most respects, the Latvians and Estonians were ahead of the Russian peasantry. This did not develop among them a desire to sever the links with the Russian Empire. In spite of a strong national renaissance at the beginning of the twentieth century, neither the Estonians nor the Lat-



vians ever formulated a wish for separation from Russia. Their utmost claims were for national autonomy within the Empire. Latvian national units were formed within the Russian army in 1915, and fought gallantly. After the Revolution, on July 5, 1917, the Russian Provisional Government granted territorial autonomy to the Baltic provinces; and National Councils were established in Latvia and Estonia. Still no claims for separation were formulated. Even the Lithuanians, who may have conserved reminiscences of the greatness of their Lithuanian State in the thirteenth-eighteenth centuries, first independent and then united to Poland, could not make up their mind as to which course the further renaissance should follow. With the exception of the period of German military occupation (1915-1917) and of the complaints of a few émigrés in Paris, they did not express any wish for separation from the Russian Empire, their claims having been limited to "national autonomy" and "federation with Russia, on the basis of equality."

The whole picture changed, however, after the Bolshevik Revolution on November 7, 1917.

## II.

After the Bolshevik Revolution, separation from Russia appeared to be the only way of salvation from communism. This was true not only for the Baltic peoples. The Russians themselves under the leadership of generals and civilians fought the Lenin government. During this civil war, Russia split into fourteen independent states, all fighting the central power in Moscow.

Western Powers, first Germany and then the Allies, became afraid of the world revolution and seized an opportunity to establish a "cordon sanitaire" all around Soviet Russia.

None of the Baltic States could achieve such a purpose by its own means. The war still was going on. On December 12, 1917, the Baltic-German nobility invoked the aid of German troops. On February 16, 1918, the Taryba (National Council) in Vilna proclaimed the independence of Lithuania. By the peace of Brest-Litovsk (March 3, 1918) Germany forced Russia to abandon all claims on Lithuania. On April 12, the Baltic Landesrat decided to organize a personal union with Prussia by electing the King of Prussia and Emperor of Germany, Grand Duke of the Baltic provinces. On April 23, Germany recognized Lithuania "in perpetual alliance with the German Empire"; and the crown was offered to Prince Wilhelm of Urach, who accepted under the title of Mindovg II. On July 7,

the Latvian National Council in exile submitted a protest to the Allied governments against the projected annexation of Latvia by Germany and against the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and demanded the creation of an "independent and indivisible Latvian State under international guarantee." Under pressure of Germany, Russia renounced her sovereign rights over Estonia and Latvia on August 27. Thus Russia was definitely pushed away from the sea, thrown back into the seventeenth century.

The collapse of Germany on November 11, 1918 marked the beginning of a new period in the history of the Baltic provinces. Soviets were emerging all over Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia bringing about the fire and bloodshed of civil war. Finland offered Estonia a loan of twenty million marks and sent two thousand volunteers to fight the Communists. On December 12, the British fleet under Admiral Sinclair captured two Russian destroyers and handed them over to Estonia. Russian "White" armies were organized in Latvia and Estonia, thus helping *de facto* the independence of the Baltic States which they would not recognize *de jure*.

The war against the Soviets continued until 1920, when peace treaties were concluded with Estonia (February 2), Lithuania (July 12), and Latvia (August 11). By that time, a "cordon sanitaire," as established by the Western Powers, did not seem a bad idea from the Soviet point of view; it removed the ghost of Allied military intervention in Russia, and Moscow hastened to recognize or even to establish buffer states in the Caucasus and the Far East. Britain, France, and Italy promptly recognized the newly created Baltic States; and in September, 1921 the latter were admitted to membership in the League of Nations. Both Russia and the Western Powers obviously considered this a temporary solution. For opposite reasons, the same expedient suited them both. With a good understanding of the situation, the government of the United States postponed its recognition until July 28, 1922. Then, the Secretary of State, Charles Hughes, asked Mr. Evan E. Young<sup>1</sup> to make known to the Baltic governments the text of the United States Government's declaration. The declaration stated (in part):

The Governments of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have been recognized *de jure* or *de facto* by the principal Governments of Europe and have entered into treaty relations with their neighbors.

In extending to them recognition on its part, the Government of the United States takes cognizance of the actual existence of these Governments during a con-

<sup>1</sup>On July 25. Papers concerning the Foreign Relations, 1922.

siderable period of time and of the successful maintenance within their borders of political and economic stability.

The United States has consistently maintained that the disturbed conditions of Russian affairs may not be made the occasion for the alienation of Russian territory, and this principle is not deemed to be infringed by the recognition at this time of the Governments of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania which have been set up and maintained by an indigenous population.

Acknowledging an accomplished fact, the United States Government obviously shared the opinion of Mr. Evan E. Young, then American Commissioner at Riga, who had reported on April 6, 1922 that it seemed to him "very possible and even probable" that at some future time "these so-called States will become again a part of Russia."

Such was, in brief, the origin of the Baltic States. Their separation from Russia and independence were an incident of the Russian Revolution and of post-Versailles politics rather than their own national achievement.

### III.

With all respect and the most sincere admiration for Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian national renaissance, astonishingly rich and fruitful during the last twenty years, we must admit, however, that there was nothing in their history similar, for instance, to the Irish struggle for independence or to the aspirations and national achievements of the Polish, Czech, and most Balkan peoples. "Latvia had no political annals throughout the seven centuries which preceded the formation of the Republic in November 1918," states the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. The same is true of Estonia. During five centuries, the Great Duchy of Lithuania was a nation of Russian culture (from the thirteenth to the seventeenth century) and of Polish culture (seventeenth and eighteenth centuries), first the Russian and later the Polish being its language of administration and literature.

All this may explain to a certain extent why the newly created States, all provided with democratic constitutions, found it difficult and, in fact, impossible to maintain democracy within their borders and virtually lost their independence to foreign powers, both politically and economically. In World War I and during the Civil War, their industrial capital was lost, plants and buildings were destroyed. Before 1918, Estonia was one of the principal sources of food supplies for Petrograd (Leningrad). In search of new capital and new markets, concessions for exploitation of oil shale deposits (the only

natural resource of the country) were granted to foreign firms. Industries, except paper and cement, became dependent upon foreign raw materials. Estonia contracted an international loan of £1,350,000 under guarantee of the League of Nations; and Latvia had a foreign debt of 39,360,000 golden francs in 1922, which represented about 5 dollars per capita in Estonia and 20 golden francs in Latvia. Before the separation, thirty-two percent of all Russian export went through the Baltic ports, and Riga was listed as "the third Russian port after Petrograd and Odessa"; a half of the imported rubber, cotton, and machinery came to Russia through the same ports. Now about six percent of the Lithuanian trade and less than three and a half percent of the Latvian trade was with Russia. In Estonia, half of the large industry and sixty percent of the wholesale trade came into German hands. Germany, Great Britain, and Finland took most of the export, and provided most of the import. The Baltic provinces became economic dependencies of Great Britain and Germany, at the very door of Russia.

The study of the German and English languages was made compulsory in the schools; while French and Russian were made optional. In spite of the reminiscences of the past, the German influence proved much more powerful than British. Lithuania yielded first. In Autumn 1926, the government leaning upon the "Iron Wolf," a fascist organization, dissolved all political parties and abolished democratic liberties. In 1929, a new government set about suppressing the "Iron Wolf," but the totalitarian régime of President Smetona continued to function until 1940. Soon after the victory of the Nazis in Germany, Karlis Ulmanis abolished democracy in Latvia. Let us quote the impartial statement of the Encyclopaedia Britannica: "In May, 1934, the Saeima (Latvian Diet) was suspended and a government along totalitarian lines was set up." From the same source we learn that in Estonia, on October 13, 1934, "the president established a dictatorial régime pending the formulation of a new constitution of a corporative character, made on the lines of Italian fascism."

Democracy did not live long in the Baltic States. It was only natural for Soviet Russia to feel that the former "cordon sanitaire" was going to become an outpost of aggression. In 1939, Estonia (September 29), Latvia (October 5, after concluding a pact with Germany on June 7), and Lithuania (October 10) were compelled to sign treaties with the U.S.S.R., granting leases of naval and air bases at points of strategical importance for Russia. However, the old governments remained in power. The arrangement did not work

well. After ten months of experiment, Moscow demanded that governments be established that would adhere to the pacts and that larger garrisons be permitted to be stationed on the Baltic shore. On June 17, Soviet troops occupied the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian territories. On July 14, new elections took place which virtually were a referendum, for the population had to vote on a single ticket. The new parliaments voted for incorporation into the U.S.S.R., and the old governments resigned.

#### IV.

There are three schools of thought as to whether or not Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania should be restored as sovereign and independent states after the Allied victory: their own, Russian, and "democratic," as expressed in the Anglo-American press. We will briefly examine all three, beginning with the last.

Restoration of the Baltic States is being made a matter of principle. *Pereat mundus, fiat justitia*. However, the 452 private American organizations planning for postwar Europe are looking for a kind of international organization, within the framework of which the sovereignty of all states should be limited. Clearly, Great Britain, Soviet Russia, and the United States are not yet ready to limit themselves. For those who are aware of that fact, the problem is thus reduced to the limitation of sovereignty of all the states except three, namely those who would limit the sovereignty of the others. As regards the Baltic States, the question then may be formulated as follows: shall their sovereignty be limited inside or outside the Soviet Union? It seems that Anglo-American public opinion would like to see them outside, and this on the assumption that the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian sovereignty will suffer lesser limitation, and that the "freely expressed wishes of the peoples" will everywhere be for liberal capitalist economy and democracy of Anglo-American pattern.

Such an assumption is supported neither by proof nor by experience; it is merely based on our faith in the common man and our wishful thinking. But, as we have seen, neither democracy nor liberal economy were maintained in the free Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian States. Eventually, restoration of the lost vested interests, national and foreign, is not likely to bring democracy, but the same political and economic setup as before, or a similar one.

From the Soviet point of view, the vested interests were at the bottom of the trouble. The Russians may exaggerate, yet they will



not trust any influence in the Baltic area except their own. The Baltic sea is to Russia what the Gulf of Mexico is to the United States, strategically and economically. A Russian would point out that had Florida, Louisiana, and Texas separated from the United States and established within their borders a political and economic system under foreign influence, the American people would certainly break the wall erected between their continent and the sea. As a Russian writer puts it, "the voluntary renunciation of an outlet to the sea, essential for a country of 200,000,000 population, is unthinkable." The historical drive of Russia to the shores of the Baltic, once resumed, cannot be stopped by preaching from pulpits. Neither, it seems, can it be stopped by arms. One does not need to be much of a realist to know that in the postwar times there will be only one Great Power ready to fight for the Baltic provinces: Russia.

But could not Russia have free use of the Baltic ports under an international government and control? A prerequisite for this would be complete Russian confidence in Western democracies and in the new international order. So far, the Soviets had some good reasons to doubt the efficiency and sincerity of collective security. They still believe that they had better rely on themselves. Wrongly or rightly, they mean business in the Baltic sea; and they will not withdraw voluntarily. Stalin in his first address of the war, on July 3, 1941, named Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians among the "peoples of the Soviet Union." Since then, there have been numerous similar references. In July, 1943, the *Red Star* declared that "the Baltic States were and shall be Soviet States."

From the Soviet point of view, this is by no means inconsistent with the Atlantic Charter. The Baltic States were incorporated in the summer of 1940, while the Atlantic Charter was signed on August 14, 1941 and cannot have a retroactive force. Moreover, the Atlantic Charter would admit territorial changes in accordance with "the freely expressed wish of the peoples concerned"; and in July 1940 an overwhelming majority of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians voted for incorporation. Was it a *free* vote? This is a matter of opinion. The Soviet affirm the vote was free, and they do not see why they should start it all over again. They would no more admit a plebiscite under international control on any part of the Soviet territory than the British would in Ulster or the United States in Puerto Rico.

We have seen the historical, economic, political, and strategical reasons for the Russian attitude. The juridical position of the Soviet Union is that incorporation was a freely consented agreement be-

tween "the peoples concerned"; under the U.S.S.R. constitution the sovereignty of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania is not abolished, but restricted on the basis of equality.<sup>2</sup> In fact, no resistance has been offered to the Russian occupation in 1940; and no Estonian, Lithuanian, or Latvian government was set up in exile as was the case with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Norway, Holland, Greece, and Yugoslavia.

What is the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian position in this discussion? What do they themselves really wish? We do not know. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, are today under the German occupation, and a Quisling administration has been set up; a five-man Estonian State Council is governing in Tallinn "in the name of the German Military Command" (*N. Y. Times*, Sept. 9, 1941). About 20,000 volunteers enlisted with the German Army, and about 11,000 fell in the battles against the Soviets (Overseas News Agency, March 27, 1943). A Latvian army under General Rudolf Aban-geriskis, former president of the Latvian Military Academy, is being organized by the Germans (*O.N.A.*, April 8, 1943).

On the other hand, Latvian and Estonian refugees in the U.S.S.R. bought tanks and planes for the Red Army. Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian guerillas are fighting the Germans, under the direction of Russian parachutists (Stockholm, March 30; *O.N.A.*, March 27, 1943). General Rastikis and the head of the Lithuanian National Council, Kubiliunas, refused to form a National Legion against the Soviets, as ordered by the Germans (Stockholm, June, 1943). Bishop Brisgis threatened Lithuanian volunteers in the German army with excommunication (*O.N.A.*, May 20, 1943). Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian national units fought in the Orel-Kursk battle, last summer, and thousands of soldiers and officers were awarded orders and medals (U.S.S.R. Embassy's Bulletin of Information, Nos. 81,83). An Estonian unit took 1,500 prisoners in Velikie Luki, including Commander Von Sass and his staff. Alongside the Russians they fight gallantly the common foe, although they know that Russia does not intend to restore the Baltic States as they were before 1940.

It is true that neither under the German occupation nor in Soviet Russia can they freely express their mind. Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian publications in this country show that opinions are divided.

<sup>2</sup>Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are granted each 25 votes out of 713 in the Council of Nationalities in Moscow, thus having an equal share of sovereignty with the other 13 Union Republics, including the Russian Republic itself.

However strong may be their attachment to their national ideals, the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian peoples do not seem to have developed, during twenty years of independence, the hypertrophic nationalism which is characteristic of some other Europeans. Abstract principles may not appeal to them in the same way as they do to others. Realistic reminiscences of their past, both far removed and recent in date, must lead them to try to make the best of the new situation.

There is no doubt that in friendly collaboration with Russia, Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian national goals may be sooner and better attained than by opposing vital Russian interests, and fighting endlessly and hopelessly.

# Russia Meets the Japanese

BY HARRY EMERSON WILDES

**V**LADIMIR ATLASOV, conqueror of Kamchatka, feared neither man nor beast; when he heard in late 1697 that a strange brown dwarf who spoke no known human dialect had been picked up on the frozen shores to the eastward, he did not hesitate to plunge forward through the winter to learn the secret of the stranger's origin.

The truth is that the Kamchadals were far more terrified of Atlasov than they could ever be of castaways upon their shores. For half a century, Russian explorers, inching onward through Siberia, had thrown a continent into terror-stricken horror. Vasily Poyarkov, the first adventurer in eastern Asia, had left a legend that the Russian Red Hairs lived on human flesh; when the explorers could not kill sufficient game to feed themselves, they had not hesitated to shoot down the natives to be roasted at the Russian campfires. Siberian tribesmen, elaborating this gruesome practice, built up the Poyarkov legend into a fearful saga of Russian ruthlessness. They did not know, probably they would not have believed, that the Russian government itself put Poyarkov on trial for murder as a consequence of these excesses; to all Asiatics, the Red Hairs were cannibals.

Atlasov met no resistance when he advanced to the sea to check the rumor of the mysterious stranger on the shore; indeed, his party found the land deserted. But when he came at last to the river Nan, which is in South Kamchatka, in the province then called Anadyr, he found the castaway living in a native hut upon the remnants of rotten fish and roots left behind by the frightened Kamchadals.

"He speaks a tongue which I do not understand," Atlasov reported, "but he looks like a Greek, for his mustache is short and his hair is black and he is very thin. When he saw our ikons, he cried as though with homesickness and seemed to recognize their purpose."

Atlasov was no scholar, but it required little learning to realize that the foreigner was no Greek. His next guess, therefore, labelled the half-starved stranger as a Hindu; when he saw a book written with incomprehensible scrawls, Atlasov grew certain that the fellow

came from India. More expert linguists in the Atlasov expedition, versed in Kamchadal, a language not well adapted to expression of the finer shades of meaning, certified that this guess was correct. Probably they knew no better, but perhaps they did not deem it safe to contradict a leader of Atlasov's quick temper and lasting memory.

For two years, Atlasov and the stranger lived together, each coming to understand the strange explorer jargon that was a confused and irrational mixture of Russian, Koryak, and Kamchadal. The Hindu was polite and only too willing to please; apparently, he agreed with almost everything that Atlasov suggested, for he reported that he was indeed an Indian coming from a land where there was an abundance of wealth and where the ruler lived in palaces built of solid gold and silver.

Such, at least, was Atlasov's impression; for the truth was that the stranger, whose name was Denbei, followed the customary Asiatic practice of giving an affirmative answer to every question asked of him. Such customs are good manners in the East; they mean nothing except that the listener has heard the question asked and that he is giving due attention to its answer; but foreigners like Atlasov, unaware of the finer shades of Oriental courtesy, misunderstood the quick assent as an affirmation. When Atlasov inquired if Denbei was a Hindu, the latter nodded his agreement and thus misled his questioner.

The fact is, Denbei told the truth. He came, said he, from Osaka, a town of which Atlasov had never heard and which the Russians understood to be "the Uzatinsk country." Atlasov then asked if this new land were tributary to the "Tsar of India," and Denbei answered yes, it was. He had been sailing, Denbei said, to "Miyako" where the ruler, "Dain-Sama," lived; but Atlasov knew nothing of the poetic name for Kyoto, and even less of the Kubo-Sama, the ancient name of the shogun; he inquired if Miyako was in India, and he understood Denbei to agree.

It was all very confused, but Atlasov, not trained in higher criticism, swallowed everything excitedly. Denbei, he realized, was too important a find to be detained in the Kamchadal hut; such a captive deserved to be cared for at Irkutsk until such time as Moscow itself should hear of him and send its orders.

Atlasov, therefore, buckled snowshoes on the castaway and started off across the snow. After five days of extremely hard plodding, during which the supposed Hindu struggled manfully but in vain, the prisoner's feet began to swell, and the man could go no further.



Atlasov left him with a small escort to recover, giving the curious order that when Denbei's feet were cured the captive should go back to Anadyr to start all over again. What the explanation may have been for thus retracing steps unnecessarily is now lost in the mists of history; but as "the prisoner was very sensible and courteous," no objection seems to have been made.

Apparently, Denbei never really learned to manage snowshoes; for, although Atlasov instructed his agent, Grigory Posnikov, to bring him on as fast as possible to Irkutsk, paying Posnikov thirty-five red fox pelts for his trouble and for the hire of necessary escorts, Denbei reached the east Siberian capital only in the fall of 1701; he had spent the spring and summer on the way.

By this time, Moscow was impatient. Atlasov had registered his discovery at the Siberian Chancellery on February 10, 1701, and Peter the Great had listened with impatience to the report of a strange castaway whom no one could identify. Moscow was certain that the man could be no Hindu, much less a Greek, and, in its greater knowledge of the world, suspected that Denbei could be none other than a Japanese. If so, Denbei would be the first native of that country to fall into Russian hands; if he was as intelligent as Atlasov's narrative declared, he would be of inestimable benefit to the Tsar in telling the real truth about what sort of country the mysterious hidden nation was. Peter ordered that the man be hurried at once from Irkutsk to the capital.

The Tsar's explicit orders show his anxiety that Denbei arrive safe and unharmed. By his command an escort was to be provided so that "the foreigner who is traveling from Irkutsk to Moscow, the one captured in Kamchatka, be brought to Moscow with all possible speed and be surrounded with every safeguard against untoward accident. The stranger must be protected in every way and not stinted in the least in either food or clothing; should he need these, the guard must buy everything that he requires. Money will be issued for the purpose by the Siberian Chancellery."

Such, however, had been Atlasov's speed in rushing to Moscow and such had been Denbei's delay that Peter's order, issued on November 1, reached Irkutsk on the return journey before Denbei even arrived at that frontier post. To the castaway's astonishment, for he had supposed that he was to be jailed, as he knew his own countrymen thus cavalierly treated foreigners, he was greeted with unexpected courtesy. Governor Dorofey Traurnicht presented him with two pieces of heavy cloth for capes; nineteen arshins, or yards, of stuff for clothing; a ruble's worth of deerskins (hard cash bought

several at that price); and two rubles' worth of shoes and food and incidentals. When the clothes were finished and Denbei's feet had recovered from the hardships of his journey from Kamchatka to Irkutsk, Ivan Safroniev appeared with fifty Cossacks to guide him to the Tsar. The escort raced so rapidly over Asia that, leaving Irkutsk on November 21, the party came to Peter the Great's capital four days after Christmas. Safroniev turned the precious passenger over to the Tsar's agents, drew a voucher for eight rubles that had been spent for Denbei's comfort—he received sables to square the account—and the Siberians and Kamchadals vanished from Denbei's life forever.

Thenceforth, the castaway Japanese existed as a living museum piece, a permanent human anthropological exhibit. He lived among the wise men of Moscow, subsisting on five kopeks' worth of food daily doled out to him from official funds.

The scenes when the Moscow wise men, conversant with Greek and Hindu, probed Denbei's knowledge must have been dramatic; but no one thought to make a record of their disappointments when Denbei's words proved incomprehensible. The latter, luckily, appears to have had something of a flair for languages, for he had picked up the rudiments of Russian while living with Atlasov and while en route across the continent with Safroniev; in broken and badly accented Russian that was mixed with Koryak and Kamchadal and that was illustrated by gestures and quickly sketched pictures, he gave the highlights of an adventurous career.

He had sailed, it appeared, from Osaka on a coastal trading ship bound for Yedo—which we call Tokyo—and which was then, as now, the chief commercial center of Japan. He was supercargo; his clumsy, high-sterned junk formed one of a convoy of thirty vessels carrying rice, wine, nankeens, sugar, flour, sandalwood, and iron to the Shogun's capital to be sold for silks, linens, and specie.

Japanese seagoing vessels in those days of economic seclusion were, to say the least, unseaworthy. Their design was bad, partly because the Japanese still followed ancient Chinese models, but more because the empire deliberately frowned upon the building of efficient ships capable of withstanding stress of storm. If, the shoguns reasoned, Japan built modern ocean-going vessels, its people might be tempted to venture overseas and thus become corrupted with undesired ideas of progress. Lumbering hundred-foot coastal craft, broad-beamed and topheavy, navigated well enough near shore in quiet seas; to venture far away was to court suicide.

Luck fought against poor Denbei. His ship, the property of an

Osaka merchant named Avashi, met a sudden storm, the kind of unexpected, howling gale that sets in along Japan's eastern coast in December and January and that sweeps unwary junks from safe waters close to shore into the broad Pacific. Denbei and his comrades knew their peril; the high seas smashed their rudder and made them helpless victims of the gale. Worse still, if the storm continued longer than was usual, there was grave danger that the junk would be carried out into the dreaded Kuroshiwo, the great Black Stream that runs like a river through the western Pacific as the Gulf Stream flows through the Atlantic. The Kuroshiwo is a godsend to Japan; its warm water tempers the climate of the eight great islands and spares them from the arctic cold that grips comparable latitudes in eastern America; it makes possible the bloom of plum trees at a time when less favored lands are frozen tight by winter. But it also flows inexorably, ten miles northward each day; a broken junk caught in this flow is carried to the Arctic or across the ocean.

Such was Denbei's fate. For twenty-eight weeks, continuous strong winds blew off shore, carrying the junk into the wide and lonely ocean. To save themselves from voyaging too far, they chopped down their mast so that it would trail, with all sails spread, in the water and thus slow the rate of drifting. They watched their two lifeboats wash away in the gale, and they knew then that they could do nothing but hope.

Fortunately they had food in plenty. Their fresh water gave out in about two months; but they had 500 barrels of wine, and so they boiled their rice in wine and they sweetened the mess with candy. When, at last, the gales subsided and the sea calmed, they fished a tree trunk from the water; and with this, and the remnants of their broken mast, they fashioned a jury mast that carried sails cut from their nankeen cargo. Then, steering as best they could with an oar and sailing with the rude and inefficient rigging, they set a compass course due west to the nearest land.

They rate much credit, these luckless Japanese who battled for their lives; their exploit was heroic and successful. In time, they glimpsed the Asiatic shore and met some natives. Denbei, the scribe and supercargo, tried to talk to the Kamchadals but could not be understood; with that naïve confidence that all Orientals place in the magic of the written word, he wrote a letter to the native leader, expecting to be answered by some intelligible message; but that worthy, who had never in his life seen writing, bowed politely and put the paper in his bosom as a souvenir. The natives then departed, taking three Japanese with them. The men were never seen again.

Denbei and his nine remaining comrades waited for the Kamchadals' return.

Morning brought four native canoes, but this was apparently a scouting party; the canoes watched from a distance and then paddled off again. All day passed in loneliness; but at night forty canoes suddenly appeared from around the river bend, crowded with at least two hundred natives, all of whom shot arrows furiously at the Japanese. Denbei's friends scurried off to safety in the hills, but Denbei dashed to the junk. Relying, as a supercargo would, on the power of bribery, he tossed out bundles of nankeens as gifts to the natives; he followed these with wine. The offer proved successful. The curious Kamchadals sniffed the rice and tasted the wine; but Japanese sake is not appealing when it is not heated; and so, to Denbei's grief, they poured the wine into the sea, but they saved the barrels as a storage place for fish.

This was the rotted fish on which the castaway was living when Atlasov arrived. No one would have called it appetizing; for the Kamchadal method of curing fish was to put the catch into a ditch; cover it with seaweed, drift wood, and rubbish; and let nature take its course. When, in Denbei's words, "the fish are entirely fermented," they put the fish into the rice barrels, covered it with water, and dropped in heated stones, adding mushrooms of a variety which Denbei thought poisonous.

"It makes them always drunk," reported Denbei simply.

Such, at least, was the story which the Russians pieced together from Denbei's polylingual and much confused recital of his adventures. That it made a stir in Moscow is apparent. Peter the Great, already impatient to meet the stranger, insisted on an audience; and, on January 8, 1702, the excited Denbei was taken to Preobrazhenskoe to meet the Tsar.

Again, it is unfortunate that no good reporter jotted down notes concerning the events. Denbei chattered an unbroken stream. Apparently, he felt no awe at thus interviewing the Tsar of all the Russias; and instead of being impressed by the grandeur of the occasion, he seems to have looked upon the affair as a stage upon which he could strut dramatically. How Peter felt about it does not appear; but the spectacle of the penniless, homeless castaway playing the rôle of center of attention must have stirred his sense of humor, else Denbei would have gone to jail if, indeed, he kept his life.

For Denbei used the opportunity to advertise the greatness of Japan. He told the Tsar that China was part of Japan, joined by a land bridge over which he had personally travelled several times;

that there was usually neither frost nor chill in Japan, and that snow, when it falls, lasts only for a single day; that the Japanese eat birds, "the size of a bull, with white feathers, black tails, and red feet"; that the fish are huge, fifteen feet in length; and that the people keep cannon in their homes.

By Denbei's story, the Japanese were supermen—a trait of national pride that has not yet entirely died—and Peter must have laughed his head off at Denbei's evident exaggerations. In talking of his dangers on the sea, Denbei drew the long bow rather further than was necessary; indeed, said he, no Japanese need ever fear the ocean because, as he insisted, it is impossible for a Japanese ship to sink. As to treasure, why nothing could compare with the gold and silver of Japan; indeed, when he went ashore at Kamchatka, Denbei boasted, he had taken with him two boxes of small gold coins that weighed no less than two poods, or eighty pounds!

How much of this was true is open to anyone's guess, although the unveracious chroniclers insist that his appearance and his words had the ring of truth about them. But eighty pounds of gold is almost a thousand Troy ounces; and with gold at its present price of \$35 an ounce, the sum that Denbei claimed that he brought ashore would mount into a fair sized total. Unfortunately, however, Peter could not lay his hands upon the wealth. "The Kamchadals did not know what to do with money," Denbei mourned; "they gave it to their children as playthings and the coin was irretrievably lost forever."

Whether or not Peter the Great believed the romantic castaway, Denbei's *skazka* inspired him to keep the stranger under observation. He sent the Japanese back into official custody, under the five kopek's daily allowance for food, with instructions that he was to learn Russian as rapidly as possible. "As soon as he is familiar with the language," Peter added, "he must tutor Russians in the Japanese tongue." As a check upon the assiduous performance of this task, regular reports were to be forwarded to the court. Prince Michael Petrovich Gagarin was to supervise the work.

Thus began the famous "school," established by Peter the Great in 1706. No record now exists to show how many Russians studied Japanese under Denbei's tutoring, but apparently he was sufficiently successful to be maintained in his teaching post. And, in his turn, Denbei must have lived a comparatively happy life; for, in 1710, he accepted Christianity, no doubt with inner reservations concerning the imperial divinity, and took the new name of Gavril.

Nor was Denbei lonely all his life. About the same time as his



christening, other unfortunate seafaring men, caught like Denbei in the quick gales that spring up on the Japanese coast, passed through identical experiences. The ship *Wakashima* of Satsuma, richly laden with precious stuffs and silver as a tribute to the shogun, washed up at Awatscha Bay on the Kamchatkan coast. These survivors escaped the fury of the Kamchadals, but they met an even worse fate in the person of an ambitious young Russian officer who, anxious for glory, shot fifteen half-starved unfortunates. Two men escaped the massacre; and these, the aged merchant Sosa and the young pilot Gonza, trekked across the frozen wastes of Siberia to report the outrage to army headquarters at Irkutsk. Their report caused the arrest of the brutal murderer, who was hanged, in the presence of the Japanese, for his heartlessness; Sosa and Gonza were then forwarded to St. Petersburg to join their compatriot. So, also, were two Japanese whom the Russians called Kuzma "Schultz" and Damian "Pomortsev," who were found in Kamchatka in 1729 and who were forwarded at once to the Japanese school at the capital. The date of Denbei's death is not known, but he was certainly alive when Sosa and Gonza arrived at the Tsar's court in 1729, and he may have been one of the group next year to greet Schultz and Pomortsev, too. In any case, the Japanese colony in the fourth decade of the century numbered at least four men and may have numbered five.

That it had its influence is evident. Everyone knew that Denbei had exaggerated his claims to the greatness of Japan; but Peter the Great was sufficiently interested to fit out an expedition, under Ivan Petrovich Kosirevsky, "to investigate Kamchatka and the nearby islands, to inquire into what government the people owe allegiance and to force tribute from those who have no sovereign, to inform himself as much as may be possible about Japan and the way thither, what weapons the inhabitants have and how they wage war, whether they might be willing to enter into friendly and commercial relations and, if so, what kind of merchandise they might be induced to buy."

Kosirevsky's fifty Russians and eleven Kamchadals, together with one of Denbei's students as interpreter, crossed in small skiffs to the first Kurile island, not far from Paramushiro, and, in August 1711, skirmished with the natives. The "battle" cost the lives of ten Kurile natives and ended in what Kosirevsky proudly called "a promise of eternal subjection." But the second Kurile island was more heavily protected; and although Kosirevsky tried three times to land, he was unable to annex the country.

At all events, the constant border skirmishings between Russia

and Japan had at last begun. Kosirevsky himself failed dismally, particularly after he was arraigned for stealing plunder for himself that should have gone to the Tsar's treasury; he retired into seclusion to become a sort of Asiatic "peasant saint" of the Rasputin pattern. But thereafter, until Peter the Great died in 1725, the ambitious Tsar seemed determined to annex Denbei's empire to his own.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Virtually all the Denbei material, as might have been expected, is in Russian; no Japanese source with which I am familiar mentions him in any way. This is, of course, due to the fact that Denbei cut himself off from inclusion among reputable Japanese by his removal, even though by no fault of his own, to foreign lands; the Japanese law, during the period of the Tokugawa exclusion policy, was adamant upon such matters.

In English, only the present writer's *Aliens in the East*, Philadelphia, 1937 (where the castaway is mistakenly called Debune) and his "The Kuroshiwo's Toll," published in the *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, 2nd Series, vol. XVII, Tokyo, 1938, treat of Denbei's experiences.

In Russian, the best source consists of several articles in *Russkaia Starina*, a monthly historical publication founded in St. Petersburg in 1870 by Michael Semevsky. N. N. Ogloblin, in the issue for October, 1891, published "Pervyi Iaponets v Rossii," giving the main basis of the story and reprinting the Denbei *skazka* in complete detail as he found it in the archives of the Siberian Chancellery. A further note, by D. P. Strukov, clarifying some of Ogloblin's statements, appeared in the following month. In March, 1892, P. A. Mullov told of later arrivals in "Iapontsy v Rossii v 1736 godu"; and in September, 1892, the travel notes of N. M. Solovyev, under the head of "Putevyia zapiski morekhoda 1770-1775," added yet more details. These *Russkaia Starina* articles have direct references to the material in the Russian archives and give definite citations.

Corroborative material may be found in the following:  
Brooks, Charles Walcott, "Japanese Wrecks," *Transactions*, California Academy of Science, 1875.

Golder, Frank A., *Russian Expansion in the Pacific*, Cleveland, 1914.

King, C. W., *Voyages of the Morrison and the Himmaleh*, New York, 1839.

Mueller, Gerhard Friedrich, *Voyages From Asia to America*, London, 1764.

# The Early American Observers of the Russian Revolution, 1917-1921

By DIMITRI VON MOHRENSCHILDT

AMERICAN news of Russia from the Bolshevik coup d'état of November 7, 1917 to the end of the civil wars in the spring of 1921 was confused and contradictory. Representatives of the American conservative press were not admitted to Soviet Russia and were reporting either from neighboring Baltic states or the territories occupied by the White armies; consequently, their reports were, for the most part, prejudiced and unreliable.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, foreign representatives of the American liberal and left-wing press, who were admitted to Russia, were scarcely better equipped to give a fairer picture of the great Russian upheaval. The difficulties of reporting Russia were enormous—a totally unfamiliar country in a state approaching anarchy, a strange and difficult language, strict censorship.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, it was only natural that American correspondents in Moscow were prone to conceal the darker side unfavorable to the Bolshevik régime; some because of personal sympathies with the ideals of the Revolution, others for fear of incurring the régime's enmity and, as a consequence, being forced to leave the country. Thus dispassionate and accurate reporting of the early phase of the Revolution was out of the question.

What type of men were the Bolshevik leaders? What kind of government did they set up? Would this new government last?

<sup>1</sup>Walter Lippman and Charles Merz in an article in *The New Republic*, August 4, 1920, analyzed news of Russia appearing in *The New York Times* from March, 1917 to March, 1920. The authors found this news on the whole unreliable, because of excessive reliance on official government sources and because of the fact that the personal sympathies of many of the correspondents were too deeply engaged on the side of the anti-Bolshevik forces. Partly because of this criticism *The New York Times* sent Walter Duranty as correspondent to Moscow in August, 1921.

<sup>2</sup>Famine areas, prison camps, areas of resistance to the Soviet government—were all taboo.

These were questions of vital interest to all classes of Americans. The demand for authentic information about revolutionary Russia was supplied by two groups of American-English eyewitnesses and observers; one, highly favorable to the Communist Revolution and the newly established régime; the other, uncompromisingly hostile. It was the first of these groups of original reporters that was largely responsible for creating a sympathetic attitude toward the new Russia among the literary, artistic, and academic groups in America.

The early pro-Soviet American observers of the Russian Revolution were a picturesque and adventurous group of "poetic journalists and journalistic poets," as they were sometimes called at the time. John Reed, the poet-revolutionary buried in the Kremlin wall and Louise Bryant, his journalist wife; Albert Rhys Williams, the ex-minister from Ohio, like Reed an eyewitness and active participant in the Bolshevik upheaval; Lincoln Steffens and William Bullitt, special Washington emissaries to Lenin in 1919; William Boyce Thompson, the copper magnate, and his colleague, the wealthy up-lifter, Raymond Robins, both American Red Cross representatives in Russia in 1917; Jerome Davis, in 1917-1918 in charge of YMCA war work in Russia and later Professor of Practical Philanthropy at Yale; E. A. Ross, Professor of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin—a free-lance observer; Isaac Don Levine, Bessy Beatty, Lincoln Eyre, Morgan P. Price, Arthur Ransome, Thomas Goode, and Henry N. Brailsford—foreign correspondents, the last four British.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup>The English observers are included because their reports were well known in America and had a strong influence on American liberal opinion.

Of this group of observers in 1943 only A. R. Williams and Jerome Davis remain as occasional writers and commentators on Soviet affairs. The others either died or became inactive, losing their status as Soviet authorities. The following are some of the better known reports on revolutionary Russia, favorable to the Bolshevik régime, published between 1917 and 1921:

Bessy Beatty, *Red Heart of Russia*, New York, The Century, 1918.

Louise Bryant, *Six Red Months in Russia*, New York, G. H. Doran, 1919.

William C. Bullitt, *The Bullitt Mission to Russia*, New York, B. W. Huebsch, 1919.

Sherwood Eddy, *Everybody's World*, New York, G. H. Doran, 1920.

Lincoln Eyre, *Russia Analyzed*, New York, The World, 1920.

Thomas Goode, *Bolshevism at Work*, New York, Harcourt and Brace, 1920.

Maurice Hindus, *The Russian Peasant and the Revolution*, New York, H. Holt, 1920.

Morgan P. Price, *War and Revolution in Asiatic Asia*, New York, Macmillan, 1918.

Arthur Ransome, *Russia in 1918*, New York, B. W. Huebsch, 1919.

John Reed, *Ten Days that Shook the World*, New York, Boni and Liveright, 1919.

Except for Reed and Williams, who were converted to Marxism, the other observers would probably have considered themselves liberals or progressives, though they were all already disillusioned in the "plutocratic" civilization of their native lands. Their reports were, in various degrees, favorable to the newly established régime.

There was no disagreement among this group of observers on the crucial and most controversial issues regarding the Bolshevik insurrection—its origin, leaders, and the nature of the government they had set up.

John Reed, who participated in the Bolshevik coup d'état of November 7, was first to describe it as a "mass revolt."<sup>4</sup> The same impression of a mass movement which swept the Bolsheviks into power was created in the writings and public utterances of A. R. Williams, Jerome Davis, W. C. Bullitt, Lincoln Steffens, and Colonel Raymond Robins. The latter estimated that only seven per cent of the population were against the new government: "The Bolsheviks won Russia with five words. They said: 'All power to the Soviets'."<sup>5</sup> Once in power, the Bolsheviks were supported by the vast majority of the Russian people. "Never in the history of modern Russia," wrote I. D. Levine in 1919, "has any government had more real authority than the present Soviet system . . . even the blind observer here quickly sees that a formidable majority of the nation favors the Soviet government."<sup>6</sup>

Edward A. Ross, *Russia in Upheaval*, New York, The Century, 1918.

*The Russian Bolshevik Revolution*, New York, The Century, 1921.

Oliver M. Sayler, *Russian Theater under the Revolution*, Boston, Little Brown, 1920.

Albert R. Williams, *Through the Russian Revolution*, New York, Boni and Liveright, 1921.

*The Bolsheviks and the Soviets*, (pam.), New York, Rand School of Social Science, 1919.

Albert R. Williams, Raymond Robbins, and Arthur Ransome, *Lenin, the Man and his Work*, New York, Scott and Seltzer, 1919.

<sup>4</sup>John Reed, *Ten Days that Shook the World*, New York, Modern Library Edition, p. 292.

<sup>5</sup>William Hard, "Bolshevik Russia," *Metropolitan Magazine*, June, 1919.

<sup>6</sup>I. D. Levine's dispatch from Moscow to the *New York Globe*, May 19, 1919. As a matter of historical fact, the Bolsheviks themselves had, at the time, no such illusions. Lenin himself in his speeches in 1918-1919 freely spoke of the peasants' indifference and even hostility to the Bolshevik régime. "We must win over to our side," said Zinoviev in an address to the Petrograd Soviet on September 18, 1918, "ninety million of the hundred million population of Russia under the Soviets. As for the rest, we have nothing to say to them; they must be annihilated." *The Northern Commune*, September 19, 1918.



Of all the Bolshevik leaders, Lenin was by far the most popular and excited the greatest admiration on the part of this group of observers. He was described as the greatest mass leader of modern times, selfless, bold, "a man of loftiest idealism and most stern practical sagacity." According to Lincoln Steffens, Lenin, compared to President Wilson, was a navigator; while Wilson was a mere sailor. Trotsky appears to have been less popular and was generally described as brilliant, but vain and arrogant.<sup>8</sup> All commentators agreed that the Bolshevik leaders were sincere and courageous international socialists whose ultimate aim was world revolution and the establishment of a communist classless state, according to the Marxian formula.

In a general way the Soviet system, during its first three years of existence, was represented by these observers as either an industrial and economic democracy based on the democratic organization of the local soviets (John Reed, A. R. Williams, Edward Ross, Jerome Davis), or as a temporary dictatorship of the Communist Party, in process of evolution toward a socialist, classless state (Lincoln Steffens, Lincoln Eyre, William Bullitt). So interpreted, Bolshevik Russia conformed to the ideal of a society that the socially-minded American intellectuals were dreaming about long before World War I. In the opinion of these reporters such a society deserved the utmost sympathy and support of every progressive and liberal-minded American.

In an open letter to American workingmen on August 20, 1918, Lenin justified the red terror on the ground that it was necessary to protect the Revolution from its enemies. This explanation was generally accepted by the early pro-Soviet commentators. All revolutions are bloody; and violence, they argued, must run its course. Some admitted excesses in the suppression of old non-Bolshevik revolutionaries, but justified them by the exigencies of the times, i.e., civil war and allied intervention.<sup>9</sup> Others went further and denied the existence of the red terror altogether.

<sup>8</sup>See *Lenin, the Man and his Work*, 1919, a joint tribute by A. R. Williams, Colonel Raymond Robins, and Arthur Ransome.

<sup>9</sup>See Lincoln Eyre, *Russia Analyzed*, 1920.

<sup>10</sup>John Reed's attitude in this connection, as reported by Emma Goldman in 1919, is characteristic: "I don't give a damn for their past [that of the pre-Bolshevik revolutionaries]. I'm concerned only with what this treacherous gang has been doing during the past three years. To the wall with them! I say I have learned one mighty expressive word: 'raztrelyat' (execute by shooting)."

Steffens and Bullitt reported in 1919 that the destructive phase of the Revolution was over and that terror had ceased.<sup>10</sup> Colonel Robins testified before the Senate Committee on March 6, 1919, that he had traveled all over Russia twice and had seen no evidence of terror. A. R. Williams in his speeches in 1919 praised the humaneness of the Bolsheviks and cited as proof the abolition of capital punishment. "No doubt there were single hours in the world war," observed Professor E. A. Ross, "when more Russian lives were consumed than the Red Terror ever took . . . it accomplished its purpose in that the bourgeoisie suddenly ceased to plot. . ."<sup>11</sup> Such statements were accepted as authentic and were widely cited in the liberal American press.<sup>12</sup>

So far as other repressive and anti-democratic features of the new régime were concerned—the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in February, 1918; the suppression of free speech and assembly, of labor unions, of local soviets opposed to Lenin's policy of inciting class warfare in the villages—these were absent in the reports and speeches of the early pro-Soviet observers.<sup>13</sup>

While generally ignoring or minimizing the repressive features, enthusiastic accounts were given of the educational and cultural accomplishments of the new régime. "The Soviet government," declared William Bullitt in his report of 1919, "seems to have done more for the education of the Russian people in a year and a half than Czardom did in fifty years."<sup>14</sup> Voicing the prevalent enthusiasm for the educational accomplishments of the Bolsheviks, the British journalist H. N. Brailsford thus concluded his series of articles on Russia in the December 22, 1920 issue of *The New Republic*: "They [i.e. the Bolsheviks] stand for rationalism, for an intelligent system

<sup>10</sup>W. C. Bullitt, *The Bullitt Mission to Russia*, p. 50.

<sup>11</sup>E. A. Ross, *The Russian Soviet Republic*, p. 177.

<sup>12</sup>Mass terror was officially inaugurated at a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Bolshevik Party on July 31, 1918, actually before the allied intervention got under way. For statistics on the red terror see the Scotch professor Sarolea's figures in *The Scotsman*, No. 7, Edinburgh, November, 1923; and Melgunov, *The Red Terror*, London, J. W. Dent and Sons, 1926.

<sup>13</sup>See characteristic reports on this subject: Arthur Ransome, "An Open Letter to America," *The New Republic*, July 27, 1918 and the Russian issue of *The Dial*, December 14, 1918. Soviet persecution of religion, and their attacks on the "bourgeois" institutions of marriage and family were generally approved by such observers as A. R. Williams, Raymond Robins, E. A. Ross, and Jerome Davis.

<sup>14</sup>W. Bullitt, *The Bullitt Mission to Russia*, p. 51.

of cultivation, for education, and for an active ideal of cooperation and social service against superstition, waste, illiteracy, and passive obedience. . . ."

There was complete agreement in regard to the future of the Bolshevik state. All the observers of this group believed that the Bolshevik government was to stay and that no power on earth could dislodge it. Without exception they attacked Wilson's policy of intervention, characterizing it as "a stab in Russia's back." They demanded the withdrawal of American troops from Siberia and Murmansk and urged the establishment of immediate friendly relations with the Soviet government. "Democratic Russia," wrote Sherwood Eddy in 1920, "turns to the great democracy, America, for help and cooperation."

The realization of the vast significance of the events witnessed had a vitalizing and stimulating effect on all these early observers. The Revolution was "a great show" and an exciting adventure. "I have been alive at a great moment," wrote Bessy Beatty in 1918, "and knew that it was great." "It was the dawn of a new world . . . socialism here and now. . . ." wrote ecstatically Louise Bryant. "I had the sense," wrote Henry Brailsford, "that I was watching a gigantic effort of creation."

No doubt the perennial appeal of Russia for foreigners, especially Anglo-Saxons, had an effect on their reports. Their writings are, in fact, full of enthusiastic descriptions of the Russian scenery, the theater, and ballet; the friendliness and hospitality of the people; the absence of commercialism and of middle class standards and conventions—characteristics which were permanent properties of the Russian people and were only accentuated by the topsy-turvy world created by the Revolution. But few of these early observers had any knowledge of pre-revolutionary Russia, Ransome excepted. The old régime, they took for granted, represented tyranny and oppression; the new—progress and social enlightenment.

A spirit of lyrical exultation pervaded the early reports of the pro-Bolshevik observers. Reed's vivid account of the ten days that shook the world set an example in form and style for some time to come; and the literature of the period consisted mostly of colorful sketches of revolutionary scenes and atmospheres, records of Lenin's speeches, dialogues caught on the streets, and of inspired essays on the accomplishments of the new régime. These early reporters, as Eugene Lyons observed, "wrote as inspired prophets of an embattled revolution . . . they were dazzled by a vision of things to come."

Not all the original reports on the Russian Revolution were favorable, however, to the new régime. Some were from the outset uncompromisingly hostile to the policies and practices of the Bolsheviks. The anti-Bolshevik observers were partly United States diplomats and agents of the State Department sent to Russia on special missions, and partly disillusioned American and English radicals, socialists and anarchists.<sup>15</sup> They attacked the Revolution on the grounds that it was violent in origin and anti-democratic in character. Some of their criticisms on this score, ignored at the time, were accepted by many liberal American intellectuals only some eighteen years later.

The American Ambassador to Russia, David Francis, repeatedly advised the United States government that Bolshevism was a menace to Russia and to the world. The new government, he reported, represented only less than three percent of the population and maintained itself in power by terror and demagoguery; it was more concerned with world revolution than with Russia's national interests. "We owe it to ourselves," he wrote in his diary, "if we would pre-

<sup>15</sup>The following are some of the better known reports by anti-Bolshevik observers, published between 1917 and 1921:

Herman Bernstein, *The Bolshevik World Dynamiters*, (pam.), New York, National Security League, 1919.

Arthur Bullard, *The Russian Pendulum: Autocracy—Democracy—Bolshevism*, New York, Macmillan, 1919.

Malcolm W. Davis, *Open Gates to Russia*, New York and London, Harper & Bros., 1920.

David Francis, *Russia from the American Embassy, April, 1916 — November, 1918*, New York, Scribners, 1921.

Cecil Malone, *The Russian Republic*, New York, Harcourt, Brace & Howe, 1920.

Ernest Poole, *The Dark People, Russia's Crisis*, New York, Macmillan, 1918.

Bertrand Russell, *Bolshevism—Practice and Theory*, New York, Harcourt & Brace, 1920.

Charles Edward Russell, *Bolshevism and the United States*, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1919.

*Unchained Russia*, New York, Appleton Century, 1918.

Edgar Sisson, *The German-Bolshevik Conspiracy: A Report by Edgar Sisson*, War Information Series, No. 20, (pam.), Washington, D. C., 1918.

John Spargo, *The Greatest Failure in All History*, New York, Harper & Bros., 1920.

*Bolshevism, the Enemy of Political and Industrial Democracy*, New York, Harper & Bros., 1919.

*Psychology of Bolshevism*, New York, Harper & Bros., 1919.

*Russia as an American Problem*, New York, Harper & Bros., 1920.

W. E. Walling, *Sovietism—the ABC of Russian Bolshevism*, New York, E. P. Dutton, 1920.

serve our institutions, to eradicate this foul monster—Bolshevism—branch, trunk, and root.”<sup>16</sup>

Edgar Sisson, special representative of President Wilson in Russia in 1918, provided an especially damaging testimony against the government of Lenin and Trotsky. His famous documents undertook to show that the Bolshevik leaders were acting as German agents, betraying the interests of Russia and her allies. On September 15, 1918, by order of President Wilson, the so-called Sisson's documents began to appear serially in the *New York Times* and the *New York Evening Post*. They caused a national furor and started a controversy as to their authenticity which has never been definitely settled.<sup>17</sup>

Sharply critical of the Bolshevik theory and practice were the pre-war socialists: Arthur Bullard, W. E. Walling, Ernest Poole, John Spargo, C. E. Russell, and the English philosopher Bertrand Russell. Except for Spargo, these men knew Russia well—Walling and Bullard being probably the best informed Americans on Russian affairs before World War I.

Bullard was an eyewitness of the Bolshevik insurrection, and his book, *The Russian Pendulum: Autocracy — Democracy — Bolshevism*, 1919, was a strong indictment of the new régime. He described the Bolshevik leaders as reckless and unscrupulous demagogues who capitalized on the country's war-weariness and general demoralization. Lenin, he wrote, seized power through violent means and maintained himself in power by methods no better than those of the Romanovs. The new government, he thought, was in no way representative of the people.

Like Bullard, William English Walling took a strongly anti-Bolshevik stand. In his book, *Sovietism—the ABC of Russian Bolshevism*, 1920, he brought together a number of Soviet decrees, speeches, excerpts from the official press. These showed the violent

<sup>16</sup>David Francis, *Russia from the American Embassy*, p. 349.

<sup>17</sup>Sisson described how these documents were obtained in his book, *One Hundred Red Days*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1931. Upon the publication of his documents, H. Alsberg, John Reed, and Santeri Nuorteva, a Finnish Communist, charged forgery. Thereupon, the National Board of Historic Service, a committee consisting of Professors F. Jamison, A. Coolidge of Harvard, and S. Harper of Chicago, undertook to investigate. Their decision, was that fifty-three of the sixty-eight documents were genuine. The others were doubtful. After the Nazi-Soviet pact was signed, some observers reinvestigated these documents. See James R. Mock and Cedric Larson, *Words that Won the War: the Story of the Committee on Public Information, 1917-1919*, Princeton University Press, 1939.



origin and the fundamentally anti-liberal and anti-democratic character of the new régime. He brought out the ruthless suppression of all opposition, the deliberate policy of terror, forced labor conscription, the Soviet policy of inciting civil war in the villages. By quoting the Bolshevik leaders themselves, the author confronted the American supporters of the Bolshevik régime (W. Bullitt, L. Steffens, Colonel R. Robins) who, he thought, were unwittingly "laying the foundations in America for a permanent anti-democratic revolutionary movement on the European model."<sup>18</sup>

Charles Edward Russell, the well known pre-war socialist and reformer from Iowa, in his book, *Bolshevism and the United States*, 1919, bitterly attacked the Bolsheviks as a political tyranny. He described the passing of the ballot box and cooperatives, the breakdown of transportation, and the terror of the Cheka. Bolshevism and the traditional American concepts of life and society were irreconcilable, he thought; and the American Bolshevik sympathizers were merely deepening class hatred and were creating labor disturbances for years to come. In the end, he predicted, American labor will be the loser.

Perhaps the keenest and the most judicious report on Bolshevik Russia was that of the English philosopher, then a Communist, Bertrand Russell. His book, *Bolshevism: Practice and Theory*, 1920, was the outcome of the author's brief visit to Moscow in the summer of 1920, in the course of which he met and talked with Lenin, Trotsky, and other high Soviet officials. He also did some independent traveling and inquiring. Russell's main objection to the Bolsheviks was their violence and dogmatism. He found the leaders to be sincere but fanatical. Of Lenin he said, "I have never met a personage so destitute of self-importance. . . He laughs a great deal; at first his laugh seems merely friendly and jolly, but gradually I came to feel it rather grim. He is dictatorial, calm, incapable of fear, extraordinarily devoid of self-seeking, an embodied theory. . . I got the impression that he despises a great many people and is an intellectual aristocrat."<sup>19</sup> Of Trotsky he thought that "his vanity was even greater than his love of power—the sort of vanity that one associates with an artist or actor."<sup>20</sup>

Politically, Russell criticized the Bolsheviks only when their methods seemed to him "to involve a departure from their own

<sup>18</sup>W. E. Walling, *Sovietism, the ABC of Russian Bolshevism*, p. 149.

<sup>19</sup>Bertrand Russell, *Bolshevism: Practice and Theory*, p. 36.

<sup>20</sup>*Op. cit.*, p. 42.

ideals." Thus he criticized the rise of the Soviet bureaucracy, the absence of all opposition, labor conscriptions, and the police system. Rightly, he emphasized the peculiarly Russian features of the Russian Revolution. "It may be that Russia needs sternness and discipline more than anything else; it may be that the revival of Peter the Great's methods is essential to progress . . . Bolshevism may be defended, possibly, as a dire discipline through which a backward nation is to be rapidly industrialized; but as an experiment in Communism, it has failed."<sup>21</sup> Nevertheless, he firmly believed that the régime was stable and that the allied policy of intervention was unjustifiable and foolish.

Thus two antagonistic and mutually contradictory interpretations of the Russian Revolution have arisen. No compromise between them was possible. There was flat disagreement between the two groups of observers as to the origin and nature of the Bolshevik Revolution, its leaders, conditions in Russia, the ultimate fate of the new régime. One group praised the leaders, was satisfied with existing conditions, prophesied that the Bolshevik régime would continue in power; the other group slandered the leaders, bitterly criticized the tyranny and cruelty of the new government, and with few exceptions foretold its speedy collapse. As the quarter century of subsequent Soviet history showed, both sides were right in some and wrong in other respects. But at the time everyone took sides. The Revolution was too great an upheaval, it challenged too many deep-rooted beliefs and traditions. It was impossible to compromise.

The liberal and progressive groups in America did not hesitate in making their choice. They gave at once their approval and support to those of the original observers who were favorable to Bolshevik Russia, while ignoring or openly attacking those who were antagonistic to the new régime.

The urge to believe in the success of the Russian Revolution is evident in all the liberal and left-wing magazines of the time. Herbert Croly's progressive *The New Republic*, O. G. Villard's *The Nation*, Norman Thomas' Christian-humanitarian *The World Tomorrow*, Thorsten Veblen's and John Dewey's *The Dial*, and above all, Max Eastman's *The Liberator*—were one hundred percent pro-Russian and pro-Soviet.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>21</sup>*Op. cit.*, p. 175.

<sup>22</sup>From March, 1918 to October, 1924 *The Liberator* was edited by Max Eastman and Floyd Dell. On November 1, 1924 it amalgamated with *The Labor Herald* to form *The Worker's Monthly*, under the control of American Commun-

*The Liberator*, an outgrowth of the pre-war radical monthly *The Masses* and like its predecessor composed of poets, artists, critics, and a miscellany of literary "highbrows," in March, 1918 became officially dedicated to the progress of socialism in Russia. "Never was the moment more auspicious to issue a great magazine of liberty. . ." said the foreword to the first issue, "with the Russian people in the lead, the world is entering upon the experiment of industrial and real democracy. . . America has extended her hand to the Russians. She will follow in their path." Beginning with the first issue, this colorful and enthusiastic publication ran serially John Reed's report of the Bolshevik uprising, published articles by Maxim Gorky, reviewed Russian political and literary news, championed immediate recognition of Soviet Russia, eulogized Lenin and Trotsky in sonnet form, systematically attacked all detractors of the Bolshevik régime. An ardent exponent of Soviet "democracy," *The Liberator* defended the dictatorship of the proletariat as a necessary stage in the evolution to Socialism. A similar attitude toward the new Russia was characteristic of other liberal and left-wing publications of the time.<sup>23</sup>

It is perhaps pertinent to ask what were some of the reasons that caused liberal-minded America to give its wholehearted support to a régime which from the outset was outspokenly anti-liberal and anti-bourgeois. One reason was, certainly, the misleading nature of the early pro-Bolshevik reports, i.e., their emphasis upon the popular origin of the Bolshevik uprising and the democratic character of the rising Bolshevik state. More fundamental, I think, was the reason that the American intelligentsia even before November, 1917 was already disillusioned in liberalism and political reformism.<sup>24</sup> With Lincoln Steffens, their chief spokesman, they believed that America had tried and had failed to achieve social justice through reform, and that it was only by changing the foundation of society that poverty, privileges, and graft could be eliminated. Social revolution was, thus, the only alternative; and Lenin's Russia, it was thought, had found a scientific solution for the chief social ills of our time.

ists: Robert Minor, C. E. Ruthenberg, Jay Lovestone, James Cannon, William Z. Foster, and others. Later the magazine once more changed its title to *The New Masses*.

<sup>23</sup>Especially *The New Republic*, *The Dial* through 1919, *The World Tomorrow*, *The Arbitrator*, *The Unpartisan Review*, *The Public*, *The Freeman*, *The Revolutionary Age*, *The Communist*, and *The Class Struggle*.

<sup>24</sup>I have in mind the Muckrakers, the pre-war Socialists, and the Bohemian radicals connected with *The Masses*.

# German Invasion and Russian Agriculture

BY LAZAR VOLIN

**A**N ANALYSIS of the war-time agricultural position in Russia is rendered extremely difficult by the meagerness and fragmentary character of available statistical and other relevant information, a situation greatly accentuated by, but not originating with, the war. Many interesting and important questions, therefore, must remain unanswered or speculative. Nevertheless, on the two paramount issues of food supply and agricultural policy some light can be thrown. It is to these fundamental questions in their broad aspects that the author will address himself in the present article.

## I.

The crucial factor as far as the food situation is concerned has been the loss of agricultural resources due to the Nazi invasion and occupation. A comparison with the First World War, which was no small affair as far as Russia was concerned, may help to drive the point home. After two years of hostilities, including the disastrous retreat of the Russian army in the summer of 1915, about 10 percent of the pre-war crop area was in the territory overrun by the enemy. The famous Russian "bread basket," which produced surpluses of grain, oilseeds, and sugar, both for export and for domestic consumption in deficient regions, was hardly touched by that war except on its southwestern fringe.

How different the picture now. At the time of the farthest advance of the German army in the autumn of 1942, a territory comprising something like 40 percent of pre-war crop area was overrun by the enemy. This included some of the most productive land, in such fertile regions as the Ukraine, Crimea, most of the Central Black Soil,<sup>1</sup> and the Don-North Caucasus areas. Since the yields of

<sup>1</sup>Much of the Orel, Kursk, and part of the Voronezh provinces. Parts of Tula and Ryazan provinces in the same area, invaded by the Nazis in 1941, were reconquered during the first Russian offensive in the winter of 1941-1942.

crops per acre were relatively high in these regions and a large proportion of such high food value crops as sugar beets and oilseeds grown, the loss of agricultural production was even greater than acreage figures indicate.

Much territory has been recovered since the winter of 1942-1943 in a series of offensives that have brought the Russians back from the Volga, the Don, and the Terek to the Dnieper. But in a large part of the regained area, which was a battleground in the autumn of 1942 and spring, 1943, with fighting swinging to and fro, obviously little was planted for the 1943 harvest. While it appears from the Soviet press that every effort was made to plant as large an acreage as possible in the regions that were reoccupied by the spring of 1943, still with the shortage of labor, draft power, and implements (following the double scorched earth drive, first by the retreating Russians and subsequently by the retreating Nazis) the acreage seeded must have been considerably below normal. The quality of sowing, too, must have been inferior with an adverse effect on crop yields. Thus, the reconquered area, at least until the harvest of 1944, will be a liability rather than an asset as far as the Russian food supply is concerned. Before the war, this area and the still occupied part of the Ukraine served as a granary for the rest of Russia.

It is true that Soviet Russia has another granary in the agricultural area that extends from the middle and lower Volga into western Siberia and the Kazak-Kirghiz steppes. This is the Russian spring grain belt, as distinguished from the higher yielding winter grain belt of the Ukraine and North Caucasus. Here too is the typical Russian dry region where devastating droughts are frequent. Much has been said about the agricultural expansion in the eastern part of this area beyond the Urals; but less has been heard about the growing population, which must be fed.

Taking into account the whole territory of uninvaded Russia, including the industrial regions of central Russia and Ural, the Far East, the cotton growing regions of Soviet Central Asia (Turkestan), and Transcaucasia, that vast area is shown by transportation statistics over a long period to be normally deficient with respect to grain and to be dependent upon shipments from the invaded surplus-producing regions of the Ukraine, Don-North Caucasus, and Central Black Soil. While the direction of such movement of grain does not change readily, the volume of shipments varies from year to year. It is governed by fluctuations of crops in the surplus and deficit regions and other factors, including the policy of the Soviet government, which has a monopolistic control of all but purely local petty



trade.

Thus according to transportation statistics during the years 1932-1934, the Ukraine, North Caucasus, and Central Black Soil area shipped out on the average 3 million metric tons of grain and flour.<sup>2</sup> The next and the last pre-war year for which similar data are available is the very good crop year of 1937, when the Ukraine and North Caucasus alone shipped a total of 5 million tons, excluding the Central Black Soil area for which figures are not given separately.<sup>3</sup> Some of this grain went into the northern invaded regions such as White Russia and Smolensk, which are also deficient in grain. But most of it was destined for the present uninvaded Russia.<sup>4</sup>

Since the war uninvaded Russia not only was deprived of these grain supplies but also had to help feed the people in the reconquered regions in addition to its own population, the army, and the refugees, the number of whom is not definitely known but was estimated in millions. For example, in the *New York Times* of August 29, 1943, Alexander Werth reported that: "Although the country around Kharkov is among the richest agricultural countries of the Ukraine, the town was left by the Germans in a state of economic chaos, and organization for at least the initial period of food-supply services into Kharkov by army authorities is essential."

Henry Shapiro of the United Press wrote on a visit to the Ukrainian front:

The Ukraine, once the 'breadbasket' of Russia, is a semi-wilderness. Almost 50 percent of its rich black earth lies fallow. One of Russia's most mechanized agricultural areas before the war, the Ukraine now has been reduced to the most primitive methods of cultivation. Women and children wander barefoot over the parched earth, foraging for food. The scars of war are everywhere. Villages are masses of rubble. Wrecks of trucks, tanks and guns litter the landscape. During a trip lasting several days I could count on the fingers of my hand the number of intact farmhouses seen in the area, where rivers once flowed peacefully through rich cherry and apple orchards and sunflower and wheat farms immortalized in Russian literature. (*New York Herald Tribune*, September 7, 1943).

What was said about grain, the staff of life of the Russian masses, applies even in greater measure to such crops as sugar beets and oilseeds. The invaded territory comprised roughly 80 percent of the

<sup>2</sup>*Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitel'stvo SSSR*, 1935 and 1936, (Soviet Statistical yearbooks).

<sup>3</sup>*Planovoe Khozyaistvo*, no. 4, 1938.

<sup>4</sup>Not all of the grain shipped in years of large crops like 1937 was for immediate consumption. Some of it was probably used to build up stocks.

pre-war Russian sugar beet acreage and over half of the sunflower seeds, the most important source of vegetable oil in Russia.

The invasion dealt a blow to the Russian agricultural economy not only in crop land but in animal resources as well. The difficulty here is accentuated by the fact that in animal husbandry the Soviet Union was climbing back to the position achieved during the late twenties, rather than moving forward as in the case of crop acreage. The collectivization of peasant farming and liquidation of the "kulaks" in the early thirties, as is well-known, was accompanied by severe livestock losses which were only partly recouped during the subsequent years.

In the summer of 1938, the latest date for which detailed statistics are available, Soviet Russia had a little over half of the horses that it had in 1928, 90 percent of the cattle, and 70 percent of sheep and goats. Only in the case of hogs was there a marked increase of 12 percent between 1928 and 1938.

But unfortunately about 60 percent of the hog population was in the invaded territory as against less than 40 percent of cattle and about 25 percent of sheep and goats. Moreover, the important livestock raising regions in the uninvaded territory, east of the Urals, were slow to recover from the heavy decline of livestock numbers during collectivization.<sup>5</sup>

To promote the recovery of animal husbandry in the thirties, concessions were made to individual ownership by collective farmers of livestock. As a result, most of the livestock in the "kolkhozes" (collective farms) actually was individually rather than collectively owned.<sup>6</sup> Since the summer of 1939, however, the Soviet government embarked on a policy of expanding collective herds, requiring each kolkhoz to have a minimum number of collective livestock depending upon its total land area. The latter, and not the number of animals, became the basis for calculating the compulsory deliveries to the state of animal products at fixed low prices. As a consequence, the collective herds increased; but at the same time individually held livestock decreased to a greater extent, and the total number of

<sup>5</sup>The number of cattle in Siberia (west of the Lake Baikal) and the Khazakh-Kirgizh region was 10.5 million at the beginning of 1938 as against 17.8 million in the summer of 1928; and the number of sheep and goats was 15.3 and 47.6 million, respectively.

<sup>6</sup>Thus on January 1, 1938, 63 percent of cattle, 67 percent of hogs, and 54 percent of sheep were in individual possession of the members of the kolkhozes.

cattle, hogs, and sheep in the kolkhozes became actually smaller.<sup>7</sup> The livestock position apparently deteriorated on the eve of the war.

That under conditions described above severe shortages of food-stuffs should develop in war-torn Russia and that she should need substantial assistance from her allies was to be expected. It is a matter of common knowledge that this actually is the situation. To what extent could the food difficulties be mitigated by the use of accumulated reserves, by expansion of production, and by rationing?

## II.

The question of reserves, which means essentially grain stocks, is as important as it is obscure. No official information on the subject has been published either before or after the war began. An article, for instance, in the *Pravda* of June 29, 1942, entitled, "The Battle of Reserves" does not mention, even casually, the existence of grain stocks. Official figures on production and procurements of grain in recent years, before the war, if accepted at face value, would indicate the existence of very considerable stocks; but on the whole statistical data are not adequate or reliable enough to permit an accurate judgment.

There are several arguments for and against existence of large stocks. Perhaps the strongest argument in favor is that the Soviet government had been long preparing for war, and the building up of reserves and stockpiles is an essential part of the process. The stringent procurement policy of the Kremlin with respect to agricultural products lends support to this argument. Perhaps the strongest evidence adduced against the existence of large stocks is that the Nazis have not put forth claims of finding large stocks of grain in the invaded regions. Surely, this is a topic about which they would have been only too willing to boast. Of course, it would be said that the Soviets tried to concentrate their grain reserves in the interior regions; and this is undoubtedly true. But then, the Germans were able to penetrate pretty far into the interior; and obviously most of the grain stocks could hardly have been held in so remote an area as that east of the Urals when the great bulk of the population, of grain production, and of the railway network are

<sup>7</sup>On January 1, 1938 there were 39.9 million head of cattle in the kolkhozes and on the same date of 1940, 38.5 million. Hogs during the same period decreased from 19.1 to 16.5 million. Figures for 1940 calculated from S. Demidov's article in *Planovoe Khozyaistvo*, no. 4, 1940, p. 19.

west of that area. There is also some serious doubt as to the availability of storage facilities for unusually large stocks.

None of these considerations, however, is conclusive. What is reasonably certain is that some grain stocks existed at the beginning of the war. Since such stocks under the present collective and procurement system are held by the government, their disposition depends upon the policy of the Kremlin.<sup>8</sup> Perhaps a clue to the war stocks situation is provided by a decree published in the Soviet press on July 11, 1942, calling for an additional compulsory delivery by the collective farms of 145 million *poods* (2.4 million metric tons) of grain as a reserve for the Red Army.

Such a step hardly bespeaks bursting granaries though it does not rule out the view that the Soviet government will go slow in depleting its reserves so as not to remain with empty granaries at the end of the war. We must finish this discussion of reserves on the same note on which we began. The whole subject is a moot one, and probably the safest conclusion is not to look for too much alleviation of the difficult food position from this direction after two years of war and scorching.

### III.

That the expansion of production even in the uninvaded part of Russia is difficult under war conditions needs no extensive argument. The great obstacles are the shortage of man power, of managerial personnel, and of draft power. During the First World War it was estimated that "up to 40 percent of the able-bodied male population of the villages were called to the colors."<sup>9</sup> During the present war probably a higher proportion of the rural male population has been mobilized. The age limit for military service is higher now than it was during the First World War, and there are fewer exemptions.

The drain of man power in Russian agriculture during the First World War was offset to a considerable extent by the existence of a

<sup>8</sup>Before collectivization of peasant agriculture in the 1930's, the bulk of the grain reserves was held individually on the farm; but subsequently they have been centralized in government hands. Kolkhozes are required by Article 11 of the Model Charter of 1935 to create annually renewable "insurance" seed and forage reserves up to 10 to 15 percent of yearly requirements. No provision, however, is made for food reserves by the Charter. Only in 1940 a government decree dealing with the harvest and procurements ordered the setting aside of 2 percent of food crops as a "food insurance reserve" (*Izvestiya*, August 1, 1940).

<sup>9</sup>A. N. Antsiferov and others, *Russian Agriculture During the War*, p. 117 (New Haven, 1930).

surplus or underemployment of labor in the villages as a result of the rapid growth of population during the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Consequently, the area cultivated by the peasants not only was not reduced during the first two years of the war but apparently was increased. It was on private estates which depended upon hired labor that a serious decline in acreage took place with a consequent detrimental effect on production for the market.<sup>10</sup>

The situation was in many respects different on the eve of the present war. The rural population in Soviet Russia not only ceased to grow, but actually decreased in the thirties. Between December, 1926 and January, 1939, when censuses of population were taken, rural population decreased from 120.7 million to 114.6 million or 5 percent. It is possible that the number of people actually engaged in agriculture decreased even more. At the same time the crop area, and especially the area under the more intensive so-called technical crops requiring more labor per acre, increased. The total crop acreage in 1939 was 20 percent greater than that of 1927, and the area under technical crops was nearly 60 percent greater. Fewer people worked more acres. Mechanization of agriculture—the tractor and the combine—made this possible despite much inefficiency in their operation.

No doubt important economies in the utilization of the agricultural labor resources were still possible with more efficient management and greater incentives to peasants to work in the kolkhozes. Much was written about the subject in Soviet Russia during the years preceding the war. Still, it is significant that in 1938 (when there was a great deal of official complaint about the competition of the private "acre and a cow" farming of collective farmers with their work in collective fields) 93.5 percent of all the able-bodied collective farmers participated in farm work. Women workers already predominated. They constituted 45.6 percent of the total labor force of the kolkhozes, as against 42 percent of male workers, and 12.4 percent of children.<sup>11</sup> Thus even before the war the burden placed on women in Russian agriculture was quite heavy. Edmund Stevens, the correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor*, reported in that paper on June 3, 1940 about his trip to Russia: "Travelling through

<sup>10</sup>Ibid, p. 144. For a more skeptical view cf. N. D. Kondratiev, *Rynok Khlebov*, p. 40 (Moscow, 1922).

<sup>11</sup>A. Arina, "Kolkhozes in 1938," *Sotsialisticheskoe Selskoe Khozyaistvo*, no. 12, 1939.



the country, one is impressed by the fact that most of the workers in the fields were women. This partly reveals the extent of Russian mobilization."

On the whole, the effect of mobilization on the Russian farm labor situation was probably much more drastic than during the First World War. Conditions would have been less difficult if it had been possible to keep up or increase the number of tractors and combines, but some tractors were diverted for war use, and two of the three important tractor factories were in Stalingrad and Kharkov. There was a combine factory in Zaporozhie and a large farm implements factory in Rostov—all in the invaded zone. The supply of new tractors for agriculture, therefore, must have been very small. This is especially disadvantageous under Russian conditions that make for heavy wear and tear of tractors because they are more intensively utilized and poorly serviced. The mobilization of many experienced tractor drivers and combine operators was also bound to leave its mark, although training of a large number of women for such jobs was undertaken before the war.

Much loss of time by tractors and combines during the season due to frequent breakdowns, shortage of spare parts and fuel, and inefficient operations were reported by the Soviet press with monotonous regularity in peace-time. Conditions could only be expected to deteriorate under the stress of war, and there were indications in the press that the volume of tractor work was small.<sup>12</sup> The draft power situation is, of course, aggravated by the shortage of horses referred to above, which was increased during the war by their mobilization for the army. When a catastrophic reduction in the number of horses took place during the collectivization campaign of the early thirties, the tractor was thrown into the breach. Now it is necessary to press even the cows into the service.

Experience has shown that in a system of collective farming, which replaced the small individual peasant farming in Soviet Russia, the managerial or administrative personnel is a *conditio sine qua non* of efficient operation and success. Therefore, mobilization of many experienced officials would have seriously impaired efficiency. To what extent it actually occurred is, of course, impossible to say. A case of this nature is cited in an article in the *Sotsialisticheskoe Zemledelie* of July 7, 1942. It was based on an investigation instituted as a result of a complaining letter to the editor and tells the story of a kolkhoz where a mobilized manager (chairman) was re-

<sup>12</sup>*Krasnaya Tatariya*, May 19, 1943.

placed by one of his predecessors who was previously convicted of a number of crimes committed while in his official position. With him there returned the corruption and inefficiency that characterized his previous administration. His appointment by local authorities instead of election by the membership of the kolkhoz was, of course, illegal; but the Soviet press has reported such violations frequently year in and year out.

#### IV.

The measures taken by the government to overcome war-time production difficulties were not novel inasmuch as agriculture was geared to an emergency for more than a decade before the war, ever since the forced collectivization of peasant farming and the struggle in the village it entailed. The pattern of war-time agricultural organization was there. It was only necessary to fill details, to dust off the old weapons. Among the latter were the reestablished political sections (*politotdel*) of the machine-tractor stations, which were for collective agriculture what the political commissars were for the army. They were originally established during a critical period in the countryside in the early thirties, but were abolished after the crisis passed.

Two important decrees were published on April 18, 1942. One provided for the increase in the minimum amount of work, as measured in special units called "trudoden," that must be performed in a kolkhoz by its members on pain of expulsion and loss of the little plots of land allotted to them for private use. This compulsory minimum of work in the kolkhozes was first introduced by a decree published on May 28, 1939, which aimed to curb private farming by collective farmers. A novel feature of the decree of April 18, 1942 was the specific allocation of the required minimum of work during different periods of the year. For instance in a kolkhoz of the Moscow province 25 trudodens "must be worked up to June 1; 25 between June 1 and August 1; 35 between August 1 and October 1 and the remaining 35 trudodens" after October 1. Those who do not fulfill these norms without valid reasons are liable on conviction by a people's court to a penalty of up to 6 months of "correctional labor" in the kolkhoz and a deduction of 25 percent of their pay in favor of the kolkhoz treasury.

The other decree provided for mobilization at the discretion of local authorities of non-farming population, except factory and transport workers, but including school children and college stu-

dents, for work on the farm. They are to be paid on the same basis as collective farmers and retain 50 percent of their regular salaries while mobilized for farm work.

Much stress has been laid on so-called socialist competition, an organized rivalry for higher production goals between individuals, whole collective farms, and even whole and sometimes distant districts. This again is not a new factor but merely an adaptation of an existing institution to war conditions and the patriotic feelings which the struggle with the invader engendered.

The differential system of payment to collective farmers by results, a system which has been continuously emphasized by the government as a means of stimulating increased exertions in the kolkhozes, was further extended by a decree published in *Sotsialisticheskoe Zemledelie* of May 12, 1942 on "the supplementary payment for higher crop yields to tractor drivers in machine-tractor stations and collective farmers working with tractor implements." Past experience, however, shows that there is a wide gap in such matters between the law and its application in practice. To mention one instance, *Zarya Vostoka* of May 23, 1943 complains that out of 4413 kolkhozes in the Georgian Republic only 67 provided bonuses to which farmers working with livestock who achieve high production results are entitled according to law. Similar criticisms are voiced from the afar-off Siberia by the *Buryat-Mongolskaya Pravda* of June 1, 1943.

Despite the numerous obstacles, the crop area in the uninvaded part of Soviet Russia was not only maintained but actually increased in 1942 by more than 2 million hectares (5 million acres). Some crops were introduced in new regions, as sugar beets in Central Asia for instance. A further expansion took place during the present year. The area sown to winter grain in the autumn of 1942 for the 1943 harvest was reported 2.1 million hectares above the preceding year.<sup>13</sup> The area devoted to the Russian equivalent of victory gardens, which in 1942 was estimated at 500,000 hectares (1,200,000 acres), apparently was further increased in 1943. On the other side of the balance sheet is the poor quality of the tillage in many regions, the weeds, the heavy harvest losses—all making for low yields, which probably offset, or more than offset, the increase in acreage. Thus little reliance can be placed in the possibility of any really significant relief from this direction.

<sup>13</sup> Commissar of Agriculture I. A. Benediktov in *Sotsialisticheskoe Zemledelie*, December 17, 1942.

## V.

A differential rationing system, such as is practiced in the Soviet Union,<sup>14</sup> coupled with in-plant or canteen feeding,<sup>15</sup> makes it possible for some categories of urban population, such as skilled workers in important defense plants, to suffer fewer hardships than others. The system of special so-called "closed stores" serving a restricted clientele may improve conditions and particularly save time of long waiting in queues for some especially favored or high priority groups. Every effort no doubt is made to feed the Red Army well with the help of lend-lease supplies.

"Russian rations limit civilians to a woefully inadequate diet."<sup>16</sup> What is even worse, rations are not fully met, even in Moscow, which is probably one of the best supplied points in the Soviet Union. Walter Kerr of the *New York Herald Tribune* cited a case of a Moscow family of four, with three working members in a high rationing category. But even this family, which, because of its composition, is in a better position than a more typical family with a larger number of non-working members,

finds it cannot get along on its rations, so it buys in the open market, where collective farmers sell their own produce after having sold a given proportion to the government at a fixed price. In the market bread costs not 1 ruble a kilo but 140 to 150 rubles, sugar not 5½ rubles but 800 rubles a kilo, cereals not 6 to 20 but 150 rubles and butter not 50 but 1,000. In the open market potatoes cost 60 to 70 rubles a kilo, and this family buys potatoes whenever it can afford them, and cabbage, which is a great must in a Russian's diet. This family finds that its rationed food lasts fourteen to twenty days, depending upon how much of the rationed food it has been able to obtain, for sometimes there is a shortage.<sup>17</sup>

In spite of the enormous disparities between controlled (rationed) and free (private market) prices, the government tolerates this state of affairs because it helps to ameliorate to some extent the scarce food supply. Without such incentives the peasants would not have

<sup>14</sup>It was introduced in Moscow less than a month after the beginning of hostilities by the decree of the local Soviet and was not even published in the nationally circulated *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, which seldom mention the subject. There has been no national legislation dealing with rationing in the Soviet Union as there was with various derationing measures in 1934-1936.

<sup>15</sup>It is not supplementary to rationing insofar as rationed foodstuffs are concerned, as our restaurant system is.

<sup>16</sup>*Eleventh Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operation For the Period Ended July 31, 1943*, p. 28.

<sup>17</sup>*New York Herald Tribune*, May 18, 1943.

brought their produce to the market. It would be an error, however, to conclude that the peasants as a class are enriching themselves in the process, even though they obtain higher money income. For with the extreme scarcity of all kinds of goods, peasants, too, have to pay fantastic prices for clothing, footwear, tobacco, household goods, farm equipment, etc.

Even when the peasants are short of bread, as they normally are in some areas, they have to buy it on the free market at very high prices. On the other hand, it is quite possible that a city family in a high rationing category may have more bread than it needs but is very short of other food. It is not surprising if under such conditions barter flourishes on a large scale. How grain became a medium of exchange in one kolkhoz was told in the Kuibyshev newspaper, *Volzhskaya Kommuna* of November 11, 1942. All sorts of articles such as nails, cord, brooms, rakes, bridles are bought and even house rents are paid with grain. This is probably not a unique instance. Money, therefore, loses much of its usefulness as a medium of exchange. Since it also has no private investment value in Soviet Russia with nationalized land and industry, it is not too difficult to siphon off large sums by patriotic loan or war gift campaigns that were reported in the Soviet and foreign press during the past year and which were obviously meant to narrow the so-called inflationary gap between purchasing power and the meager volume of goods available for purchase.

## VI.

So far we have dealt with exchange in one form or another in which the farm population may have some advantage over the city folk. But it should not be overlooked that, as a result of collectivization of peasant agriculture, a large proportion of the farm output is acquired by the state through a sort of taxation in kind. This consists of compulsory deliveries at low fixed prices which bear a similar relation to free market prices as do the retail prices of rationed goods. Another, and an increasingly important, source of government supply of farm products are payments in kind for services of state-owned machine-tractor stations.

In 1937, for instance, compulsory deliveries amounted to 12.2 percent and payments in kind to machine-tractor stations to 14.3 percent of the grain crop of collective farms. In 1939 the respective shares increased to 14.3 and 19.2 percent of the crop. The compulsory deliveries and payments to machine-tractor stations, which we shall henceforth term simply government procurements, were



styled by Joseph Stalin the "first testament" of collective farmers in the sense that the state has the prior claim to the collective farm output. Before the procurement obligations to the state are fully met, collective farmers can only receive advances which must not exceed 15 percent of the grain actually delivered to the state and 5 percent of sunflower seed. Only after the obligations to the state are fully met and the annual seed and forage supplies and the required reserves set up, can grain be distributed among the peasants in accordance with the amount of work performed. The peasant thus emerges as the residual claimant to the production of the collective farm.

This rigorous procurement policy was further tightened, as we had occasion to mention, in 1939 and 1940. The basis of assessment for compulsory deliveries was changed in the case of animal products from the number of animals to the farm land area, and in the case of grain and most other crops, from the sown area specified by the government plan to the arable area, i.e. land under crops as well as land unsown but capable of being put to crops. When we consider that the arable area of collective farms was estimated at the beginning of 1936 at over 160 million hectares (395 million acres) and all sowings in 1938 at 117 million hectares (290 million acres), the great opportunities for increasing government procurements become evident.

That this heavy pressure did not abate with the war was a foregone conclusion. It is supported by the tenor of the Soviet press, which during the procuring campaign in the autumn and early winter of 1942-1943 played on the familiar themes with variations, "struggle for grain" and sabotage of the grain procurement plan. On the other hand, it is probable that with the scarcity of both foodstuffs and manufactured goods and the memories of past famines, a more than ordinary effort was made to hold or hoard grain on the farm, using for this purpose various subterfuges.<sup>18</sup> *Volzhskaya Kommuna* of December 25, 1942 in an article entitled "Grain and the Responsibility of Communists" laments that even local party officials sometimes protect the saboteurs of grain procurements.

The procuring operations during the war have doubtless been rendered more difficult also by the mobilization of many experienced officials, by the greatly diminished tractor work (which, it will be recalled, was paid in kind), by transportation bottlenecks and by other factors. The government, however, has had this advantage,

<sup>18</sup>*Pravda*, December 4, 1942; *Volzhskaya Kommuna*, December 12 and 29, 1942; *Sotsialisticheskoe Zemledelie*, December 3 and 10, 1942.

that now, unlike the First World War years, it does not have to deal with politically influential landlords and millions of independent small peasant proprietors, but with a relatively small number of collective and state farms. Furthermore, it can appeal to the patriotic sentiments of a much more literate peasant population to support the army against the invader and to help the people of the reconquered regions. Collections of grain and other farm products for these purposes, additional to regular procurements, were reported in the Soviet press. But how much weight quantitatively should be attached to this factor it is difficult to say. It is doubtless far more significant that the firm grip established in peacetime by the Soviet government over Russian agriculture through collectivization, with the primary objects of securing a large share of an expanding farm output, has remained unshaken during the war.

For whatever other changes took place in Soviet Russia since the beginning of the war, there has been no significant relaxation of the collectivist agrarian policy. As a matter of fact, the changes that have been so much in the public limelight—the turn towards nationalism and the accompanying rehabilitation and cultivation of the Russian national and especially military history—were discernible for several years before the war; whereas the trend of agrarian policy was towards intensified collectivism. That the Kremlin expects to continue along the same lines is made clear by a decree published in the Soviet press on August 22, 1943 on the rehabilitation of the devastated areas.

It is true that history, an appeal to which is so fashionable in Russia today, discloses that most major wars brought in their train a drastic shake-up of the Russian agrarian structure. Thus, the Crimean campaign of 1854-1855 was followed by the abolition of serfdom, and the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905, by serious agrarian disturbances and by the Stolypin laws that radically altered the land tenure. The first Russo-German war brought the agrarian revolution of 1917-1918 and liquidation of landlordism. The civil war that followed the Bolshevik Revolution ended with the N.E.P.

How valid is this historical experience for the period following the present war? Here we enter the realm of crystal-gazing, a game which is notoriously hazardous in the case of Russia. The readers are therefore welcome to try it for themselves.

# American-Soviet Trade Relations

By E. C. ROPES

THE history of the trade relations between the United States and Russia under the Soviet régime duplicates in most respects that of the relations between the first socialist state, fortified by its monopoly of foreign trade but inexperienced in the handling of that trade, and individual capitalist states, where foreign trade is carried on by single firms or associations of firms. Developments have followed a fairly uniform pattern, beginning with the purchase by the U.S.S.R. of goods necessary for the reconstruction of its economy, and the sale of its export goods, of the same character as before the revolution, in world markets. From 1918 to 1922 the U.S.S.R. trade registered an excess of imports, which was only partially redressed in 1923 and 1924, and increased thereafter, except for two years, until 1932; for the five years thereafter a heavy export excess was achieved, which, together with large shipments of gold, established Soviet credit on a firm basis.

Soviet trade with other countries began in 1918 in an atmosphere of general distrust in the ability and honesty of the Soviet government, and sellers in other countries took advantage of the need of the U.S.S.R. by imposing prices and terms of payment that reflected the unusual risks supposed to be involved. Inexperience in foreign markets on the part of the Soviet purchasing and selling agencies made these vulnerable to market or individual firm pressure, resulting often in the agencies' paying excessive prices for imports or selling exports below world market rates. For a period (1928-32) the tremendous requirements of the U.S.S.R. for imported machines and goods forced the sale of exports at any price that would move them; this procedure led to charges of dumping and retaliatory moves on the part of other countries.

By 1933, however, the Soviet government had established itself as an important factor in foreign trade, and its agencies had learned how to handle their business. A reorganization in 1935 of these agencies and their transfer to Moscow resulted in closer coordination of the foreign trade mechanism; and a policy of reducing imports to the minimum and maintaining exports at a fairly high level led to

the achievement of the excess of exports referred to, with its favorable effect on the credit standing of the U.S.S.R. abroad.

Even before this point had been reached, however, under pressure of excess productive capacity at home, a number of governments (16) had adopted various schemes for encouraging exports by guaranteeing or insuring payments for goods sold to foreign customers acceptable to the authorities providing this financial support, thus relieving the individual firm of the risks attendant on sales in certain countries. In all cases but one (Belgium) this scheme was extended sooner or later to cover sales to the U.S.S.R. In this way the foreign debt, which had piled up by 1931 against the U.S.S.R. to an estimated total of \$300,000,000, was temporarily assumed by the foreign governments whose nationals supplied the U.S.S.R. with the goods it required. Eventually, as noted above, all obligations were met by the U.S.S.R.; and no loss was suffered by the respective governments.

It may be noted that by 1935 the credit of the U.S.S.R. was so well established abroad that bills or acceptances backed by the guarantee of a foreign government were discounted by banks in several countries at favorable rates. This condition was in sharp contrast to the situation in earlier years, when Amtorg and other Soviet bills could be sold only in a "black" speculative market at discounts running as high as 40 percent.

The development of Soviet foreign trade since 1935 has been characterized by a continued drop in both exports and imports, a repayment of all foreign credits obtained, and the adoption of a policy of cash payments for imports, often running parallel with payments under credit schemes (Germany, England). Since 1938 no foreign trade statistics have been published by the U.S.S.R., and very few other countries have issued figures of their trade by countries and commodities.

The exchange of goods between the United States and Russia, which was very active between 1914 and 1918, particularly on the export side in 1916 and 1917, dropped in 1918, but was resumed in 1919, only to fall again until 1924; it continued comparatively large until 1931, exports being especially high in 1930 and 1931. The curve dropped again until 1935, when a rise in both exports and imports started, continuing till 1941 (1st quarter), the latest period for which United States statistics have been published.

Two points stand out in a study of this trade. The first is that since 1914, with the exception of one year, 1933, the trade has always shown an excess of goods exports, so large that it could not

be redressed by invisible items, but only by Soviet payments in foreign exchange or gold. The second point is the extremely low position of Russia—U.S.S.R. among United States sources of imports and customers for exports. Both these points must be constantly borne in mind.

The entry of the U.S.S.R. into United States markets, as buyer and seller under the government monopoly of foreign trade, occurred first unofficially, by means of the Products Exchange Corporation (1919) and the Arcos-America, Inc. (1923), both American corporations. These were amalgamated in 1924 into the Amtorg Trading Corporation. Other Soviet trading agencies in the United States, like the All-Russian Textile Syndicate, the Centrosoyuz, and the Selskosoyuz, formed for particular trading purposes, were gradually absorbed by the Amtorg, which has for about ten years been the only agency representing the export and import activities of the U.S.S.R. in the United States.

From the first the Amtorg, though an American corporation (New York) and hence subject to United States laws, had the anomalous and for years unique position of representing a government in business, and a socialist or communist government at that. As such, it was impossible for the concern to assume the character of a normal American company engaged in selling and buying for foreign account. In selling, it had to compete with other sellers, domestic and foreign, of similar goods; but as buyers, it represented a single huge purchaser, whose orders were at times and for certain firms the only large ones offered. Hence there was often keen competition among American firms for Soviet business with the usual result of cut prices, lengthened terms, and other inducements. No united action or front was attractive to American firms, many of whom were unfamiliar with export trade and distrustful of forms of unified export action, such as Edge Act corporations. The large firms experienced in exporting played safe; the smaller ones often risked more than they could afford to lose to take Soviet orders away from their competitors. As all Amtorg commitments were met, however, no losses ensued; and by 1930, or even before, the standing of the Amtorg as a buyer justified the demanding of credits from private sellers, in the form of postponed or long-term payments for goods for which, for several years of depressed American business, it was the only large customer. There followed an era of extensive buying by the Amtorg of huge quantities of tractors, machine-tools, and other machinery, in particular oil-well and electrical equipment, at prices reduced to the minimum and on a basis of



payment extending over six months to two and a half years, according to the need of the manufacturer or of the Amtorg, and the bargaining ability of buyer and seller.

There grew up at this time a fully developed mechanism whereby American manufacturers who had over-extended their financial reserves by selling to the Amtorg on credit could shift part or all of the load to "investors" equipped with cash and faith in the ability and intention of the Amtorg to meet its obligations punctually. Leading firms of this type discounted Amtorg acceptances at high rates, selling the paper to their connections in London, Paris, and Berlin, or retaining it in the United States. It is not too much to say that the possibility of obtaining promptly cash for goods sold on time to the Amtorg enabled many American firms, both large and small, to accept business that otherwise they could not have handled. American banks as a rule did not favor sales to the Soviet Union, and the working capital of most firms was too limited to finance the long terms which the Amtorg required.

The peak of this discount business, which started in 1927, was reached in the next year or so, and then declined, in accordance with the lower discount rates that could be obtained and the drop in Soviet orders. No further attempt was made to assist in providing credit facilities for American firms selling to the Amtorg; and in spite of the sale by the General Electric Company of some \$25,000,000 worth of electrical machinery on a five year payment basis, the Amtorg was not able to persuade any other American manufacturer to take similar risks.

American exports to the U.S.S.R. rapidly fell off from the high point of 1930 (\$113,000,000) to a low of \$8.9 millions in 1933. A revival occurred in 1934, to \$15 million, and since then the trend was steadily upward to 1941.

In July, 1933 an American government agency, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, accepted the risk of underwriting a large sale of cotton, of which there was a huge surplus in the country, to the Amtorg, on terms of thirty percent cash, balance with five percent interest over twelve months. The amount involved, \$4,500,000, was duly repaid by July, 1934.

During that interval of a year the United States government had extended *de jure* recognition to the government of the U.S.S.R. and had exchanged diplomatic representatives with that country. Widespread speculation at once arose over the immense possibilities of export trade with the U.S.S.R., financed by United States government funds; perhaps a dozen schemes were formulated for banking

or trading associations which should amalgamate the export activities and finance the sales of American firms receiving orders from the Amtorg. Soviet spokesmen emphasized the quantity of goods which could be bought by the U.S.S.R. if adequate credit facilities were provided; the smallest amount mentioned was in the hundreds of millions of dollars, the largest was one billion dollars.

All attempts at establishing private credit or trading agencies naturally ceased when the first Export-Import Bank, to finance trade with the U.S.S.R., was founded under government auspices, with funds to be appropriated by Congress. For a number of months discussions of United States-U.S.S.R. trade centered around this agency and the prospects for its development. The whole idea of extending credit to the U.S.S.R., however, was complicated by the question of the Russian debts to the United States inherited from the First World War; and despite protracted negotiations no agreement could be reached between the two governments. Finally, early in 1935 the Export-Import Bank for Russia was dissolved, and the prospects of a loan or credit to the U.S.S.R. evaporated. The U.S.S.R. was later classed as a non-paying debtor, to whom the provisions of the Johnson Act would apply; thus any private credit to the Amtorg or any other Soviet agency, became impossible.

By this time Soviet gold production had grown to a point where it could be utilized to purchase large quantities of American or other foreign products. Foreign exchange was also available to the Amtorg by diversion from London, where Soviet sales exceeded purchases. Amtorg orders began to climb, but the pressure for credits was relaxed, and sales by American firms in 1935 and subsequent years were almost always for cash on shipment or a maximum forty-five days after shipment, allowing time for the goods to arrive and be inspected, and claims, if any, to be made.

The Administration decided that this time was favorable to attempt to include the U.S.S.R. among the nations with which the United States was negotiating agreements under the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of June 12, 1934. After lengthy negotiations, a commercial agreement was signed on July 13, 1935, whereby the United States extended to the U.S.S.R. certain benefits given other nations under this Act. This agreement expired after twelve months, but has been renewed annually since then; the latest renewal was August 6, 1942. In return for the generalized tariff reductions granted to the U.S.S.R. in the first agreement, and most-favored-nation status granted later, the U.S.S.R. engaged to purchase American products in a given agreement year of a value of \$30,000,000,

increased in the 1938 agreement to \$40,000,000. Soviet imports from the United States have always exceeded the minimum guaranteed in the successive agreements.

Under present war conditions American exports to the U.S.S.R. are military supplies, shipped chiefly on Lend-Lease account. Before the U.S.S.R. was added to the Lend-Lease countries (November, 1941), a credit for \$100,000,000 was opened by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation for purchases by the Amtorg; this credit is being repaid by shipments from the U.S.S.R. of strategic materials needed by the United States.

On all orders placed by the Amtorg since 1935, payments have been specified in cash, or not more than forty-five days after shipment. In the case of orders requiring fabrication, the seller often insisted on progress payments and received them. The record of the Amtorg for meeting its obligations has not been impaired; all bills have been paid on or before the due date.

As previously stated, during all the years between 1918 and 1942, United States exports to the U.S.S.R. have exceeded imports from that country, except in 1933. The value of imports has never exceeded \$30,000,000, even in years when exports were ten times that figure (1916, 1917). Yet Russia has always been an important source of supply of certain products known and needed in American markets; and the government of the U.S.S.R. has succeeded in supplying the American demand for most of the products acceptable before the war, and also in developing sales of products never before received from Russia, such as coal, pulpwood, lumber, and plywood. It is believed that under peace conditions, and with closer trade relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R., the quantities of these goods listed could readily be increased, and new items added.

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# The Memoirs of Bely

BY WALDEMAR GURIAN

## I.

"PROBABLY the most interesting man in Russia," notes V. Bryusov after meeting young Boris Nikolaevich Bugaev, who became, under the pseudonym Andrey Bely, one of the greatest Russian writers of the twentieth century. Outside of Russia, Bely is almost unknown, for only a few of his poems and short excerpts from his novel *Kotik Letaev* have been translated into English. He himself did not believe that his Russian could be rendered in any other tongue. "As I was asked to permit the translation of my symphonic novel *Kotik Letaev* into English I answered by silence, before me rose the picture of distorted rhythms and deformed words." Even in Russia, Bely's reputation remained somewhat limited and precarious. His name was widely known, but he was read and studied by a comparatively small circle. According to Professor Ernest Simmons, "his versatility—he was a poet, novelist, essayist and critic—seems to have prevented the concentration that might have resulted in supremely great achievement. . . ." Gleb Struve states bluntly that in Bely's soul "a genius and a fool co-existed." And even his friend Alexander Blok, the greatest of the symbolist poets, confesses that neither he nor Merezhkovsky could understand all Bely's writings.

Bely's manifold writings cannot easily be described. Their size and variety alone prevents that. An edition of his works planned before he was forty would have filled twenty volumes. His productive capacity was amazing: his novel *Petersburg* can be studied in six versions which permit one to follow the change of the basic conception from a negative to a positive attitude towards the Bolshevik Revolution. He liked to sketch large plans, but they either were not completed or were continuously reshaped during their execution. Most important of his ideas—his theories of the structure of Russian verse—were very imperfectly formulated and written in utmost haste.

<sup>1</sup>*Literaturnoe Nasledstvo* (Literary Heritage), Moscow, 1937, vols. 27-28, p. 637, note 20.

But despite all his weaknesses and vacillations, Bely is one of the most important Russian writers of the twentieth century. Ivanov-Razumnik, certainly a penetrating interpreter of the Russian spirit in the early period of the Revolution, remarks that Bely's *Petersburg* will always remain an object of study for anyone interested in Russia and that a few of his poems should be included in all Russian anthologies. Among his poetry, whose value varies greatly, there are socio-political poems full of despair over the Tsarist world and its oppressed people, similar to those of Nekrasov; but there are also poems expressing the symbolist mysticism which is beyond time and space. In his prose, as students of literature agree, Bely anticipated the style of James Joyce. He is a master of satirical writing, patterned on Gogol; but he is also a master of objective, classical descriptions, whose quietude and detachment show the influence of Tolstoy. He is regarded as a leader of the so-called "formalists" who are interested primarily in aesthetic form and for whom words have an independent, self-sufficient existence beyond meaning and context; at the same time, he is also known as an emphatic enemy of aestheticism which isolated art from life.

Bely was a man of incredibly broad erudition, his reading embracing the most varied fields. He not only took a degree in the natural sciences but was for years an industrious student of philosophy. Nevertheless, when he attempts to be an epistemologist or a metaphysician who delights in presenting complicated dialectical construction, he appears as a somewhat confused and confusing dilettante.

Bely was never at rest but was constantly fleeing from himself as well as others. He was continually a victim of fashions and sects; but he survived them, even though he may have become their most fanatic propagandist and zealot. Fedor Stepun, who knew him well, has characterized his thinking as "exercises on a trapeze under the dome of his solitary ego."<sup>2</sup> Yet this intellectual hermit is a representative voice of his generation and epoch, one that possessed a most profound insight into the Russian mind as it awaited the coming Revolution. Although he never accepted the Bolshevik victory of 1917, interpreting the meaning of the Russian Revolution differently from the followers of Lenin, he was, however, radically opposed to the fierce anti-bolshevism of writers like the Merezhkovskys. And at his death he received a friendly obituary in *Pravda*, the official organ of the Communist Party.

<sup>2</sup>In Stepun's necrology of Bely in *Sovremennyya Zapiski*, Paris, 1934, LVI, 257 ff.



II.

It may be asked what part of Bely's work will assure him a lasting reputation and an ever widening circle of readers in the future. I think that he will always be remembered for his *Memoirs*. He began to publish them in 1930 and had completed three volumes when a fatal illness forced him, in December, 1933, to stop all work. In these *Memoirs* Bely attempts to justify himself in the face of the official ideology of the Soviet Union. He points out that he was educated in a world whose shortcomings no longer exist; he complains that he heard of Marx and Lenin too late in life. But this external adaptation has failed to save his reputation among Communist critics. An introduction to the second volume by L. Kamenev—Lenin's friend and collaborator who was executed during Stalin's purge in 1936—accuses Bely of misinterpreting his times and describing only the narrowness and sterility of Russian society—especially the intelligentsia before the Bolshevik Revolution. Similar views are expressed by another Communist writer, C. Volpe, in his preface to the third volume. But the very fact that Bely succeeds in describing his life and environment as they really were gives his autobiography its lasting value.

The *Memoirs* do not extend beyond 1910 except in some instances where Bely is anxious to present the full picture of his relationship to certain persons. Nothing is said of his experiences as an obedient follower of the anthroposophic leader Steiner, who completely dominated his life from 1912 to 1916, even to the extent of forcing him to labor in the construction of his Goetheanum in Dornach, Switzerland. Neither do the *Memoirs* describe Bely's return to Russia in 1916; nor his attitude to the events of 1917; nor his sojourn in Berlin during 1922-1923 which nearly caused his mental collapse, but did liberate him from anthroposophy. Only a few remarks are made about the period after his return to Russia in 1923, where he remained until his death in 1934. During these eleven years Bely was anxious to adapt himself to the general conditions of the Soviet régime. He even attempted to become a Soviet writer. He planned novels dealing with fascist Germany and socialist reconstruction, but none was ever completed.

Bely's *Memoirs* are devoted to only the first two periods of his life, his childhood and youth (1880 to 1902) and to his most turbulent years as a symbolist writer and propagandist (1902 to 1910). He regards his life as typical of the conflict between generations—between the liberal-positivist fathers, who believed that their civil-

ization of the late nineteenth century was absolutely secure, and their sons, who were aware of the crisis threatening Russian institutions and standards. The sons were sure that the coming twentieth century would bring about an eclipse of the previous order and a completely new world. They discovered, too, in their revolt against utilitarianism and a flat religion of progress true values of the tradition overlooked by their fathers. Not only did they realize the importance of religion; they also redeemed the true meaning of Russian literature. They saw the hidden beauty of Russian lyricists like Lermontov, Tyutchev, Fet and the true greatness of writers like Gogol, Tolstoy, and Dostoevsky.

The Memoirs indict the fathers for whom the solution of all Russian problems lay in the acceptance of Western civilization and constitutionalism; and their sons, who represent Bely's own generation, for their excessive aestheticism and eroticism strangely mixed and diluted with pseudo-mysticism.

The description of the struggle between the two generations is interwoven with an attempt to portray his childhood as the foundation of his whole intellectual and spiritual life. Bely regards his childhood as dominated by the continual struggle between two worlds, incompatible and hostile, but bound together indissolubly. His father, a professor at the University of Moscow, was noted both for his learning and for his eccentricity. His broad philosophical erudition made him superior to most of his positivist colleagues, but in his personal life he could not really liberate himself from their world—except by eccentric habits and actions. He believed that it was necessary to express everything by formulas and to define the undefinable. Bely's mother was a Russian beauty whose complete irrationality bordered on hysteria. To his father she was not a living woman but the realization of his geometric ideal of beauty. She was always haunted by the fear that her son would become, like the father, a man for whom nothing would matter save mathematical abstractions and equations.

The child Bugayev fled to a dream world, which became his real existence. To those who met him he appeared as an undeveloped and awkward boy, almost an idiot. The struggle between his parents, which compelled him to conceal his real soul, and the clash between an irrationality expressed in feeling and a will to be most exact and precise, shaped his whole life.

Bely always sought for formulas and symbols which would evoke the strange, the inexpressible. He played with concepts and systems; he ceaselessly constructed new artificial worlds; and in his longing

for the supreme wisdom he fell victim to cults like anthroposophy. He preached a symbolism which was, all at once, art, contemplative mysticism, and guide for a social regeneration of his epoch.

An untiring producer of formulas and systems, Bely is also a great poet and a seeker of the reality behind the appearances of the visible world. As a metaphysician and preacher of various gnostic systems, he does not, perhaps, deserve much of our attention; but as a poet living in his dream world, he has created some unforgettable visions.

### III.

Bely combines the analysis of his inward development with the description of his social and intellectual environment, which becomes more and more conspicuous in the second and third volumes of his *Memoirs*. His childhood was spent in the atmosphere of the professorial apartment in the Arbat quarter of Moscow during the last decades of the nineteenth century. It was in this apartment that Bely experienced the stale positivism and bourgeois moralism of the Moscow professors. They appeared to him either as men without real knowledge, pretending to know everything, or as narrow specialists who, in their daily life, were slaves of senseless conventions. When they tried to escape this world of routine, they became eccentrics and cranks. Such were his father and his parents' friends.

The eccentric is a necessary part of a stagnant society. He does not alter the existing order; his protest is merely an external gesture, an attitude bereft of any consequence. His bizarre behavior shows the impossibility either of adapting the soul to existing reality or of creating a new society. Yet these eccentrics, despite the fact that they were originally regarded as strange, isolated men, became heroes and leaders in a bourgeois world which had lost all belief in itself.

Bely's portrayal of Russian society (especially Moscow society) of this time is a curious combination of open disgust and, perhaps unconscious, admiration. After the Revolution of 1905 the professors who had appeared as ruling majesties and whose chairs had been admired as unerring tribunals of supreme wisdom were gradually replaced by religious philosophical circles, by symbolist writers, by men longing for a new art and revelation. The lawyers and politicians who were preparing themselves for fashionable careers were anxious to demonstrate their interest in an ultra modern literary salon. More or less perverse eroticism, despair produced by the collapse of revolutionary hopes, mysticism, and an aesthetic sensation-

alism produced the most extraordinary mixture. Even a serious religious philosopher like Bulgakov easily fell victim to cranks pretending to have a mystical mission.

Bely was in the center of this world. During the crucial year of 1905 he spent weeks in the Petersburg apartment of the Merezhkovskys; he was a companion of the outstanding young poet A. Blok; he was on the editorial staff of *Vesy* (The Scales), a symbolist periodical edited in Moscow by V. Bryusov; he frequented the famous Petersburg tower-apartment of Vyacheslav Ivanov, where breakfast was served at noon and the night was spent in exciting conversation with the celebrities of the Russian capital; he participated in everything and met everybody—poets, philosophers, professors, literary tramps. Bely sympathized with the Revolution of 1905 (he notes that he gave lectures to help raise funds for the socialist party) and was, he tells us, proud to have had some acquaintance with the Bolshevik circles, never dreaming of the importance they were to have in the future.

After 1905 Bely turned to mystical nationalism in both his poetry and novels. This phase, however, does not receive much emphasis in his Memoirs; whereas his socialist sympathies are somewhat overstressed.

In 1910 he left Russia accompanied by a twenty-year-old girl, Asya Turgeneva. They decided to bring their broken lives together because they both felt a complete estrangement from the Russian society of the time. In a simple and beautiful passage Bely relates how they came to their decision of leaving Russia. He describes their union as permeated by pity, free from the burning and degrading passions of his relations with other women.

#### IV.

Bely's gifts for sharp and satirical observations are shown in his portrayals of many persons most representative of his age. However, he shows little understanding of the religious thinkers Bulgakov, Berdyaev, and V. V. Rozanov. He is embarrassed by Vyacheslav Ivanov, who had become famous as a symbolist poet and the founder of the school of mystical anarchism. To Bely, Ivanov remained an ambiguous figure, a man with an imposing mind, but always changing, with little real knowledge of himself or his doctrines. It was, says Bely, difficult to decide whether he was a prophet or an eccentric smiling at his own words.

Bryusov is treated in a rather friendly manner. He appears as an

aesthete who realized the failure of his generation which was incapable of really heroic sacrifices; an ambitious man hungry for power, fame, and influence. Another symbolist poet and aesthete, F. Sologub, is also treated rather sympathetically.

Bely despised the Merezhkovskys, and he pictured them in very dark colors. He describes Dimitri Merezhkovsky as a heartless man, a believer in cheap paradoxes, and a dubious master of dialectical artifices, who seeks comfort and an easy life with pompons on his elegant slippers and the odor of exotic perfumes around him. His wife, the gifted poetess and critic Zinaida Hippus, who was the confidant of young Bely when he entered the literary world, in his *Memoirs* is the embodiment of artificial conduct. Jealousy and love of intrigue appear as her only natural attributes. The pages on the Merezhkovskys will remain as examples of Bely's devastating characterizations of some of his former friends.

But the major figure in Bely's *Memoirs* is Alexander Blok, his most intimate friend and his bitterest enemy. Speaking of the recollections of Blok which he published in 1922, Bely says in his last *Memoirs* that he had there pictured Blok in a rather roseate light because of the effect which Blok's untimely death had produced on him. But in his *Memoirs* Bely does not attempt to deny that his relations with Blok were of the utmost significance throughout his life.

Blok and Bely had known each other before either of them began publishing. Both were deeply influenced by the renowned philosopher Vladimir Soloviev. They were impressed by Soloviev's eschatological attitude, by his belief that the end of the world was imminent; they were captivated by his poetry in which he expressed his veneration for the Eternal Feminine, the Sophia, whose purity and supratemporal character were sharply contrasted with the sensual and changing aspects of the world. Blok's poems devoted to the Beautiful Lady fascinated Bely, and Blok was struck by an article on art which was one of Bely's first publications. Their first letters to each other were written at the same time in January, 1903. After some abstract philosophical exchanges, the correspondence assumed the character of most intimate friendship.

The tension between Blok and Bely, nourished by complicated personal relations, became an open conflict when Blok turned in his poetry from the Beautiful Lady to the Unknown Lady of the Petersburg night clubs and ridiculed his former mystical aspirations and those of his friends. This conflict was never really solved even though it was externally appeased after several crises provoked both by Blok's vehement rejection of some of Bely's writings as unintel-



ligible and completely alien to him, and by Bely's attacks on Blok's poetry and critiques.<sup>3</sup> Blok understood the situation exactly, yet he was very friendly to Bely. He lent him money and helped him to return to Russia in 1916, but he noted in his diary that Bely no longer meant much to him. Though Bely continued to be overexpansive in expressing his friendship, there was no longer in his letters the old limitless confidence and presupposition of common views and aspirations which are so moving in the first solemn and intimate exchanges.

Blok regarded Bely as an hysterical, immature man whose talents he both admired and feared. He deplored the fact that Bely achieved no stability as he grew older. He had no understanding but rather disgust and pity for his anthroposophic adventure. To Bely, Blok was the ideal figure of his dreams, the herald of the coming world of beauty. He took his Beautiful Lady not as a symbol of the love of Lyubov Mendeleeva—who became Mrs. Blok—but as a real revelation of the Sophia. Therefore, he was shocked when Blok dropped all mystical pretensions, when he saw the Sophia as Astarte and began to devote his poetry to sensual love, to its adventures and despairs in the strange atmosphere of the Great City. He regarded Blok as a traitor, as a blasphemer, as a man desecrating his mission.

Blok and Bely became somewhat reconciled when Blok embraced a mystical nationalism. They had in common, too, a scornful rejection of the capitalist, bourgeois world. The downfall of this world was powerfully expressed by Blok in his poem "The Twelve," the greatest work produced under the inspiration of the year 1917. Whereas Bely was inclined to dream about the new culture and the new society, Blok was much more pessimistic; he was the poet of catastrophes, but a poet who could express his despair in verses evoking with striking beauty the contradictions of a soul which knows of the eternal ideal but does not know how it can be found—perhaps it is merely an illusion and a mirage.

## V.

Blok died in 1921 after three years of silence; he was, as he said himself, a dead man though still breathing. He no longer heard, as he did when he wrote "The Twelve," the noise of the universe undergoing a decisive change. Bely survived him for almost twelve

<sup>3</sup>A survey of the relations between Blok and Bely is given in the introduction by V. N. Orlov to *Aleksandr Blok i Andrey Bely. Perepiska* (The Correspondence of Blok-Bely), Moscow, 1940.

years and continued to write. But did he retain his metaphysical optimism, the belief, often hysterically and vaguely expressed, in the coming new world? Anthroposophy disappeared; Steiner became a devil in his eyes after 1923; his acceptance of the official Communist outlook sounds somewhat hollow and smacks of an adaptation to an alien world. Bely sees himself in his Memoirs as an old man, though he was only fifty-three when he died. He realized that his life was full of errors and illusions; all that was left was the knowledge of a crisis which his generation had experienced but was unable to utilize in creating a new society and a new way of life. He looks back—and a world of eccentrics and of idyllic figures appears, a world which has remained alive in his memory.

In his *Dead Souls* Gogol presented a devastating indictment of the Russian world under Nicholas I; Bely's Memoirs are an indictment of the Russian literary and intellectual society under Nicholas II. Their representatives either did not realize what was coming or they were incapable of translating into actions their dreams, ideas, and presentiments of the impending catastrophe. The absence of form and discipline in their lives made possible not only the wild, elemental movements of the masses, but also the imposition of a most rigid external order. But Bely's world of recollection is beyond politics. He succeeds in elevating a transitory society into the representation of human characters which are timeless although they exist under the specific conditions of Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century. The political and social problems of Gogol's Russia have vanished a long time ago; but his characters will always remain. The same has to be said of Bely's Memoirs. His eccentric and idyllic friends and enemies will not be forgotten; they will always live as examples of the eternal conflict between over-idealistic aspirations and the limitations imposed by the world existing in time and space.

Bely himself has characterized his significance in verses which he wrote in 1907, predicting not only the manner of his death—he died from the effects of a sunstroke—but also the fundamental inadequacy of his life:

He put his faith in shows of cosmic gold,  
But the sun killed him with its arrowy rays.  
In thought he measured centuries untold,  
But knew not how to live his own brief days.

## Book Reviews

CURIE EVE. *Journey Among Warriors*. Garden City (New York), Doubleday-Doran, 1943. 501 pp. \$3.00.

MOATS, ALICE-LEONE. *Blind Date With Mars*. Garden City (New York), Doubleday-Doran, 1943. 486 pp. \$3.00.

GRAEBNER, WALTER. *Round Trip to Russia*. Philadelphia - New York, Lippincott, 1943. 216 pp. \$3.00.

These three books have one thing in common—they were written by people who had not been stationed in Russia as regular correspondents but either went there as free lance observers or made only a flying visit to the country. Otherwise they differ a great deal, perhaps not so much in content as in style and approach.

For Miss Curie the visit to Russia was only a part of her worldwide "journey among warriors." She spent there less than a month (in January, 1942); and out of five hundred pages of her account, slightly over one hundred and sixty are devoted to Russia. The book has been widely read and commented upon, and it is hardly necessary to emphasize once more its outstanding literary qualities. Of Russia's prodigious war effort, of the patriotism and self-sacrifice of the Russian people, Miss Curie writes with contagious enthusiasm and sympathy. But while she succeeds to a high degree in conveying to us the general atmosphere of Russia at war, she somehow

fails to make convincing the individual Russians whom she describes. During her stay in Russia she interviewed an Orthodox bishop, a famous ballerina, a Red Army general, factory workers, local communist leaders, and scientists; and, as reported by Miss Curie, there is an amazing uniformity in their thoughts and even forms of expression. Granting the effect of unanimity and single-mindedness caused by the war, one still suspects that this complete absence of individual traits is due to the author's highly emotional approach. One might say that her enthusiasm has slightly blurred her vision. In places it has also affected her judgment. Thus she makes a good deal of the fact that in Russia today all the best food and all the best clothes go to the Red Army and holds this up as a "profoundly inspiring" example, as if the same were not true in any other country at war. Some of her conclusions I would be inclined to question, as, for instance, when she explains the new conciliatory policy of the Soviet government towards the Church by the fact that "the battle against the Church was won, and the victors could well afford to sign an armistice." The most interesting chapter to me was the one describing the author's visit to Tolstoy's country home of Yasnaya Polyana shortly after the Germans were driven out of the region. There are a few factual errors in Miss Curie's account and these mostly of a minor nature, but to a Russian it is slightly disconcerting to find that

practically all the names except the best known are not given correctly.

In contrast to Miss Curie's romantic spirit, Miss Moats went to Russia in a lighthearted and irreverent mood; and on the whole she succeeded in preserving it throughout her six-months stay in that war-beset country (she was there from May until November, 1941). With a disarming frankness she tells us that her trip to Moscow "began as a joke" and that her presence alone is "a guarantee that high tragedy will inevitably become low comedy." In fairness to Miss Moats I feel compelled to say that she slightly exaggerates. It is true that perhaps a disproportionately large part of her book is given over to such subjects as the daily life of the diplomatic corps in Moscow, the quarrels of foreign correspondents among themselves and with Soviet officials, and her own private feud with the American ambassador. But, in the first place, all this makes highly entertaining reading; and secondly, beyond that one can find in her book some valuable and interesting data on such weightier subjects as the woman's part in the Russian war effort or the organization of the Polish army on Russian territory. One also can appreciate her common sense as expressed, for instance, in the following summing up of the difference between the American and the British attitudes towards Russia: "We could wholeheartedly join them in their enthusiasm for the prodigious resistance of the Red Army . . . but we refused to grow misty-eyed over the idealistic Russians and preferred to respect them for what they were — hard-headed realists and brave people. . ."

In Mr. Graebner's book we cannot find either the romantic spirit of Miss Curie or the spiciness of Miss Moat's narrative. His approach is more matter of fact, and on the whole his book has a greater informative value. Mr. Graebner, who was in Russia from July to October, 1942, entered the country from Persia and instead of flying by plane traveled by boat across the Caspian Sea and up the Volga River to Kuibyshev. The author thinks that this trip, which took eleven days, gave him the opportunity to see "more of the Russian people, more of their life, and more of their land than most visitors of the Soviet Union see in a year." One must say, however, that his account does not contain any striking revelations, which, of course, does not deprive his observations of their interest and value. One thing he stresses more than most other writers is the hardships which the war inflicted upon the civilian population of Russia. On his way to Moscow he saw people wearing clothes "that Americans would hesitate even to give to the Salvation Army" and having nothing to eat except black bread, and he discovered that matches were "almost as scarce as pearls." The situation in Moscow was not much better, judging from the author's following remark: "Had we been obliged to eat the regular civilian foods in Moscow we probably would have collapsed in several weeks from undernourishment." And yet the Russians, he says, looked surprisingly healthy. His explanation is that "the Russians have adjusted their bodies to less food."

There are in Mr. Graebner's book many other interesting observations and remarks. In the

churches he saw more young people, children, and Red Army men than he expected. His general conclusion is slightly less pessimistic than that of Miss Curie: "Religion is not dead in Russia, but all indications were that it is in an extremely unhealthy condition." Mr. Graebner attributes the past persecution of the Church in the Soviet Union to the counter-revolutionary part it had played, as witnessed by the "official blessing the Church gave to the Kerensky government and such counter-revolutionary tactics as permitting machine guns to be placed in church belfries." The first part of this statement contains two historical errors: the Kerensky government was not counter-revolutionary, and the Church never gave it its official blessing. And I do not know of any evidence for the second allegation. Among some other errors in the book I should cite the statement that in the Soviet Union "everybody, except the bureaucrats, earns about the same amount of money." Likewise it is permissible to doubt that the present-day Russians "enjoy running for street cars and standing in queues."

In spite of these and other errors Mr. Graebner's book is interesting, well written, and well worth reading.

MICHAEL KARPOVICH

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CASSIDY, HENRY C. *Moscow Date-line, 1941-1943*. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1943. 375 pp. \$3.00.

BROWN, JAMES E. *Russia Fights*. With a foreword by Joseph E. Davies. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943. 276 pp. \$2.50.

HINDUS, MAURICE. *Mother Russia*. New York, Doubleday, Doran & Company, 1943. 395 pp. \$3.50.

The two informative and eminently readable volumes by Henry C. Cassidy, of the Associated Press, and James E. Brown, of the International News Service, cover approximately the same ground and present a lively picture of the tribulations and trials of foreign newspapermen in the Soviet capital, skillfully drawn against the background of wartime Russia. Although Messrs. Cassidy and Brown display at times a somewhat excessive, if legitimate, interest in "news value" and "the atmosphere of a big story" — so petty and trivial in comparison with the gigantic struggle in which Russia is engaged — they are by no means unsympathetic observers and pay a warm and deserved tribute to the Red Army and the power of resistance of the Russian people. The two American correspondents, however, do not allow their admiration for fighting Russia to blind them to the inconsistencies of Soviet policy and to the imperfections of the Soviet régime. They make it abundantly clear that the lot of foreign journalists in Moscow is not a happy one. "Every newspaperman was subject to periodic fits of frustration at his inability to do real reporting," writes Mr. Brown; "none of us had any illusions that our war coverage was anything near adequate." "The stumbling-blocks which all the experts [on Russia] encountered were many," writes Mr. Cassidy. "Highest of all was the lack of information. What information they possessed came largely from official newspapers, containing an unbelievably small amount of news. . . . The



experts had few, if any, personal contacts, either official or unofficial, with the people of the country they were trying to judge. The foreign colony of Moscow lived a life apart, behind walls which were invisible but as impregnable as the ramparts of the Kremlin." Little wonder therefore that to the outside world the U.S.S.R. remained an enigma.

The German invasion, according to Mr. Cassidy, took Russia by surprise. "In the censor-tight cylinder of Moscow, no one knew [that conflict was coming to the eastern front], not the foreigners, not the Russian people, not the Soviet leaders. The reason we did not know there would be a war was that we did know the Soviet Union wanted peace at almost any price, would make almost any concession, even unasked, to escape war. What we could not know was that Germany was determined, in any case, to attack." On the eve of the invasion Moscow pursued toward Germany a policy of "voluntary appeasement." Sir Stafford Cripps sought in vain an interview with Stalin or Molotov and "the general impression" was that Vyshinsky, first vice-commissar of foreign affairs, who finally received the British ambassador, "went as far as to indicate he considered Sir Stafford a 'provocateur' for implying that Germany would turn against her Soviet friends." In the Soviet capital after the outbreak of the Russo-German war "the confusion was complete."

The Cassidy and Brown volumes are particularly valuable for their vivid description of the everyday life of the most privileged group of Moscow residents, foreign diplomats and correspondents. The appraisals by the two American jour-

nalists of the Russian policies of the United States and Great Britain, especially their graphic accounts of the visits to Moscow by Churchill and Willkie deserve particular attention and make absorbing reading.

Unlike Messrs. Cassidy and Brown, Maurice Hindus professes complete indifference toward the more sensational methods of American and European journalism. "I have always felt," he writes, "that a single day in a village or a single meal with young people in a factory would tell me more of the heart and mind of Russia than an interview with any leader, however exalted." The unquestionable merits of this approach are unfortunately largely destroyed by Mr. Hindus's highly emotional attitude and his uncritical endorsement of many official Soviet theories, however fanciful and contrary to easily ascertainable facts. For instance, he recapitulates without a word of warning the familiar legend of the secular struggle between Teutons and Slavs, but he fails to note the numerous instances of cooperation between Russia and the Germanic states, especially Prussia, and, of course, ignores the four partitions of Poland. The two major theses of *Mother Russia* are the revival of Russian nationalism, a development duly noted by every recent writer on the Soviet Union, and the far more questionable contention that the successive Five Year Plans were primarily defensive measures introduced in anticipation of the present war; the plans, it is claimed, are chiefly responsible for Russia's resistance to the invaders. No one will accuse Mr. Hindus of understating his case. His panegyric of Russian patriotism and Russian hatred for Germany and the Ger-

mans is replete with superlatives and hyperbolic statements which, in the opinion of the reviewer, far from achieving their purpose, tend to degrade what might have been a great national epic to the level of a propaganda pamphlet.

The theory that the Five Year Plans and Stalin's doctrine of "socialism in one country" have "saved the nation" is not likely to commend itself to those who have made a factual study of Soviet planning. Although the plans contained provisions for the development of the eastern regions, the fact that they were largely concerned with the industrialization of the western territories at present occupied by the enemy strongly suggests that the invasion and the retreat of the Red Army, unprecedented in Russian annals, were not foreseen by the Kremlin. Ruthless collectivization, according to Mr. Hindus himself, was extremely costly and dealt Russian agriculture, especially animal husbandry, a blow from which it was still recovering in 1941. It would seem therefore that far from "saving" Russia, collectivization was in part responsible for the tragic shortage of foodstuffs of which Mr. Hindus gives so telling a picture.

It is a matter of regret that in his account of Soviet education Mr. Hindus passes in silence the remarkable decree of October 2, 1940, which, in violation of the Soviet Constitution, abolished free instruction in the three senior years of the secondary schools and in all colleges and universities, thus making advanced education the prerogative of the relatively well-to-do groups. It would have been interesting to know how he reconciles this legislation and the recent revision of the status of army offi-

cers with his assertion that "Russia is liberated from any and all manifestations of social superiority, social snobbery, social exclusiveness."

MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY  
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COLE, G. D. H. *Europe, Russia and the Future*. New York, Macmillan, 1943. 233 pp. \$2.00.

CHILDS, JOHN L., COUNTS, GEORGE S., AND OTHERS. *America, Russia and the Communist Party in the Postwar World*. New York, John Day, 1943. 92 pp. \$1.25.

The author of the first of these books, a prolific English writer, began his career some thirty years ago as a propagandist of the so-called Guild Socialism, a movement which had no great success. Today Mr. Cole stands somewhere midway between the British Labor Party and the Communists; and his new book, in a sense, is a program of a postwar reconstruction that would combine revolution with democracy and Soviets with liberty.

According to the author, there are only two possibilities for Europe at the end of this war—Nazism or Socialism. All attempts to get back to capitalism are foredoomed to failure. The only great capitalist power which will remain in the world will be the United States; and because of this, Mr. Cole assumes a most hostile attitude towards American intervention into postwar European affairs. What he is afraid of is "international capitalist feudalism under American leadership." If left alone, Europe will naturally fall into several large "super-national states," with a socialist planned economy in each one of them. He

envisages three such states: an enlarged Soviet Union; a Middle-European State, including Germany and South-Eastern Europe; and finally a West-European State from Italy to Scandinavia, with France in the center. To this last state will also belong Great Britain ("Little Britain" for the author) in case she undergoes a successful socialist transformation.

The entire scheme is offered by the author without any serious arguments in its favor, except for an extensive criticism of the old system of national sovereignty. Greatly exaggerating the defects of the system, the author repeatedly argues the inability of small and medium size states to survive, both from the military and economic point of view ("In a purely economic sense, unification under the Nazis might be better than no unification at all"). This is why he divides Europe into his three zones, not hesitating even to make of defeated Germany a much larger political and economic organism than the Third Reich. He does not explain what makes him feel sure that wars can be prevented in this way. He agrees, however, to have all of Europe united into one state, and he seems to favor in particular the inclusion of Germany and of the whole of Eastern Europe into the Soviet Union (to which he also would add India).

Like all the writers of this trend of thought, the author attacks with violence all moderate socialists and is much more kindly disposed to Russian communists. "Much better be ruled by Stalin than by a pack of half-hearted and half-witted Social Democrats." He demands of Socialists that they drop all their accusations against Communism, as Communism is the only force cap-

able of achieving the revolution and of realizing socialism at the end of the war. As to the internal Soviet régime, Mr. Cole not only approves of its economic system as worthy of imitation, but he even finds in Russia a "democracy" which today "passes its test of activity" in the war against Germany. On the whole the book is a political pamphlet, rather superficial and none too convincing.

The authors of the second book under review, Messrs. Childs and Counts, belong exactly to that moderate socialist trend which arouses the ire of Mr. Cole. They are both members of Columbia University and both play a prominent part in the American Labor Party. Their book resulted from the discussion of the problem by a special Committee on Education and the Post-war World of the American Federation of Teachers. It is written in a terse and condensed form.

The authors do not offer any general scheme of postwar reconstruction and limit themselves to the problem of postwar relations between the United States and Russia. England is virtually neglected, a simplification which somewhat affects the conclusions arrived at. The authors are convinced that Soviet Russia "can scarcely afford to build her future foreign policy on the cornerstone of an assumed early collapse of the capitalist democracies, and on the doctrine of world-wide upheaval following the peculiar pattern of the Russian Revolution." Thus the problem of Russia's relations with America will remain one of relationship between two widely different political and economic systems.

Towards communism in general, as distinguished from the Soviet

government, the authors are definitely hostile. In a separate chapter they subject the American Communist Party to a most merciless criticism. Apparently such is their attitude also to the other communist parties outside of Russia. With regard to the Soviet Union, on the contrary, they endeavor to maintain a loyal attitude, being interested in the first place in the establishment of peaceful collaboration between America and Russia. While by no means trying to justify the ruthless methods of collectivization or the suppression of opposition, they are ready to believe that Soviet Russia has successfully solved the problem of national minorities, that the main aim of the Soviet foreign policy is not the promotion of revolution but the maintenance of peace, and that lately it has tended to loyal cooperation with the democracies and a sincere adherence to the Atlantic Charter.

Starting from this premise, they offer some political suggestions both to this country and the Soviet Union as prerequisites to a lasting peaceful cooperation.

Thus America must definitely give up both isolationism and imperialistic tendencies and continue her cooperation with the United Nations after the war is over. She also must acquiesce in the fact that Russia has her own political system, and she must prove to the Russian people that under no condition will she pursue a policy of encirclement of the Soviet Union or of interference in its internal affairs. The authors go even further: "The United States must recognize that just as she is the leading power in the New World, the Soviet Union is destined for a period to be the leading power in the Old."

On the other hand the authors address certain demands to Russia. First, "she must abandon slavish adherence to a nineteenth-century system of revolutionary dogma." Second, she must reconcile herself to the fact that for an indefinite period of time both the United States and Great Britain will remain capitalistic states. Third, she must abandon her policy of "defensive isolationism" and free herself from her "persecution complex." Fourth, she must renounce the policy of political and cultural imperialism. This means the abandonment of the policy of the Comintern in deeds as well as in words, and complete non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. Finally, Russia must adhere unreservedly to the system of international collective security.

The authors seem to think that such a change in the policy of the Soviet government is possible while all the fundamentals of the Soviet system remain intact, and this is the weakest point in their discussion. To expect the Soviet government to change its ideology and to embrace a new political philosophy strikes one as a utopia, so long as the political and economic system of the Soviet régime remains what it is. Interesting and valuable as this book is, its authors have not succeeded in proving that such a scheme can be realized.

D. J. DALLIN

New York City

DALLIN, DAVID J., *Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy 1939-1942*. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1942. XX, 452 pp. \$3.75.

SCOTT, JOHN, *Duel for Europe: Stalin versus Hitler*. Boston,

Houghton Mifflin Company, 1942. 381 pp. \$3.50.

KEETON, GEORGE W., and RUDOLF SCHLESINGER, *Russia and Her Western Neighbors*. London, Jonathan Cape, 1942. 140 pp. 8s. 6d.

Here are three books which topically are closely related although their approaches differ. The reader of all three will find that the viewpoints of the historian Dallin, the journalist Scott, and the lawyer Keeton supplement each other on many occasions.

Dallin's work is by far the most pretentious of the three. In the introduction, the author strongly stresses his conviction that it is the theory of "third power," i.e., the picture of a Russia eager to remain aloof both from the fascist and the democratic groups of the Great Powers, that provides the clue for an understanding of the Soviet Union's foreign policy in 1939-1942. Consequently, the Soviet policy of expansion to the West during this period is presented as a deliberate choice in favor of territorial acquisitions, made in order to strengthen Russia's defence position, as against the alternative policy of military alliances. The only purpose of Moscow's compromises with Berlin was to extend the period of preparation for the war with Germany which was regarded as inevitable. At the same time the Soviet leaders tenaciously clung to the policy of securing "strategic" frontiers. Seen from this angle even the Russo-Finnish war appears in retrospect as the first chapter of the present Russo-German war: the Soviet Union in 1939-1940 fought Germany in Finland.

Dallin rightly points out that for

the period under review a certain dogmatism in appraising the international situation resulted in serious errors of judgment on the part of Soviet leaders. One of them was that in the coming war the Soviet Union would have to face a coalition of capitalist powers united against the only socialist state in the world. As late as the summer of 1939, Moscow still evaluated the European situation in terms of the Munich agreement, ignoring the profound international repercussions of the German occupation of Prague, and failing to realize that a break between Germany and Great Britain had become inevitable.

All the essential facts on any important aspect of Soviet foreign policy in recent years can be found in Dallin's comprehensive book. By carefully sifting and scrutinizing the bits of official and unofficial information (the latter being much more voluminous than the former), the author has succeeded in presenting a surprisingly clear and basically accurate picture of Soviet foreign policy. Among the unpublished material used by the author let me cite as particularly interesting a manuscript, apparently written by a former Lithuanian government official, dealing with "German-Soviet relations as seen from the Baltic." To sum up, Dallin's book must be regarded as a very remarkable contribution to the recent diplomatic history of Europe, although the author's hope that it might serve "as a guide for the future" seems to be over-optimistic.

John Scott, known as the author of a revealing book on the eastward shift of Russian industrialization, in his second book has written a vivid account of the tense atmosphere in Moscow during the



first two years of the present war. A comparison with Dallin makes clear how vague is our knowledge of certain diplomatic steps of far-reaching importance: Mr. Scott's tale, for instance, concerning the Russian proposal of April, 1939, of an alliance against German aggression, is at variance with Dallin's account of the same episode in the diplomatic game. In addition Scott sheds considerable light on Soviet trade relations in 1939-1941 (the topic of an appendix in Dallin's book), on the Russian oil industry in the same period, and the state of Russian military preparedness on the eve of the German onslaught. An appendix of forty pages reprints judiciously chosen documents from various sources.

Professor Keeton's and Dr. Schlesinger's book is divided into two parts: "The Problems of Russia's Western Border" and "The Danubian and South-Eastern European Countries." The first part follows the line taken by the *London Times* in three editorials of July 15, August 1, 1941, and March 7, 1942, and is decidedly favorable to the Soviet point of view with regard to the question of strategical frontiers. The second part reflects Professor Keeton's special interest (in his capacity of the Director of the New Commonwealth Institute) in the problem of postwar federation in Central and South-Eastern Europe and its possible relationship to Soviet federalism.

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DAVIES, RAYMOND ARTHUR and STEIGER, ANDREW J. *Soviet Asia: Democracy's First Line of Defence*. New York, The Dial Press, 1942. 384 pp. \$3.00.

EDELMAN, MAURICE. *How Russia Prepared: U.S.S.R. beyond the Urals*. New York, Penguin Books, 1943. 127 pp. \$0.25

LENGYEL, EMIL. *Siberia*. New York, Random House, 1943. 416 pp. \$3.75.

The first of these books, written by two journalists (a Canadian and an American) had an instantaneous success and it is already out of print. This success is a testimony to the timeliness of the subject which is properly emphasized by the authors: "Not only is America's future closely bound with that of Soviet Asia, but the Americans have a great deal to learn from Soviet Asia, both historically and in immediate significance. . . Soviet Asia much resembles America in spirit. Its size, its high-pitched activity, its youthful exuberance are typically American."

It is these dynamic aspects of contemporary Siberian life that the authors stress most. They do not overlook its dark sides, however: "We saw a great deal of poverty, much dirt, remnants of illiteracy. . . We were often driven to distraction by red tape and bureaucracy and slovenliness and inefficiency. And yet we were not affected deeply. Somehow, in the enormity of the creation of a new world they seemed small and insignificant." Their description of present day Siberia is based partly on personal observations (they were there in the spring of 1940) and partly on various published materials, including some recent ones (up to the spring of 1942).

Like most foreign writers on the subject, the authors too often neglect Siberia's past development, giving the erroneous impression that the exploitation of its natural resources did not start until after

the Revolution. Contrary to well known facts they find it possible to assert, for instance, that until recently the recovery of the gold in the Lena river valley was by "artisan methods." Among the most valuable chapters of the book are those dealing with the Siberian Arctic region (chapters 7-9). The story of the awakening of the primitive tribes of the region to a new life makes fascinating reading. Equally interesting is their account of the development of the Northern Sea Route. Here the authors do point out that Soviet achievements in the field of Arctic exploration were prepared a long time ago by the works of Admiral Makarov, A. Popov (the Russian inventor of the radio), and the great D. Mendeleev.

Much interesting material of a very timely nature is contained also in the last chapters of the book on "The Soviet Far East — Zone of Perpetual Preparedness" and on "Siberia in World Affairs." The attached bibliography is valuable, though by no means complete, but the usefulness of the index is impaired by the fact that scarcely a page in the book is indexed correctly.

Maurice Edelman, the author of the second book under review, is a British business man who represented his firm in Russia in 1932-1939. He travelled throughout the country, speaks Russian, and has contributed a number of articles on Russian affairs to the *Manchester Guardian*, the *New Statesman and Nation* and the *Evening Standard*. Because of the special opportunity Mr. Edelman had of studying the Soviet economic and industrial systems, whatever he has to say on the subject is factual, instructive, and well worth reading. On the

other hand, whenever he deals with political or ideological questions, his discussion suffers from the lack of a critical approach and he often becomes guilty of factual errors.

According to Mr. Edelman, the Soviet Union from the outset was an innocent victim of capitalistic and imperialistic hostility, as if there never had existed either the original revolutionary messianism of the Soviet leaders, or the subversive work of the Comintern in foreign countries, or the "Trojan horse" tactics during the Popular Front period. Due to this wrong perspective the author tends to interpret practically every move of the Soviet government for the last twenty-five years as preparation for the unavoidable war. Under this head come not only the famous Moscow trials, with regard to which the author simply accepts the official version, but also the Soviet policy towards science, religion, and art; even the law prohibiting abortion. In a similar vein, as a war measure, the author treats the establishment of the autonomous Jewish region of Biro-Bidjan on the Amur; the chapter on this subject is entitled "Jews against Japan." In dealing with the policy of the Soviet government, the author displays a good natured tolerance. Thus, discussing the causes for the terrible famines of 1922 and 1931, he mentions only the droughts and does not say a word either about the food levies of the Military Communism period, or the forcible collectivization of Stalin's new socialist drive. Equally idyllic is the picture he gives of the evolution of the Cheka through the G.P.U. to the present-day N.K.V.D.: "Its (N.K.V.D.) place in Soviet life has become something like a combination of our

own war-time Ministry for Home Security and the road transport department of the Ministry of War Transport."

Finally, one can find in Mr. Edelman's book a number of surprising statements concerning Russia's prerevolutionary past. For instance, he tells his readers that "tea drinking has only become general among the peasantry in the last twenty years," or that the staple diet of the soldiers of the Tsar's army consisted of "a dried herring and a handful of *kasha* (porridge) which they carried in their knapsacks." (!).

More serious is the fact that the author appears to believe that before the Revolution the bulk of the Russian industry was situated in the Baltic states and on the Polish border. Does he really think that the industry of the Lenigrad and Moscow regions, of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk, the Donbass, and the Ural regions was first created by the Bolsheviks?

All these and many other errors of fact and judgment cannot detract from the value of those parts of the book in which the author deals directly with his main theme—Russia's industrial preparation for the war. In all these chapters the author gives a good deal of material which cannot be found elsewhere.

The third author, Mr. Lengyel, first became acquainted with Siberia in the summer of 1916, when he was twenty years old. As a soldier of the Austro-Hungarian army he was taken prisoner by the Russians, remaining there as prisoner of war until November 1917. Subsequently, he revisited Siberia at two different times as a tourist. He supplemented his personal observations by much reading of Siber-

ian history, geography, and ethnography.

Mr. Lengyel has attempted to give something like a Siberian encyclopedia, but as this is a task which obviously cannot be accomplished by one author in a single volume, the chapters of his book are of unequal value. Beginning with a general survey of Siberian lands and people, the author goes on to outline Siberian history, including the story of the construction of the Trans-Siberian railway—perhaps the most interesting and the best chapter in the book. Then comes a chapter on the history of political exiles in Siberia which is rather superficial, being based mostly on George Kennan's well-known book. Chapter 5 deals with the civil war period in Siberia (1918-1922), and here the narrative is marred by rather serious errors. It is followed by a discussion of Soviet achievements in Siberia, which the author tends to exaggerate, and by a short chapter on the Soviet Arctic region. The last two chapters ("Bouriats, Mongols, Jews" and "The Republics of Soviet Central Asia") are too brief and could well be omitted. The main thesis of Mr. Lengyel's book is expressed in the following words: "Siberia is the New World of the Old World. . . Once a mere backyard to the city of St. Petersburg, Siberia became a world force of the utmost importance under the Communist Government. That is also why Siberia became not merely a problem, but also a solution, a potential New World, and the huge stage upon which the final act of the world drama may be enacted." This is a daring and far-reaching hypothesis, and in the book itself one does not find enough evidence to support it. But

the book can well serve a more modest purpose—that of being a guide to a first acquaintance with Siberia.

V. ZENZINOV

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KORNILOV, ALEXANDER. *Modern Russian History*. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, rev.ed., 1943. 594 pp. \$4.50.

Russian historical writing is little more than a century old, yet it is doubtful whether any other land has so rich an historiography. During the nineteenth century with its belated awakening to self-consciousness great interpretive syntheses were produced, and every conceivable philosophical outlook was made to serve a school and furnish illumination, while from time to time the results of the fruitful clash of viewpoints were distilled into some excellent popular volumes. One of these, the "Modern History" of Professor Kornilov, first issued in Russian in 1914 and in English in 1917, has just been reissued.

So much has happened since this work first appeared and so great has been the progress in recent historiography that in many ways this "modern history" seems strangely outmoded. The intervening quarter century has seen wars and revolutions, the rise and fall and purge of the Marxist school of Pokrovsky (like Kornilov, Pokrovsky was a follower of the great master Kluchevsky), and, since 1921, an amazingly vigorous historical school in exile: the late Milukov at eighty-four was still laboring on the vast outlines of his *History of Russian Culture*; Rostovtsev tracing the country's cultural roots into ancient Persia and Greece; Hrushevsky, in exile within his native land,

strengthening the decentralist school by his studies in the history of the Ukraine; the Eurasians pushing the frontiers of historical knowledge back into time and eastward into space for their audacious reinterpretation of the whole sweep of Eurasian history. As I was reading Professor Kornilov's introductory chapter summarizing "the first nine centuries" of Russian history, I was startled by the realization that the recently published volume by George Vernadsky, *Ancient Russia*, actually ends at the point where the first of Kornilov's "first nine centuries" begins!

Yet, despite this dating in essential respects, Professor Kornilov's "Modern History" is a good telling of the story of nineteenth century European Russia. Humaneness, liberalism, respect for freedom, dislike of autocracy and police state, love of peace, desire for the general diffusion of cultural and material goods among the masses — these ideals provide the book's basic approach. Though these viewpoints, like some of the conclusions, may seem in some quarters a little out-of-date, they may be expected to enter again into future syntheses of Russian history as into any intellectually desirable future for the race.

After Kluchevsky, Kornilov regarded as his second master Sergeevich. From the latter he derived his belief that the grouping of history into periods and the attempt to extract from each period its "essential contribution" is what gives history its meaning. However dubious the theory, Kornilov made truly brilliant use of it. The best thing in this book is the sweep of its "period" interpretations, best of all the remarkable condensation of the "first nine centuries" into a single

introductory chapter. As one considers them, suggestive thoughts crowd in from all directions as to the place of Russia in history and the influence of the occupying of that place upon Russia's own internal development.

Russia, be it remembered, is that heartland of which the geopoliticians speak. Sprawling over two continents, including half of Europe though two-thirds of Russia lies in Asia, it is open to invasion in all directions and touches the interests of some great powers and many lesser ones on every edge of its monstrous bulk: British imperial interests on the frontier of India; German and Scandinavian on the Baltic; Austro-German and Italian in the Balkans; Japanese, Chinese, European and American on the Pacific; the fate of Turkey, Persia, Finland, Poland, the central European and Balkan lands; the balance of power in Europe and Asia at once. Thus every disturbance of equilibrium on its far flung borders, every step in its consolidation and expansion, has carried with it war or the threat of war. To leave it out of any reckoning is to leave out the very heart of the two continents that have served as the central powerhouse of world culture, economy and politics.

Kornilov pictures the early centuries of its history as an endless series of tribal invasions. (Vernadsky, pushing back another decade of centuries adds innumerable waves to that endless violent wandering of peoples). At last comes growing stability in the rise of Muscovy and the Muscovite autocracy, an autocracy which we are apt to forget drew its first strength from popular support in the struggle against the Mohammedan Tartar yoke and then the defense

against Roman Catholic Poland, deriving its power from unification, its rationale from perpetual war, its administrative technique from the Turco-Mongol bureaucracy.

As the historian's "periods" succeed each other, the harsh ways of war continue to shape the institutions and spirit of the land. From 1228 to 1462, in place of a Renaissance, 90 internal wars and 160 foreign invasions. From the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, three great wars with Sweden ending with the annexation of Finland and the Baltic States; seven desperate wars with Poland and her allies ending with the Polish partition. This partition, we are reminded, made Russia a guilty partner with Prussia and Austria and was destined to put an end (in the later nineteenth century) to Russia's wise policy of cultural autonomy for her peoples, and to throw her into Prussian and Austrian arms for the suppression of any movement for national self-determination. The Stalin-Hitler pact was but the latest, and it is to be hoped the last, example of the fateful effects of the Polish partition.

And it was perpetual war which decreed that in place of the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and the Rights of Man, Russia under Peter and even Catherine would witness the culmination of bondage for military purposes at the moment when the West was abolishing it. Perpetual war carried with it the continuous exhaustion of national wealth and human material, the distortion of institutions, the degradation of culture. Though, of course, he does not use the term "total war," Kornilov reminds us that Russia was the first to have compulsory armies of millions while other countries counted



them in tens of thousands, that the whole populace was made to bear the swollen burden of service to the state, that state finance was in continuous exhaustion and all projects for education and welfare forever without funds; that even industry was organized and developed only by dictate from above for the purposes of supplying the armies with iron and steel, cannon and munitions, uniforms and supplies, by the adscription of state-owned serfs to state-owned industries by simple *ukaz*. (It still remains for the sociologist to determine how much of Bolshevism and Stalinism is ascribable to the nature of socialist doctrine and how much to this heritage.)

The latter part of Kornilov's work is the roseate product of nineteenth century stability and optimism. He believed that "the task of forming the national territory could at length be considered accomplished" and that therefore Russia, powerful and secure, need no longer be subject to the harsh rule of war. He saw "the problems of national welfare, of material and spiritual well-being, moved to the foreground," and significant beginnings of "the unbinding of classes, the liberation of the people, the relaxing of the state power." But even these too sanguine hopes throw a penetrating light into the gloom of the years that have intervened since the good professor delivered the last of the lectures which make up this book. They are fruitful errors not because they are on the side of the angels, but because they give fresh insight into Russia's history and her place in the uncertain future of Europe and the world.

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SPECTOR, IVAR. *The Golden Age of Russian Literature*. Caldwell, Idaho, The Caxton Press, 1943. 258 pp. \$3.50.

SIMMONS, ERNEST J. *An Outline of Modern Russian Literature, (1880-1940)*. Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1943. 93 pp. \$1.00.

There is a great need today of well-edited, up-to-date anthologies and outlines of Russian belles lettres, both for the college student and the general reader. The late Professor Wiener's two-volume anthology (Putnam, 1902), which covers the whole of Russian literature from its origin to the end of the nineteenth century, is still the best in the field. For some time, however, this book has been out of print. Thus, Dr. Spector's and Professor Simmons' books are welcome additions.

Dr. Spector's *The Golden Age of Russian Literature* is an outgrowth of the author's lectures at the University of Washington. It is a combination of an anthology, a literary history, and a bibliographical guide. It covers a period of a century and a half, from the publication of Fonvizin's *The Minor* in 1782 to Sholokhov's *The Silent Don* in 1940, and contains numerous résumés of novels and plays. Poetry is excluded, though single chapters are devoted to Pushkin and Lermontov respectively. "Only those authors have been chosen," says the author, "whose contributions are of national and universal significance." This being the case, one is surprised not to find such classics as I. Krylov—the greatest of Russian fable writers; M. Saltykov-Shchedrin—a great nineteenth century satirist;

N. S. Leskov—one of the greatest masters of the short story. Conversely, one is equally surprised to find a whole chapter devoted to the sensational and second-rate work of Leonid Andreev.

Dr. Spector is a devotee of the social-political interpretation of Russian literature. Consequently, there is hardly any discussion of the literary, aesthetic values of the works he surveys. A great deal of space has been devoted to Tolstoy's philosophy, and practically nothing is said of Tolstoy's art. The chapter on Dostoevsky is even more one-sided. No idea can be gleaned, for example, of the great novelist's dramatic power and psychological insight. At the same time a futile attempt is made to connect all his novels with the political issues of the time. Surely, few readers of Dostoevsky, Russian or American, will agree with Dr. Spector when he says that the main issue of *Crime and Punishment* is "political" and only secondarily "ethical."

In spite of its shortcomings, Dr. Spector's book, as a reference guide, is no doubt a useful addition.

Professor Ernest Simmons' modest *Outline of Modern Russian Literature, (1880-1940)* ably fills a very serious gap. The book contains chapters on the novels and poetry of the last two decades of the nineteenth century; a chapter on the prose fiction after Chekhov; one on the symbolist and modernist movements, preceding the Revolution; several highly informative and judicial chapters on the Soviet poetry, drama, and recent trends in Soviet literature. The *Outline* is also provided with a selective bibliography of modern Russian literature in English trans-

lations (1880-1940). Well written and organized, this little book can be recommended unreservedly both to the student and general reader.

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ALDANOV, MARK. *The Fifth Seal*. Translated by Nicholas Wreden. New York, Charles Scribner, 1943. 482 pp. \$3.00.

Mark Aldanov is one of the Russian émigré writers who has contributed the most to Russian literature in exile. His early works, such as his study of Lenin, and *St. Helena — Little Island*, which revealed his brilliant gifts, appeared at the time when Russian culture, having suffered at the hands of Bolshevism, was mustering its forces abroad. Aldanov's work proved this culture's unflinching spirit and its will to survive. During the following years, he wrote a series of novels, mostly with a historical background, or dealing with the experience of contemporary Russians caught in the revolutionary storm, and living in exile. Some of his novels, such as *St. Helena, Ninth Thermidor* and *Devil's Bridge*, translated into English, are familiar to the American public. Others, like *The Key*, *The Escape* and *The Cave* were published in Russian only, and first appeared in the outstanding Paris Russian review *Sovremennyya Zapiski*.

*The Fifth Seal*, published in America, in Nicholas Wreden's excellent translation, has been called "Aldanov's most mature novel." It has all the qualities which distinguish this gifted and highly intelligent and refined author. It has been written according to his fav-

orite pattern, a panorama of events and of society, seen through the eyes of *dramatis personae*, whose individual destinies Aldanov describes. We can find the same method in most of his works. But there is indeed in *The Fifth Seal* a maturity and mellowness, a sort of quiet aloofness, which characterizes the true historian.

The heroes of *The Fifth Seal*, such as the self-complacent Soviet Ambassador Kangarov, the Bolshevik non-conformist Wislicenus, the Red Army general Tamarin, sent on a mission to "capitalist Europe," and the French intellectual Vermandois, are all very typical of their age. It is the age which immediately preceded the second World War, when Europe lived in that stifling atmosphere which heralded the approaching catastrophe. It was the age of Stalin's purges, when Soviet diplomats abroad dreaded to return to Moscow, and when French intellectuals flirted with Communist ideology, thinking dangerously, but living snugly. For fanatical revolutionaries, like Wislicenus, it was the age of disillusionment and doubt, far more painful perhaps than the tor-

ment inflicted by prosecutor Vyshinsky during the famous trials.

Though, as Aldanov writes in his preface, his only concern is "artistic truth" and he therefore describes men and events with that calm clearheadedness which is so characteristic of him, he attains in some of his pages a highly dramatic and even a grim effect. Such is, for instance, the scene depicting General Tamarin's death, during the civil war in Spain. But even the less dramatic pages of *The Fifth Seal* are steeped in tragedy, the psychological and spiritual tragedy of a world which has ceased to believe in itself.

In the preface, already quoted above, Aldanov says of the storm which broke over Russia in June, 1941: "It seems almost superfluous to say that this storm has aroused in the exiled writers the same emotion, that it has aroused in the writers who continue to live in Russia." May we hope that in some future novel he will be able to depict a world in which scepticism and self-complacency are no longer reigning supreme?

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# Bibliography

## The Russian Press in the United States

By DAVID SHUB

The Russian press in the United States has a history of more than three-quarters of a century. The first publication in the Russian language, which made its appearance in San Francisco in 1867, lasted for five years before it disappeared because of a dearth of readers. The tide of mass immigration from Russia did not reach these shores until the eighties when Tsarist political oppression, religious persecution, and poverty in the villages brought the first wave of immigrants. Later, revolution and civil war provided additional impetus. It is true that individual political émigrés had begun settling in this country even as early as the eighteenth century, but not until the sixties of the last century did they begin to arrive in larger groups. It was then that scores of intellectuals left Russia to escape oppression and to find free outlet for their aspirations in the New World.

One such political émigré was the priest Agapay Goncharenko, who arrived in the United States in 1864. Goncharenko may be called the founder of the Russian press in America. He had been arrested in Russia in 1860 for contributing to the anti-Tsarist magazine *Kolokol* (The Bell) edited in London by the illustrious Russian publicist Alexander Herzen. Goncharenko escaped from prison; reached Lon-

don, where he established contact with Herzen and his circle; and in 1864 left for America at the insistence of Bakunin in order, in the famous anarchist's words, "to further there the Russian cause." For several years Goncharenko lived in New York City. Following the purchase of Alaska in 1867, the American government offered to subsidize the establishment of a Russian-American newspaper for the population of the territory, for the purpose of "Americanizing these 'citizens by purchase'." Goncharenko accepted the offer and left for San Francisco, where he soon began to publish his Russian-American periodical *Vestnik Alyaski* (Alaska Herald). In this publication Goncharenko acquainted the Russians of Alaska with American laws and custom. At the same time he conducted propaganda against the Tsarist régime, smuggling his periodical through illegal channels into Siberia. This led to a protest on the part of Russia, and the American government soon stopped the subsidy of fifty dollars per issue. Nonetheless, Goncharenko's periodical, later renamed *Svoboda* (Freedom), had succeeded in attracting a number of Russian and American supporters who kept it alive for more than five years. Consisting of eight pages, it appeared twice each

month, with half the text in Russian, the other half in English. Goncharenko, in his own words, was the publisher, printer, and distributor. *Svoboda* discontinued publication in 1873. The next periodical in the Russian language did not appear until sixteen years later.

The anti-Jewish pogroms which swept South Russia soon after the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881, the introduction of new restrictive laws against the Jews, and the general political reaction in Russia which began with the reign of Alexander III, caused the mass emigration of Russian Jews. The overwhelming majority of the Jewish immigrants who reached the United States in the early eighties were inhabitants of the southwestern and northwestern provinces of the Russian Empire, where the Great Russians were only a very small minority. In their old homeland most of these first Russian-Jewish immigrants had been either artisans or small traders and had had little contact with Russian culture. In fact, only a comparative handful could speak Russian fluently. Nevertheless, among these immigrants there were small groups of intellectuals who had been educated in Russian *gymnasiums* and universities. These individuals were thoroughly permeated with Russian culture; and Russian was, or became, their language. The majority had been participants, or at least sympathizers, of the Russian revolutionary movement, and in this country they tried to maintain their ties with one another. These men, who worked in factories and attended night school, established the foundations of the Russian and Jewish socialist labor movement in the United States.

Among the first revolutionary immigrants there were also a number of Great Russians, as well as Ukrainians, whose native tongue was Russian. In the first years they lived on New York's East Side together with their Jewish compatriots and comrades. For many years the Russian language could constantly be heard on the streets of the East Side; so much so that its inhabitants jestingly referred to East Broadway, then the main street of the East Side, as *East Broadveyskaya Ulitsa*.

In 1889, one of these Russian Jewish intellectuals, a socialist named Louis Miller, founded the small Russian weekly newspaper, *Znamya* (The Banner), which appeared in New York for three years. *Znamya* called itself a "labor newspaper." Its philosophy was revolutionary, and it boasted such illustrious contributors as Peter Lavrov, George Plekhanov, Paul Axelrod, and other ideological leaders of the Russian revolutionary movement then living in Western Europe. After *Znamya* went out of existence, another Russian Jew, Dr. George M. Price, founded the *Russkiya Novosti* (Russian News) in 1892. Price was succeeded as editor by Jacob Gordon, who later became a famous Jewish playwright. The newspaper had a circulation of some two thousand. At about the same time, Eli Rosenthal, the chief of the Slavonic department of the Astor library, was publishing *Spravochnyi Listok*, (Information Bulletin), a periodical devoted mainly to familiarizing Russian immigrants with life in the United States. Both publications were discontinued in 1893. In the same year, the noted economist, statistician, and publicist, Dr. I. A. Hourwich, founded in New York



the weekly magazine *Progres* (Progress). The co-editor was W. Zhuk. The publication, which was populist in its sympathy, carried serious political articles concerning both Russian and American problems. Appealing primarily to intellectuals, its standards were on a par with the best journals then appearing inside Russia.

As the Russian-Jewish intelligentsia became Americanized, and the influx of fresh intellectual forces from Russia temporarily ceased, the Russian press in this country went into temporary eclipse. *Progres* passed out of existence in 1894, and until 1908 there was not a single Russian periodical or newspaper in the United States. During this period hundreds of thousands of Russian immigrants settled in the United States. At first they were mainly members of Russian religious sects who were persecuted for heresy against the Greek Orthodox Church. Later Russian peasants began migrating to this country, but they were mainly illiterate or semi-literate White Russians and Ukrainians who in their homeland had never read newspapers and who spoke in Byelo-Russian, Ukrainian, or a curious jargon of the two tongues. To these immigrants the language of Russian literature was to all intents foreign.

Only after the final suppression of the first revolution in 1906-1907 were the ranks of the Russian American immigrants swelled with workers, peasants, and intellectuals from every corner of the Russian Empire. Soon Russian political, professional, and labor societies began to spring up in various parts of the United States. In New York in 1908 the Central Committee of the Union of Russian Social

Democratic Organizations in America founded the weekly *Russko-Amerikanskii Rabochii* (The Russian-American Worker). Among its contributors were Dr. Sergius Ingerman, Dr. D. James, I. A. Rubinow, Morris Hilquit, I. Liadoff, and the former deputies of the second Duma: Ivan Ozol and L. Gerus. Despite its proletarian masthead the language and contents of the periodical were such as to make it inaccessible to the Russian workers in this country.

In less than a year it had to suspend publication. But in the same year—1908—the newspaper *Russkii Golos* (Russian Voice) made its appearance under the editorship of Ivan Okuntsov, a political émigré who had arrived in the United States in 1907. Okuntsov was a teacher with virtually no journalistic experience. From the start his newspaper appealed to the barely literate peasant immigrants of the northwestern and southwestern provinces who became laborers in this country. Okuntsov spoke to them in their own language, adapting his paper to the least educated level of the Russian colony. A man without particular principles or convictions, he tried to ape the American "yellow" press of the period. Although he had little to offer to the more intelligent Russian readers, his paper, as well as the *Russkoe Slovo* (The Russian Word; founded in 1910), which Okuntsov also edited for many years, played a significant rôle both in the history of the Russian press and in the cultural development of the broad mass of Russian immigrants in the United States. By teaching the former White Russian peasants to read a newspaper for the first time, these publications indirectly performed

a broader cultural and educational service. Of the same general character was the newspaper *Velikii Okean* (Pacific Ocean) which appeared three times a week in Los Angeles and San Francisco from 1912 to 1917 under the editorship of M. Shcherbak. Like Okuntsov, Shcherbak was a political émigré with little professional experience in journalism.

The year 1911 marked a significant milestone when the Russian Social Democrats founded the *Novyi Mir* (New World) in New York City. Its first editor was the noted revolutionary Leo Deutch, the author of *Sixteen Years In Siberia*, a book well known in this country at the time. Deutch was "imported" from Paris to edit the party organ. The chief contributors were Dr. Sergius Ingerman, Dr. D. James, H. Burgin, and the leaders of the Russian Mensheviks then in Europe: L. Martov, Theodore Dan, Leon Trotsky, Alexandra Kollontai, Ivan Maisky. (The last three later acquired world fame as Bolsheviks.) Deutch soon left the *Novyi Mir*; and the newspaper continued under the editorship of Dr. Ingerman and Nikolai Nakorakin, who was known in this country as Ivan Elert.

*Novyi Mir* was published by an association which then included both Mensheviks and Bolsheviks. Formally both factions still were members together of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. During the first few years, however, the dominance of Mensheviks in the *Novyi Mir* association found expression in the newspaper's editorial policy.

The most widely read Russian newspaper was still the *Russkoye Slovo*, but the more politically conscious Russian workers and the

radical intelligentsia read the *Novyi Mir*, which was then considered the official organ of the Socialist Party and of the Russian Labor Organizations with their several thousand members.

During World War I the *Novyi Mir* took the "internationalist" line, which accorded with the anti-war position of the American Socialist Party. In opposition to the *Novyi Mir*, Leo Deutsch in 1915 founded the pro-ally monthly *Svobodnoye Slovo* (Free Word).

The periodical suspended publication in 1916 when Deutsch returned to Europe. At the same time, Bolshevik influence increased considerably in the *Novyi Mir*. Bucharin, who came to the United States in 1915, soon became one of the key members of the staff. After the arrival of Trotsky in 1916 (he was then very close to the Bolsheviks although still not a member of their organization), the Mensheviks lost editorial control of the *Novyi Mir*. With Bukharin and Trotsky as the new editors, the paper adopted a clear-cut Bolshevik line. The two men, who were soon to loom so large on the stage of the October Revolution, managed to rally to their cause most of the younger revolutionary elements grouped around the *Novyi Mir*. Almost overnight many of the *Novyi Mir* group in New York were catapulted to high positions in Russia; together with Bukharin and Trotsky they played important rôles both in the Bolshevik seizure of power and in the establishment of the Soviet régime. From the musty offices of an obscure radical newspaper in New York, to Lenin's headquarters in the Smolny Institute, and then to the Kremlin was quite a leap. Yet the *Novyi Mir* produced so many of their political

Cinderellas that Morris Hilquit once remarked: "To be a Soviet Commissar one must first have swept the offices of the *Novyi Mir*." History has since obscured many of their names, and it would be well to recall them here. From the *Novyi Mir* came Volodarsky, a young reporter, who soon after the March Revolution became one of the principal Bolshevik agitators in Petrograd. After the Bolshevik Revolution he was appointed Commissar of the press in Petrograd, which was then the seat of Soviet rule. In that capacity Volodarsky suppressed all the non-Bolshevik newspapers in 1918. The bullet of a terrorist ended his career in the same year.

To G. Chudnovsky, another contributor to the *Novyi Mir*, went the historical rôle of arresting the members of the Kerensky government in the Winter Palace on the night of November 7, 1917. L. Melnichansky, a member of the executive board of the *Novyi Mir*, was for many years one of the leading commissars in command of the Soviet trade unions. Nikolai Yanson, an ardent supporter of the paper, became a member of the praesidium of the all-powerful Central Control Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party; later he was appointed Commissar of Justice of the Russian Soviet Republic. A former advertising agent of the *Novyi Mir* named Model became the commandant of the notorious Fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul, where the arrested Ministers of both the Tsarist and Kerensky governments were incarcerated. S. Zorin of the *Novyi Mir* staff became the chairman of the first Revolutionary Tribunal established by the Bolsheviks in Petrograd. Alexander Menson-Minkin, a for-

mer linotype operator on the paper, became no less than the director of the Moscow State Mint.

The *Novyi Mir* remained in Bolshevik hands even after its general staff left for Russia immediately after the fall of the Tsar. In an effort to combat the Bolshevik influence, the Menshevik Social Democrats headed by Dr. Ingberman, together with a group of Socialist Revolutionaries in New York, founded a large anti-Bolshevik Socialist weekly newspaper, *Narodnaya Gazeta* (The People's Newspaper), early in 1918. For two years this newspaper appeared under the editorship of Dr. Ingberman, B. Sakharov, and David Shub.

Meanwhile changes had taken place in the *Russkoye Slovo*. Its standards improved greatly, especially after energetic young Leo M. Pasvolsky, son of the publisher, became its editor. The paper was now a respected organ of democratic opinion. In 1917 a new daily, *Russkii Golos*, (Russian Voice), appeared on the scene. Founded by a cooperative association of staff writers and printers, it was edited for a number of years by the same Ivan Okuntsov who had pioneered in the field of popular Russian-American journalism. Although the paper was not Communist, its policy was pro-Soviet.

Late in 1921, Anatole Gan, the former publisher of a Siberian newspaper, founded in New York the *Utro* (Morning), a large literary-political daily. The editors were Gan, Professor A. L. Fovitsky, and David Shub as managing editor. Among the regular contributors to *Utro* were practically all the outstanding Russian writers and publicists abroad, including Ivan Bunin, Alexander Kuprin, the poet Balmont, and many others.

*Utro* was in existence for a little more than three months. The very scale on which it was launched made financial survival impossible.

After the departure of Pasvolsky from the *Russkoye Slovo*, the newspaper in 1920 became the *Novoye Russkoye Slovo* (New Russian Word), and changed its policy to a pro-Soviet orientation. This was the era when many Russians in this country thought that the Soviet Union was beginning to evolve toward democracy. When these illusions were dissipated, the *Novoye Russkoye Slovo* returned to its former democratic position.

In 1938 the Communist *Novyi Mir*, which had been steadily declining to the point where it had no more than a thousand readers, was absorbed by the *Russkii Golos*. Since that time, the latter has been the unofficial Russian-language organ of the Communist Party in the United States.

Russian weeklies and dailies also appeared for a number of years in Detroit, Chicago, and San Francisco; but in contrast to the New York publications, they were read locally only, and were for the most part small and unprofessional in character.

In the years preceding the present war, the Russian newspapers in this country were approaching a moribund state. The influx of Russians both from the Soviet Union and from Western Europe had completely ceased. The old immigration was either dying out or becoming Americanized and no longer reading the Russian press. Those among the new generation reared in this country who read Russian newspapers were rare exceptions.

Soon the whole picture was changed. Hitler's advent to power in Germany, the outbreak of the

European war, and the fall of France brought a new wave of Russian émigrés, representing in large part the more cultured and better educated stratum which had lived for years in Germany, France, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and other western European countries. Among them were noted political figures of the democratic Russian parties, as well as outstanding writers, scholars, journalists, and other leading representatives of the pre-Soviet Russian intelligentsia. They injected new life into the Russian colony and the Russian press in the country. They founded a number of new Russian periodicals, which in content and literary quality were not inferior to those which had appeared in Russia before the Revolution, and later in Paris.

At the present time there are five Russian dailies in the United States: three in New York and two in San Francisco. Of these the most widely read is the *Novoye Russkoye Slovo*, which since 1923 has been edited by Mark Weinbaum. It is a non-partisan democratic newspaper, whose staff combines the veteran Russian-American newspapermen, together with many well known journalists who arrived from Europe in the past few years. The *Novoye Russkoye Slovo* is an anti-Communist paper which has always supported the Allies and has backed the Russian cause in this war since the date of German invasion. The newspaper is distributed throughout the United States and Canada. The second from the standpoint of reading public is the *Russkii Golos*. The official editor is D. Krinkin, a former member of the *Novoye Russkoye Slovo* staff. The regular staff includes General Victor A. Yakhontoff and S. Kournakov, a for-

mer Cossak officer of the personal convoy of the White General, Baron Wrangel. The *Russkii Golos* faithfully follows the Communist Party line. The third Russian daily in New York is *Rossiia* (Russia), founded late in 1932 by Nikolai Rybakoff, its present editor. Until Pearl Harbor the paper openly asked Russians in this country to support Japan and Germany on the ground that the Axis was seeking to liberate Russia from the Third International and the "Judeo-Bolsheviks." Since America's entry into the war, *Rossiia* has become fervent in its professions of loyalty to the United States, but it continues to follow its former defeatist line with regard to Soviet Russia. The circulation of *Rossiia* probably does not exceed one thousand; its readers are mainly reactionary elements among the Russian émigrés.

Of the two Russian newspapers in San Francisco the moderate democratic *Russkaya Zhizn* (Russian Life) has the wider reading public. The present editor is Professor G. K. Guins. The other San Francisco paper, *Novaya Zarya* (New Dawn), is edited by G. M. Sukhov. Its principal contributor is Alexander Kazem-Bek, the former leader of the "Young Russians," a group which looks for the evolution of Soviet Russia toward Great Russian nationalism. Both papers are read by the Russian colony of California and neighboring states.

The combined circulation of all the Russian newspapers now published in the United States probably does not reach 75,000.

Since the recent arrival of Russian political émigrés from France, a number of new periodicals have made their appearance. In 1940 the

bi-weekly *Sozialisticheskii Vestnik* (Socialist Messenger) appeared in New York as the organ of the Foreign Delegation of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. The paper was founded in Berlin in 1921 by the late Menshevik leader L. Martov. After Martov's death in 1923, it was edited by Theodore Dan and Rafael Abramovitch. The *Socialist Messenger* is a serious political journal devoted mainly to life in the U.S.S.R. It was read throughout Europe and secretly in Russia as well. For many years the paper had exceptionally well-informed secret correspondents in Moscow, Leningrad, and other cities within the Soviet Union. Many extremely important political changes inside Russia as well as secret struggles behind the scenes in the Russian Communist Party were brought to the attention of the world by the underground correspondents of the *Vestnik*. Thus extracts of Lenin's famous will appeared for the first time in this paper, long before Stalin himself quoted from it in a dramatic speech during his fight against Trotsky.

When Hitler came to power, the *Vestnik* staff moved to Paris, where the journal appeared until the summer of 1940. After the fall of France the editor and the staff of the *Vestnik* came to the United States.

As early as 1939 there had been a schism in the *Vestnik*. The Foreign Delegation, previously dominated by Dan's left wing which advocated a united front with the Communists, now had a right wing majority favoring democratic evolutionary socialism, rejecting all dictatorships and advocating the subordination of all other objectives to the task of winning the



war against Hitlerism. At that time Abramovitch succeeded Dan as chairman of the Delegation and became sole editor of the *Vestnik*. The present staff consists of Dr. Solomon S. Schwartz, Boris I. Nicolaevsky, Y. Denike, Peter Garvy, David Dallin, Vera Alexandrova, and Gregory Aronson.

In opposition to the *Vestnik*, Dan and his close associate, A. Yugow, founded in Paris in 1939 the *Novyi Mir*, which continued to appear until the fall of France. In 1941 they resumed publication in New York with the *Novyi Put* (The New Road). The staff includes Max Werner, the noted writer on military affairs. The *Novyi Put* advocates a united front between Socialists and Communists, with the ultimate fusion of both into a united revolutionary socialist party, whose objective, after Hitler, would be the immediate socialization of all Europe. *Novyi Put* looks to the evolution of the Soviet Union into a "worker's democracy." It unreservedly supports the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and is quite cautious in its criticism of the internal actions of the Soviet government.

The Russian Socialist Revolutionaries began to publish a small monthly periodical *Za Svobodu* (For Freedom) in New York in 1940 under the editorship of three veteran leaders of the party, Nicholas Avksentiev, Vladimir Zenzinov, and Victor Chernov. After Avksentiev's death in 1943 his place was taken by Professor Mark Vishniak. Alexander Kerensky is a contributor to the magazine. *Za Svobodu*, like the *Vestnik*, is the organ of democratic socialism; but whereas the *Vestnik* is Marxist, the Socialist Revolutionaries follow in the tradition of the Russian

*Narodniki* (populists). *Za Svobodu* and the *Vestnik* both favor all-out aid to Russia in the present war and close collaboration in the post-war world as well between Russia and the Western world. Nonetheless, neither renounces the right to criticize the internal policies of the Soviet government, believing that the liquidation of the one party dictatorship and the establishment of democratic government in the Soviet Union is indispensable not only for the interests of the Russian people but for the cause of enduring world peace as well.

In 1942 a new literary magazine, *Novosselye* (New Abode) made its appearance under the editorship of the poetess Sophia Pregel. The magazine publishes short stories, poems, and articles devoted to literature, music, and painting. There are no political articles as such, but the periodical does carry pieces concerning the Russian war whose trend is patriotic but non-Communist. As a whole the magazine is intended for a fairly broad public.

Outstanding among Russian publications in the United States today is the 400-page quarterly, *Novyi Zhurnal* (New Review),

From the time of Pushkin, Russia had a unique type of monthly periodical of 400-500 pages, which was not only a focus of Russian intellectual life, but to a certain extent even substituted for political parties. Virtually every literary school and socio-political trend had its magazine. Almost all of the classics of Russian literature, including most of the works of Dostoevsky and Tolstoy, as well as the works of the outstanding Russian critics and publicists, appeared for the first time in such journals.

Soon after the Bolsheviks came

to power they suppressed all these journals as "organs of counter-revolution." In 1920 a group of Russian intellectuals founded in Paris the *Sovremenyia Zapiski* (Contemporary Annals), which soon developed into one of the finest periodicals in the history of Russian journalism. During the twenty years that this magazine existed, it published the leading works of Ivan Bunin, Alexander Kuprin, Dmitri Merezhkovsky, Alexis Tolstoy, Mark Aldanov, Michael Osorgin, Boris Zaitsev, Ivan Shmelev, and the writings and reminiscences of Russian scholars, philosophers, literary critics, and publicists. Many of these works later appeared as books which were translated into a number of languages and had great success in Europe and the United States. After the fall of France, the *Sovremenyia Zapiski* went out of existence; but two of its editors, Avk-

sentiev and Vishniak, succeeded in reaching this country. With their help and that of a number of former contributors of the *Sovremenyia Zapiski*, Mark Aldanov and Michael Zetlin founded the *Novyi Zhurnal* in 1941. The *Novyi Zhurnal* is to a certain degree a direct successor to the *Sovremenyia Zapiski*. The first four issues appeared under the editorship of Mark Aldanov and Michael Zetlin. The magazine is now edited by Professor Michael Karpovich and Michael Zetlin. The five issues which have thus far appeared have carried new works by Mark Aldanov, Ivan Bunin, Michael Osorgin, Nina Fedorova, Alexandra Tolstoy, Nicholas Kalashnikov, and other novelists; as well as articles by outstanding Russian scholars, artists, and publicists devoted to problems of literature, music, art, history, and Russian and world politics.